Assessment of psychic claimants : an application of schema theory to the evaluation of strong psychic claims by Wiseman, Richard
THE ASSESSMENT OF PSYCHIC CLAIMANTS
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ABSTRACT
This thesis aims to construct, evaluate, and apply a cognitive proto-model which
accounts for the trickery involved in the fabrication ofjust one type of psychic ability,
namely; macro-PK. This cognitive proto-model describes how an observer analyses
a demonstration of ostensible macro-PK. The model accounts for how an observer:
construes such phenomena as either a magic trick or a display of genuine psychic
ability, develops counter-explanations which account for how the phenomena may be
fabricated, enforces measures designed to counter such trickery, and assesses the
outcome of the demonstration. The proto-model is then used to categorise the
stratagems employed by magicians, and pseudo-psychics, to fabricate macro-PK. The
thesis discusses how an observer may be deceived into: misconstruing a magic trick
as genuine macro-PK, developing incorrect counter-explanations, employing
ineffective safeguards against trickery, and incorrectly assessing the outcome of the
demonstration. One small part of the model is then experimentally tested via one pilot
study and two formal experiments, all concerned with the effect that observers' belief
in psi has on the observation, and recall, of pseudo-psychic demonstrations. The
proto-model is then used to produce recommendations for researchers wishing to
investigate individuals claiming macro-PK ability. These recommendations are
designed to help researchers: maximise the development of their counter-explanations,
construct effective counter-deception measures, and accurately assess and report the
outcome of a study. Two case studies are presented to explore the application of this
model and its recommendations. First, they are employed to help assess a present day
psychic claim made by the Society for Research in Rapport and Telekinesis
(SORRAT). This group claimed that 'spirit entities' were able to divine the order of
a sealed deck of ESP cards. The thesis outlines the design, and running, of the
investigation, emphasising the controls that were employed to counter potential subject
cheating. Second, the thesis describes how the recommendations were used to
reassess the 'Feilding Report', a well-respected publication describing in detail an
investigation into Eusapia Palladino (a well known Italian medium operating around
the turn of this century). This reassessment revealed that Palladino may have used
an accomplice during investigation, as the controls described by the investigators
would not have prevented such trickery. Finally, the thesis discusses the implication
of the above work for parapsychology, and the directions which future research in this
area might take.
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Parapsychology has been defined as the study of:
...apparent anomalies of behaviour and experience which exist apart
from currently known explanatory mechanisms which account for
organism-environment and organism-organism information and
influence flow. (Parapsyetiological Association Report 1, n.d., p. 1)
Most parapsychologists draw a distinction between two types of ostensible psychic
ability. The first of these, extra-sensory perception (ESP):
...refers to situations in which, under psi-task conditions1, an organism
behaves as if it has information about the physical environment (as in
'clairvoyance'), another organism's mental processes (as in
'telepathy'), or a future event (as in 'precognition). (Parapsychology
Association Report 1, n.d., p. 1).
The second type of psychic ability, psychokinesis (PK):
...refers to situations in which, under psi-task conditions, an
organism's physical environment changes in a way that appears to be
related to the organism's mental or physiological processes.
(Parapsychology Association Report, n.d., p. 1).
Both ostensible ESP, and PK, have been further classified according to whether
statistics are required for their detection. In some circumstances the use of statistics
may be necessary. For example, an individual might attempt to influence a random
number generator (RNG), such that it's output deviates away from chance (see Rush,
1986a, for a brief overview of these studies). Also, an individual may be asked to
score above chance during a card guessing, or 'ganzfeld', experiment (see Palmer,
1986, for a brief overview of these studies). In contrast, other examples of ostensible
PK, and ESP, do not require statistics for their detection. For example, an individual
might appear to use his/her psychic ability to decrease the weight of a table, such that
it levitates above the ground (for often conflicting accounts of this type of phenomena
'The term 'psi-task conditions', refers to conditions which eliminate all known
channels of communication between organism/environment, or organism/organism.
1
[labelled 'macro-PK'| see Randall, 1982, and Kurtz, 1985). Also, the claimant may
display ostensible ESP that obviously could not be accounted for by chance alone (see,
e.g., Inglis's [1979| description of the phenomena apparently produced by the mental
medium, Mrs Piper). These latter type of ostensible ESP, and PK, have been labelled
'major' paranormal phenomena (Stevenson, 1990).
Many individuals appear to possess major psychic ability. Theoretically, they may
be either genuine, or false. Individuals who demonstrate fake psychic ability could
be separated along a 'self-deception' to 'other deception' continuum. One extreme
of this scale consists of individuals who believe that they possess genuine psychic
ability, and are deceiving themselves. For example, certain individuals may,
unknowingly, applying a great deal of physical pressure to cutlery during 'spoon
bending parties' (Houck, 1984). The opposite end of this scale consists of individuals
who consciously use trickery to fabricate psychic ability. Individuals falling towards
this end of the continuum could be further separated along a second continuum, based
on the claimed validity of their apparent ability. At one extreme of this continuum
would be 'mainstream' magicians (e.g., close-up2 and stage magicians). These
individuals perform in a theatrical setting, do not claim to have genuine psychic
ability, and aim to entertain their audiences. Other individuals fall towards the middle
of the continuum, ambiguously claiming that their abilities are neither genuine, nor
fake. These individuals tend to be either spirit magicians3, bizarrists4 or mentalists5.
2'Close-up' magicians perform within a few feet of spectators, usually using small
objects such as playing cards, and coins.
3These magicians simulate the summoning of spirits, and fabricate phenomena
commonly associated with seances (e.g., table levitations, materialisations etc.). For
a good overview of this type of magic, see Burger (1986).
"These magicians usually simulate rituals traditionally associated with the
invocation of satanic entities, and fabricate a wide range of weird, and bizarre,
phenomena (see Burger, 1991).
5Whaley (1989, p. 441) notes that there is some confusion regarding the definition
of the term 'mentalist'. However, one distinction often employed concerns the way
in which the performers account for the phenomena they exhibit. The spirit magician,
2
Finally, the opposite end of this continuum is occupied by pseudo-psychics. These
individuals unambiguously claim that they possess genuine psychic ability and, as
such, engage in 'psychic fraud' (see, e.g., Morris, 1986a, Hansen, 1990).
This chapter will first discuss the benefits which may be gained through studying the
fabrication of major psychic ability (be it by magicians, mentalists, spirit magicians,
bizarrists or pseudo-psychics). The chapter will then briefly review previous literature
concerned with this topic and finally, outline the aims, and methodology, of this
thesis.
1.2 THE BENEFITS OF STUDYING CONJURING. AND PSYCHIC FRAUD
1.2.1 Introduction
This section will discuss how the study of conjuring, and psychic fraud, is beneficial
to two areas, namely the assessment of psychic claimants, and the construction of a
general theory of deception.
1.2.2 The assessment of psychic claimants
This section will outline why an understanding of psychic fraud is vital to the accurate
assessment of psychic claimants6, both within, and outside of, parapsychology.
1.2.2.1 Assessment within parapsychology
Parapsychologists7 have been, and are, concerned with the assessment of psychic
claimants. This assessment can take place in 'real time' (i.e., whilst a claimant is
demonstrating ostensible psychic ability). For example, psychical researchers
investigated individuals such as D.D. Home, Eusapia Palladino, Marthe Beraud ('Eva
and bizarrist, usually states that the phenomena are caused by either a spirit, or
satanic, 'entity'. In contrast, the mentalist appears to possess psychic ability himself.
6In this thesis, the term 'psychic claimant' will be used to refer to any individual
who claims to possess genuine psychic ability, regardless of the validity of that claim.
7In this thesis, the term 'parapsychologist' will be used to refer to both modern
day parapsychologists, and their historical forefathers, psychical researchers.
3
C'), Mina Crandon ('Margery' the medium) and Rudi Schneider (see, e.g., Inglis
[1979, 1984], for an extensive, if perhaps uncritical, overview of some of this work).
More recently, parapsychologists have assessed subjects such as Ted Serios (see,
Eisenbud, 1989), and Bill Delmore (see, Kanthamani & Kelly, 1974, 1975).
Parapsychologists have also examined such claimants in retrospect (i.e., after such
claimants have attempted to demonstrate their ostensible psychic ability). For
example, Tietze (1973) has described past investigations of 'Margery', Gregory
(1985) has reassessed the case of Rudi Schneider, and Beloff (1991) has urged
researchers to reconsider the mediumship of Eusapia Palladino.
Some researchers believe that this line of inquiry is vital to parapsychology (see, e.g.,
Braude, 1986, Stevenson, 1990). These writers have stressed that such abilities are,
to some individuals, more convincing proof of psi than evidence derived from
experimental parapsychology8. Also, Braude has argued that human abilities are best
studied in extremis, and in the environment in which they naturally occur. Braude
asserts that these criteria are more likely to be fulfilled by the assessment of psychic
claimants, rather than more experimentally-based studies.
However, this line of research has proved problematic. Eisenbud (1983) has
suggested that such work may be hindered by researchers' unconscious fear of major
paranormal phenomena. Also, Stevenson (1990) has also noted that, in the early days
of psychical research, the investigation of single claimants was often more expensive
than running parapsychological experiments. However, it is widely acknowledged
(see, e.g., Rush, 1986b, Hansen, 1990) that actual psychic fraud, and allegations of
such cheating, are two of the main problems facing this line of research. The extent
of these problems should not be underestimated. For example, Brandon (1983) has
recently argued for the widespread occurrence of such cheating among Spiritualist
mediums. In addition, Hansen (1990) has noted that:
"Experimental parapsychology usually consists of studies run on 'undistinguished'
subjects, in well controlled procedures and requiring statistics to evaluate it's outcome
(see Rush, 1986b).
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...every annual convention of the PA [Parapsychological Association]
since 1980 has included papers reporting positive results from subjects
who later admitted to, or were reported as having used, trickery at
some point in their careers, (p. 26).
Failure to counter actual subject cheating, or accusations of cheating, can have serious
negative consequences, both for individual researchers, and for parapsychology as a
whole. Such failings can lead to loss of funding. An example of this occurred after
Randi (1986) instigated his 'Project Alpha' hoax. In this project, Randi sent two
pseudo-psychics to be assessed by the McDonnell Parapsychology Laboratory.
Although the researchers at the laboratory did not make any formal statements, as to
the validity of the claimant's psychic ability, neither did they manage to detect the
trickery employed by the two young men. Randi's revelation of the hoax contributed
to the loss of funding, and eventual closure, of the McDonnell Laboratory. Failure
to discover subject cheating can also result in widespread publicity. For example,
'Project Alpha' was widely reported in the popular press including the Washington
Post, and the New York Times (see Gardner, 1983). Also, controversy, concerning
the possible fraudulent nature of many psychic claimants, has threatened to destroy
the unity of parapsychology. For example, arguments concerning the validity of the
Mina Crandon almost split apart the American Society for Psychical Research (see,
for example, Inglis, 1984, Tietz, 1973). The magnitude of these negative outcomes
are reflected in John Palmer's (1988) recent comment that:
Psychic fraud...has been the single most important factor in damaging
the reputation of parapsychology and retarding its growth, (p. 109).
However, as noted by Randall (1982):
To refuse to investigate a phenomenon because it occurs among people
who may be dishonest is rather like a bacteriologist refusing to work
with the organism Escherichia coli because it normally lives in human
faeces! We must face up to the unpleasant aspects of our task, not
seek to avoid them!
Thus, according to Randall, parapsychologists should not refuse to investigate psychic
claimants, but rather counter the problem of psychic fraud.
Thus, one major benefit to be gained through understanding psychic fraud is the
prevention, or detection, of such trickery. However, such an understanding may have
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additional benefits for researchers wishing to assess psychic claimants. For example,
an understanding of psychic fraud may allow researchers to design studies which both
control against subject cheating, and include conditions that may help elicit genuine
psi. Second, such an understanding may help prevent researchers wasting their own
time, and resources, as well as that of their claimants. For example, a genuine
psychic may approach researchers, wishing to be tested. Both researchers, and
claimants, may invest considerable time, and money, in the design and running, of
pilot studies, and formal experimentation. Let us imagine that the claimant produces
genuine psychic phenomena. If the researchers have not correctly designed, run, and
reported this experiment, their results may be explained away (albeit erroneously) as
being due to subject cheating. If this is the case, their endeavours will have been in
vain. In addition, the psychic may have to face the unpleasant experience of being
labelled a cheat. This, in turn, may dissuade other psychics from becoming involved
in parapsychological testing.
1.2.2.2 Assessment outside parapsychology
Individuals claiming strong psychic ability exist in a diverse range of 'real world'
settings. For example, an individual may claim to be able to psychically cure a
physical illness, or psychological problem, faced by members of the general public.
Second, various law enforcement agencies are approached by individuals, offering
'psychic tips' that they feel might help prevent, or solve, a crime (see Lyons and
Truzzi, 1991). Finally, alleged psychics have also been used within industrial
settings, being asked, for example to use their abilities to divine productive sites for
mineral extraction (see Couttie, 1988). Fraudulent psychics operating in many of
these areas can cause considerable economic, and social, damage. An individual may
devote themselves (financially, and/or emotionally) to an alleged medium. As such,
the revelation that this medium is fraudulent may prove painful. For example, Houdini
(1924) notes that following Margaret Fox's confession of trickery, one woman wrote
to Fox, noting:
Hundreds of thousands have believed through you and you alone.
Hundreds of thousands eagerly ask you whether all of the glorious light
that they fancied you had given them, but was a false flicker of a
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common dipcandle of fraud...The disclosures that you make take from
me all that I have cherished most. There is nothing left for me now
but the hope for the reality of that repose which death promises us' (p.
14).
Also, an individual, or set of individuals, may fabricate psi to exploit members of the
community. This may involve a leader of a religious cult fabricating biblical miracles
to encourage followers to give their possessions to the cult. Youngsters, and other
impressionable people, might be encouraged to join cults, after have been impressed
by the apparent proof of psychic powers offered by those who lead the cult. For
example, the 'Reverend' Jim Jones attracted several hundred followers to his cult in
the US, often maintaining these followers by faking psychic ability, including
miraculous healing, and 'walking on water' (for a more detailed description of these
alleged miracles, see Mills, 1979). Unfortunately, the personal power that Jones
possessed is reflected in the fact that he was able to instigate the mass suicide of
nearly all his followers.
An understanding of psychic fraud may help the general public, law enforcement
agencies, and industry, counter this, often exploitative, form of deception.
1.2.3 The construction of a general theory of deception
Human deception occurs within many areas, including9: military operations (e.g.,
Daniel & Herbig, 1982, Gooch & Perlmutter, 1982), 'confidence games' (e.g.,
Maurer, 1974, Henderson, 1985), patient malingering (e.g., Pankratz, 1981, Rogers,
1984), forgery and plagiarism in art and literature (e.g., Arnau, 1961), white collar
fraud (e.g., Comer, 1977, Clarke, 1989, Price, 1991), pickpocketing (e.g., Joseph,
1940), short changing (e.g., Mayer, 1969), experimenter fraud in science (e.g., Broad
& Wade, 1982), gambling scams (e.g., Ortiz, 1984), some techniques involved in
9These areas, and articles, were derived from a brief search of Psychological
Abstracts and Social Science Citation Index (under the subject headings of 'deception'
and 'fraud'). In addition, past reviews and bibliographies, of the deception literature
were also scanned (e.g. Hyman, 1989, Barton Bower, 1982). Clearly, the areas, and
articles, mentioned are far from comprehensive, and are cited merely to give an
indication of the variety of literature pertaining to human deception.
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advertising and selling (e.g., Leff, 1976), hoaxing (e.g., MacDougall, 1940),
shoplifting (Farrell & Farrara, 1985), 'quack' medicine (e.g., Young, 1967, Maple,
1968), imposture (e.g., Wells, 1986), verbal lying (e.g. Ekman, 1984), and deception
within the intelligence and security services (e.g., Handel, 1982, Pforzheimer, 1985).
Some theorists postulate that it may be possible to discover the underlying principles
of deception, regardless of the setting in which it occurs (see, for example, Jastrow,
1900, Jones, 1980, Whaley, 1984, 1988, Mitchell & Thompson, 1986, Lambert,
1987). This notion has perhaps been most strongly advocated by Whaley (1984), when
he wrote:
I...assert that deception is the same regardless of whatever field it
appears on. It is not a function of technology. All deceptions are
applied psychology - the psychology of misperception - and hence are
connected by more than one or two analogous points. Consequently,
along psychological lines it must be logically possible to develop a
general theory of deception, (p. 270).
Only a handful of theorists (e.g., Whaley, 1984, Jones, 1980, Lambert, 1986) have
offered proto-theories containing such principles. However, as noted by Hyman
(1989) none of these authors has yet managed to :
...demonstrate that a single, coherent framework can meaningfully
account for the psychological issues involved in the various types of
deception, (p. 134).
Yet, on a more optimistic note, Hyman also writes:
Although I have managed to read only a small fraction of the literature,
I have become quite optimistic about the possibility of a coherent
psychology of deception, (p. 151).
Assuming that such a theoretical construct is possible, it is clear its formation may
depend, in part, upon a firm understanding of deception as it occurs within some of
the areas outlined above. A number of writers have suggested that an understanding
of magic may play a disproportionately large part in this process. For example,
Jastrow (1900) notes:
The conjuring tricks, or paradoxes which apparently contradict or rise
superior to ordinary experience, furnish the most various types of
illustration of the psychology of deception, (p. 112).
Whilst, more recently, Barton Bowyer (1982) has noted:
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Unique among all cheaters, the magician proclaims before all those he
is about to deceive that he is going to do so. The audience knows that
he will try and trick them. For the time they are in his presence, they
can give their entire attention to the magician's efforts and try and
detect the method by which he achieves his illusions. No other act of
deception is so concentrated in time or free of extraneous distractions.
Yet the magicians are the most consistently successful of all
deceivers... .we can probably learn more about cheating by examining
magic and magicians than hv studying any other single field that
practises it. [emphasis mine], (p. 229-230).
1-2.4 The strategies, and tactics, of psychic fraud
Whaley (1969) has noted that deception theorists tend to treat the tactics, and
stratagems, of deception as two extremes of a continuum. A tactical explanation of
a deception accounts for how a certain type of trickery was, or can be, performed.
In contrast, a strategic explanation of deception accounts for why (in terms of more
abstract concepts, and principles) such trickery will be, or was, successful.
Individuals interested in the countering of psychic fraud may find it more helpful to
know about the stratagems of psychic fraud, as opposed to it's tactics. This is, in
part, because although there are only a limited number of stratagems involved in the
fabrication of psi, there are an enormous number of tactics used to implement these
stratagems10. Trying to detect these tactics may be problematic. For example, the
literature of magic, and psychic fraud, is not well organised, such that it may be
difficult for an individual to discover all the ways in which an ostensible psychic
phenomena can be fabricated. Second, both magicians, and pseudo-psychics, are
continually inventing new tactics by which to fabricate psi. It would be problematic
to discover the nature of these innovations, especially as some of this information is
not widely disseminated, even within certain sections of the magical, and pseudo-
10This huge range of tactics is reflected in the enormous amount of, often
clandestine, literature which outlines the methods used by magicians, and pseudo-
psychics. For example, the 1991 catalogue of one British company ('Magic Books
by Post') specialising in literature relating to conjuring, lists over 1400 currently
available books, and pamphlets.
9
psychic, communities11.
Also, the stratagems of conjuring, and psychic fraud, are more likely than tactics to
generalise to both other areas of deception, and deception in general. As such,
individuals interested in the construction of a general theory of deception may find it




The previous section outlined the benefits of understanding conjuring, and psychic
fraud, to the assessment of psychic claimants, and the development of schema theory.
To determine if there is a need for additional research in these areas, a literature
search examined these domains for previous material concerning conjuring, and
psychic fraud. This section will detail this search procedure12.
1.3.2 Books ~
LCMARC BOOKS
'LCMARC Books' is a complete bibliographic record of all books that have been
catalogued by the United States Library of Congress from 1968 to date. An on-line
computer search of this database was carried out under the subject headings of;
MAGIC, CONJURING, PSYCHIC FRAUD, PSYCHICAL RESEARCH,
nFor example, conjuring possesses it's own 'underground' movement. As noted
by Whaley (1989), these are:
The informal interpersonal networks of the most avid magicians who
diffuse among themselves the latest effects and methods by word-of-
mouth and private letter, often years before publication of public
performance, (p. 726).
12Two points should be noted. First, this search was restricted to publications
written in English. Second, the symbol '?' symbolises a search 'wild card'. For
example, the expression MAGIC? would search all records which started with the




National Library of Scotland Book Catalogue
A computer search of the National Library of Scotland Book Catalogue, from the
period 1978 to date, was carried out using the following subject headings; MAGIC,
CONJURING, PSEUDO-PSYCHIC, PSYCHICAL RESEARCH,
PARAPSYCHOLOGY.
Edinburgh University Library Book Catalogue
A computer search of the Edinburgh University Library Book Catalogue was carried
out, from the period 1985 to date, under the following subject headings; MAGIC,
CONJURING, PSEUDO-PSYCHIC, PSYCHICAL RESEARCH,
PARAPSYCHOLOGY.
Bibliographic Index
The 'Bibliographic Index' contains a list of bibliographies published separately, or
appearing in parts of books, pamphlets and periodicals since 1937. This was searched
by hand under the subject headings of; MAGIC, CONJURING, PSEUDO-PSYCHIC,
PSYCHICAL RESEARCH, PARAPSYCHOLOGY.
Harry Price Library Catalogue
The Short Title Catalogue of the Harry Price Library describes itself as containing
literature concerning; 'psychical research, spiritualism, magic, psychology,
legerdemain and other methods of deception, charlatanism, witchcraft and technical
works for the scientific investigation of alleged abnormal phenomena from circa 1450
A.D to 1929'. A supplement to this catalogue contains literature purchased between
1929 and 1935. At there time of publication, these catalogues represented possibly
the most complete record of works pertaining to conjuring, and psychic fraud, in the
world. Both publications were searched, by hand, for relevant literature.
Edinburgh Public Library
11
The book catalogue of the Edinburgh Public Library was searched, by hand, under




This database contains abstracts selected from psychological journals, and related
disciplines. The period 1927-1975 have yet to be computerised, and so were searched
by hand, under the following subject headings; CONJURING, MAGIC, PSYCHIC,
PSEUDO-PSYCHIC, PSYCHICAL RESEARCH, PARAPSYCHOLOGY,
DECEPTION, FRAUD. Psychological Abstracts from 1976 to date have been
incorporated into a 'Silverplatter Information System', stored on CD-Rom, and were
searched under the following subject headings; CONJURING, MAGIC, PSYCHIC,
PSEUDO-PSYCHIC, PSYCHICAL RESEARCH, PARAPSYCHOLOGY,
DECEPTION, FRAUD.
Sociological Abstracts
This data-base contains selected abstracts from the sociology literature, and related
disciplines. The period 1974 to date has be incorporated as parts of a 'Silverplatter
Information System', stored on CD-Rom, and was searched under the following
subject headings; CONJURING, MAGIC, PSYCHIC, PSEUDO-PSYCHIC,
PSYCHICAL RESEARCH, PARAPSYCHOLOGY, DECEPTION, FRAUD.
Social Science Citation Index
This database contains citations to articles that have occurred within approximately
4700 journals within the social sciences. An on-line computer search, from 1972 to
date, was undertaken using the following subject headings; MAGIC, CONJUR?,
PSEUDO-PSYCHIC, DECEPTION, FRAUD.
Magazine Index
The 'Magazine Index' consists of a collection of articles from over 500 popular
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magazines, on a variety of topics including; current affairs, performing arts, business,
sports and leisure activities. An on-line computer search of this database was
undertaken, from the periods March 1959 to December 1970 and January 1973 to
November 1988, under the following subject headings; MAGIC?, CONJUR?,
PSYCHOLOGY? and MAGIC?, PSYCHOLOGY? and CONJUR?, PSYCHIC?,
PSYCHOLOGY? and PSYCHIC?, DECEPTION, FRAUD.
British Humanities Index
The British Humanities Index is a guide to articles appearing in British newspapers,
and journals, from 1916 to date. It includes good coverage of the arts, economics,
history, philosophy, politics and society. In addition, it also contains selected non-
specialist articles of popular interest in science and technology. This database was
searched, by hand, under the subject headings of; MAGIC, CONJURING, PSEUDO-
PSYCHIC, PSYCHICAL RESEARCH, PARAPSYCHOLOGY, DECEPTION,
FRAUD.
Parapsychology Abstracts International
The 'Parapsychology Abstracts International' provides summaries of abstracts from
over 100 parapsychology journals, and related disciplines, to date. This was searched
under the following subject headings; SUBJECT FRAUD, PSEUDO-PSI, PSYCHIC
FRAUD, CONJURING, FRAUD and MAGIC.
1.3.4 Dissertations
Dissertation Abstracts International
This database consists of information relating to doctoral dissertations submitted by
nearly 500 institutions, mainly within North America. An on-line computer search,
from 1861 to date, was carried out using the following subject headings; MAGIC?,
CONJUR?, PSEUDO-PSYCHIC.
British Index to Theses
This database contains a comprehensive listing of all dissertations, for higher degrees,
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within British Institutions since 1950. The period 1950 to 1970 was search, by hand,
under the subject headings of; CONJURING, MAGIC, PSYCHIC, PSEUDO-
PSYCHIC, PSYCHICAL RESEARCH, PARAPSYCHOLOGY. The period '1970
to date' has been incorporated as part of 'Silverplatter Information System', stored on
CD-Rom. This was searched under the subject headings of; CONJURING, MAGIC,
PSYCHIC, PSEUDO-PSYCHIC, PSYCHICAL RESEARCH, PARAPSYCHOLOGY.
1.3.5 Additional searches
In addition to the searches outlined above, the following individuals were contacted,
with a request for relevant references; George Hansen (expert on subject fraud within
parapsychology, writer on psychic fraud [see Hansen, 1990]), Professor Ray Hyman
(professor of psychology at the University of Oregon, magician and expert on human
deception [see, e.g., Hyman, 1989]), Dr Bart Whaley (pioneer in the general theory
of deception [see Whaley, 1984, 1988]), Dr Paul Solomon (psychologist at Williams
College, Williamstown, previously written on the psychology of magic [Solomon,
1980]), Colonel Michael Dewar (Deputy Director of the International Institute for
Strategic Studies, writer on military deception [Dewar, 1989]), Dr David Lambert
(cognitive scientist at the Naval Ocean Systems Centre, previous writer on deception
[see Lambert, 1987]), Professor Jones (physicist, and expert in military deception
theory [see Jones, 1980]), Professor Michael Handel (Professor of Strategy at the US
Naval War College, writer on military deception [see Handel, 1982]).
1.3.6 Obtaining references
References were obtained via the Edinburgh University Inter-Library Loans Service,
the National Library of Scotland, the Edinburgh Public Library, the British Library
and the Harry Price Library.
1.4 A BRIEF SUMMARY OF PREVIOUS LITERATURE
1.4.1 Introduction
This section will briefly summarise the literature discovered by the search outlined
above. The section will first describe literature concerning the assessment of psychic
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claimants, and second, work pertaining to the relationship between psychology,
conjuring and psychic fraud.
1.4,2 The assessment of psychic claimants
A large amount of literature has been written concerning psychic fraud, and the
assessment of psychic claimants. This work will be split into three groups.
First, a large amount of work described 'case studies' of the investigation, and
exposure, of pseudo-psychics. This work varies on many dimensions. For example,
some of these exposures occurred around the turn of this century (see, e.g., Baggally,
Johnson, Feilding, Taylor & Lobb, 1906, Mayhew, 1906 and Houdini, 1924), whilst
others have been reported more recently (see, e.g., May & Jahagirdar, 1975, Pamblin
& Collins, 1975, Delanoy, 1987, McBurney & Greenberg, 1980, and Frazier &
Randi, 1981). The descriptions of these exposures also vary in detail, ranging from
little more than a few pages (e.g., Bell, 1935, Baggally, Johnson, Feilding, Taylor
& Lobb, 1906, and Besterman, 1928), to considerable length (e.g., Marks and
Kammann, 1980, Randi, 1987). Finally, some of these exposures have been made
whilst the pseudo-psychic was undergoing laboratory testing (e.g., Besterman, 1928,
Delanoy, 1987, Pamblin & Collins, 1975), whilst others have taken place in 'real
world' settings (e.g., Frazier & Randi, 1981, Randi, 1987).
Second, some literature contains detailed descriptions of the specific methods used
within conjuring, and psychic fraud. Some of this work was written around the turn
of this century, and is mainly concerned with the methods of fake mediumship (see,
e.g., Carrington, 1907, Abbott, 1907, Lewis, 1886, Hodgson, 1892 and Price, 1939,
Chapter 11), whilst other texts have been produced more recently, and contain details
of trickery used by present day pseudo-psychics (see, e.g., Randi, 1982a and Couttie,
1988, Chapter 17).
Third, there exists a small number of articles that explicitly discuss with the
stratagems that underlie conjuring, and psychic fraud. For example, Marks &
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Kammann (1980) briefly discuss some of the stratagems allegedly involved in the
psychic fraud practised by both 'Kreskin', and Uri Geller. In addition, Morris (1978,
1982) outlined nineteen of the major stratagems that can be used to fabricate ESP.
Also, Morris (1986b) advances some pragmatic recommendations for the minimisation
of psychic fraud in laboratory studies. These recommendations include, for example,
guidelines for actively involving magicians in parapsyetiological research, and
reducing the motivation of pseudo-psychics to become involved in parapsychological
experimentation. In addition, Morris (1986a) has presented probably the first
conceptual framework for understanding some of the principles involved in the
fabrication of both ESP, and PK. Hansen (1990) recently reviewed psychic fraud
within parapsychology, describing some of the stratagems used by pseudo-psychics,
and their relevance for methodology within parapsychology. Other authors who have
more briefly discussed the stratagems of psychic fraud include Akers (1984), and
Alvarado (1987).
1.4,3 Psychology, conjuring and psychic fraud
A small amount of literature has discussed the relationship between cognition,
conjuring and psychic fraud13.
Some of this work was produced around the turn of this century (e.g., Dessoir, 1897,
Binet, 1896, Triplett, 1900 and Jastrow, 1900). These writers evoked contemporary
psychological principles to explain the efficacy of conjuring, and psychic fraud. For
example, Dessoir employed the notion of 'association' to explain how spectators can
be deceived into making erroneous inferences whilst watching a conjurer. Also,
Binet employed the then contemporary notions of 'positive/negative' and
'active/passive' illusions to classify conjuring tricks. However, soon after 1900,
psychological interest in the study of conjuring, and psychic fraud, rapidly declined.
Hyman (1989) has speculated that:
.. .it disappeared for the same reasons that attention, imagery, and other
mentalistically orientated topics did. A psychology of deception is, of
13For an extended review of some of this literature, see Hyman (1989).
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necessity a mentalistic psychology.. .The behaviouristic psychology that
dominated American psychology from the early 1900's until the
cognitive revolution in the late 1950's had no room for mentalism of
any kind...(p. 135).
However, from the 1960's onwards, psychology experienced a rise in cognitivism and
with it, a renewed interest in the psychology of conjurers, and pseudo-psychics. For
example, Moskowitz (1973), produced a paper which, although primarily related to
the use of magic within occupational therapy, also contained sections regarding the
psychology of conjuring. Solomon (1980) noted how various types of cognitive bias
(e.g., perceptual readiness, perceptual set, the 'gestalt' laws of perception and
auditory illusions of location) are exploited by the magician. Other relevant research
has also been carried out within social psychology, and social cognition. For
example, Kelley (1980) examined magic tricks in terms of the erroneous attribution
of causality. In addition, Nardi (1984) employed the tools of frame analysis to
explain the efficacy of conjuring. Also, Randal (1982) noted how ideas within
communication theory in general, and persuasion theory in particular, may help
explain the efficacy of conjuring. Finally, other authors who briefly discuss
psychology and conjuring include Gregory (1982) and Derlien (1975).
1.4,4 Section summary
This section has summarised some of the previous literature relating to the study of
conjuring, and psychic fraud. Section 1.2 noted the benefits that an understanding the
stratagems, as opposed to the tactics, of psychic fraud may bring to individuals both
wishing to assess psychic claimants, and construct a general theory of deception.
Unfortunately, most of the previous literature within this area has tended to
concentrate upon the tactics of psychic fraud, taking the form of case studies of
individual pseudo-psychics, or 'cook books' ofmethods for fabricating psi. However,
a small number of theorists have started to outline some of the stratagems of pseudo-
psychic trickery. Most of these writers have tended to concentrate on the fabrication
of ESP, as opposed to PK. Given the importance of forming such an understanding,
further research in this area is clearly needed.
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1.5 THESIS AIMS AND METHODOLOGY
Section 1.4.4 noted that, for the most part, previous researchers have not examined
the stratagems of psychic fraud. Of the little work which has been undertaken in this
area, most of it has concentrated upon the fabrication of ESP, as opposed to PK. For
this reason, the first part of the thesis aims to identify the stratagems used to assess,
and fabricate, PK. This will be achieved via the formation of a cognitive model
which concentrates on the way in which an observer assesses ostensible macro-PK,
and the way in which this process is disrupted by magicians, and pseudo-psychics.
Cognitive modelling postulates:
...explanations of human cognition are expressed as abstract models
based on the conception of the human brain as a physical symbol
system, and the processes which manipulate it. (Aitkenhead & Slack,
1985, p. ix).
This type of modelling is germane to the analysis of conjuring, and psychic fraud, for
two reasons. First, conjuring, and psychic fraud, are clearly complex, and 'real
world', occurrences. Several theorists (e.g., Bartlett, 1932, Brewer & Treyens, 1981,
Neisser, 1976), have noted that cognitive models aim to account for such naturalistic
phenomena. Second, conjuring, and psychic fraud, clearly exploit human bias.
Again, most cognitive models aim to account for the bias, and error, frequently
discovered in various cognitive processing (see, for example, Alba & Hasher, 1983,
Nisbett & Ross, 1980, Hewstone, 1989).
There are a number of ways in which cognition can be modelled (see Rumelhart &
Norman, 1985). However, this thesis will employ by far the most popular type of
modelling, namely 'schema theory'. Thorndyke (1984) has defined a schema as:
...a cluster of knowledge representing a particular generic procedure,
object, percept, event, sequence of events, or social situation, (p. 167),
further noting that:
This cluster provides a skeleton structure for a concept that can be
'instantiated', or filled out, with the detailed properties of the particular
instance being represented, (p. 167).
Thorndyke & Yekovich (1980) noted five concepts which help define the 'schematic'
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approach to mental modelling. First, schemata are a prototypical abstraction of the
concepts they represent. For example, a 'desk' schema may consist of the abstract
properties of a desk (e.g., the number of desk legs, the composition of the desk top,
and the shape of the desk). Second, schemata are hierarchically organised, with
higher level schema being more abstract than lower level schema. For example, an
individual may have an 'office' schema that consists, in part, of the type of furniture
likely to be found in an office (e.g., desks, chairs, and filling cabinets). Each of
these types of furniture would themselves consist more specific schema (e.g., the type
of desk schema outlined directly above). Third, to represent specific instances of
events and objects, these abstract schema can be filled with specific information. For
example, to represent a particular desk, the 'desk' schema may be completed with
certain 'values' (e.g., a particular desk may have four legs, a metal top and be
rectangular in shape). As noted by Rumelhart (1981):
The total set of schemata instantiated at a particular moment in time
constitutes our internal model of the situation we face at that moment
in time. (p. 166).
Fourth, schemata allow an individual to make predictions concerning the type of
information likely to be present in a particular situation. Such predictions usually help
the observer interpret 'incoming' information, as well as completing missing
information with 'default' values. For example, an individual may see three legs of
a desk and assume that the fourth leg is identical to these three, because his 'desk'
schema dictates that most desks have four identical legs. Finally, schemata are
formed through by induction from numerous experiences with various exemplars of
the generic concept. For example, an abstract 'desk' schema may be formed by an
individual perceiving a large range of many different types of desks.
Theorists have proposed schemata that are capable of representing information from
both physical (see, e.g., the 'object' schemata proposed by Palmer, 1975), and social
(see, for example, the five types 'social' schemata identified by Taylor & Crocker,
1981), domains. In addition, theorists have postulated ways in which schemata may
be employed within a variety of cognitive tasks including; perception (see, for e.g.,
Palmer, 1975), comprehension (see, e.g., Bransford & Johnson, 1973), memory (see,
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e.g., Alba & Hasher, 1983) and problem solving (see, e.g., Wason & Johnson-Laird,
1972).
Chapter two will outline the construction of a schematic proto-model that identifies
the main stages involved in assessing ostensible macro-PK. A 'proto-model'
represents the first step towards a fully fledged cognitive model. As noted by Miller,
Polsen & Kintsch (1984) such a model aims to identify the general stages involved in
a procedure, rather than account for those stages within a general theoretical
framework. For example, the above authors note that a proto-model, concerned with
baking a cake, might outline the stages involved in the baking process (e.g., collecting
of ingredients, mixing of ingredients, etc.). However, a more complete cognitive
model of this procedure would attempt to explain each of these stages in terms of a
more general theoretical framework. Thus, a full cognitive model might discuss the
role of short term memory, and perceptual 'pattern matching', in the collecting, and
mixing of the cake ingredients. These authors note that, although the 'proto-model'
is not in itself a full explanation of behaviour, it does represent a necessary initial
step towards the full cognitive modelling of a task. This 'proto-model' will be
constructed from several different types of information. For example, the model will
use literature that has discussed the relationship between psychology, and the
fabrication of macro-PK (see section 1.4.3). In addition, it will also use information
contained within case studies of psychic claimants, and pseudo-psychics (see section
1.4.2).
Chapter three will then describe how this proto-model can be used to classify the
stratagems used by pseudo-psychics, and magicians, to fabricate macro-PK. This
chapter will draw upon literature which has been produced by, and for, pseudo-
psychics, and conjurers14. This material clearly falls into the category of 'folk
psychology' and, some theorists (e.g., Churchland, 1984, Nisbett & Wilson, 1977)
have advocated that such material may often be incomplete, and inaccurate.
14See Appendix A for details of the literature search used to discover, and obtain,
this material.
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However, other theorists advocate that such 'folk psychology' should be taken very
r)
seriously within academic psychologists, in that it can form a useful stating point for
the construction of more formal theories (see, e.g., Heider, 1958, Joynson, 1974,
Flanagan, 1984). This chapter will also draw upon my own intuitions gained through
working as a professional magician,and from informal conversations, and formal
interviews, with fellow practitioners of magic.
Chapter four will then outline the elaboration, and experimental testing, of just one
section of this proto-model (i.e., the effect that an observer's belief in psi has on the
recall of a pseudo-psychic demonstration).
The second part of the thesis concentrates on the way in which the above proto-model
can help assess claims of major psychic ability.
Chapter five outlines recommendations for researchers who wish to assess the validity
of ostensible macro-PK. These recommendations draw upon work presented within
the previous three chapters. Chapter six then applies the recommendations to an
assessment of a claim of major psychic ability, made by the Society for Research into
Rapport and Telekinesis. Chapter seven then applies these recommendations to the
analysis of one of the best known, and well-respected, documents in psychical
research (the 'Feilding Report' produced by Feilding, Baggally and Carrington, 1909).
Finally, chapter eight will briefly outline how future research could build upon the
work presented in this thesis.
1.6 SUMMARY
This chapter first described the type of phenomena which constitute major ESP, and
PK. The chapter next noted that these phenomena were fabricated by a range of
individuals including mainstream magicians, spiritmagicians, bizarrists, mentalists and
pseudo-psychics. The next section of the chapter argued that an understanding of the
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stratagems of conjuring, and psychic fraud, may benefit the assessment of psychic
claimants, and the construction of a general model of deception. A brief review of
previous literature pertaining to this topic revealed the need for additional work in this
area. Finally, the chapter discussed the overall aims of the thesis, as well as the
methods used to achieve these aims.
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CHAPTER 2
A PROTO-MODEL FOR THE ANALYSIS OF OSTENSIBLE MACRO-PK
2.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter will briefly outline a proto-model that describes how one individual
(referred to as the 'observer') analyses a demonstration of ostensible macro-PK,
performed by another individual (referred to as the 'claimant'). The model describes
the analysis of ostensible macro-PK in several situations. For example, the 'observer'
may be a member of a magician's audience, a sitter at a fake seance or a
parapsychologist investigating an alleged psychic. The 'claimant' may be a magician,
a fake medium, or a psychic claimant.
The model will draw upon literature derived from sociology, social cognition,
cognitive psychology, psychical research, parapsychology, conjuring and psychic
fraud.
The model is composed of several sections. The chapter will outline each section in
turn, discussing how the model operates during both active (i.e., as an investigation
is taking place), and retrospective (i.e., after an investigation has occurred), analyses.
2.2 FRAMING A DEMONSTRATION
2,2,1 Introduction
The notion of 'framing' has provided sociologists, and social psychologists, with a
useful tool for examining the way in which individuals experience a wide variety of
social events (see, e.g., Goffman, 1974/1986). However, despite the popularity of
the concept, theorists have found it difficult to explicitly define the term 'frame'.
This point is noted by Goffman (1974/1986) who, at the beginning of his seminal
book on frame analysis, writes:
My treatment of these initial terms [i.e., 'frame' and 'frame analysis']
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is abstract, and I am afraid the formulations provided are crude indeed
by the standards of modern philosophy. The reader must initially
bestow the benefit of mere doubt in order for us both to get to matters
that (I feel) are less dubious, (p. 10).
In addition, the vagueness of the 'frame' concept is reflected by the wording of the
definitions themselves. For example, Goffman notes:
I assume that definitions of situations are built up in accordance with
principles of organisation which govern events-at least social ones-and
our subjective involvement in them; frame is the word I use to refer to
such of these elements as I am able to identify. That is my definition
of frame, (p. 10-11).
Also, more recently, Reber (1985) has defined the term in the following way:
Any social situation can be 'defined' in accordance with basic
principles that will affect and control the ways in which people involve
themselves with and experience that situation. These 'definitions' are
frames, (p. 286).
In this thesis, a frame will be seen as a relatively abstract, high level, schema which
dictates the type of lower level schemata that can be used to make sense of a situation.
As such, frames are used by individuals to help to define, and construe, a situation
in a certain way. For example, an observer may see two individuals engage in lip to
lip contact. The observer may frame this event as two people kissing, and simply
walk by the two individuals concerned. Alternatively, the observer may frame the
event as one individual giving mouth to mouth resuscitation to another, and offer to
help out at the scene of an emergency. As illustrated by this example, certain social
situations can be framed in different ways. Likewise, a demonstration of ostensible
macro-PK may be framed in one of three ways. First, the demonstration could be
perceived as a magic trick, and the claimant as a magician (i.e., an individual who
openly acknowledges fabricating macro-PK). If this is the case, the observer would
believe that any ostensible macro-PK which occurs is the result of trickery. Second,
the demonstration could be framed as a pseudo-psychic hoax, and the claimant as a
pseudo-psychic (i.e., an individual who fabricates macro-PK, but claims such
phenomena to be genuine). Again, if this is the case, the observer would believe that
any ostensible macro-PK which occurs is the result of trickery. Third, the observer
may frame the demonstration as a display of psychic ability, and the claimant as a
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genuine psychic. If this is the case, the observer would believe that any ostensible
macro-PK which occurs is the result of genuine psychic ability, and not trickery. It
should also be noted that the observer may be unwilling to frame a demonstration in
one specific way. For example, an observer may be unable to decide if a
demonstration should be framed as either genuine, or fake.
The following sections will outline the way in which the framing of a demonstration
may be affected by, and affect, the observer's analysis of that demonstration.
2,2,2 Factors which influence the framing process
The main factors involved in the framing process can be split into three categories;
cognitive, motivational and social. On a cognitive level, the degree to which an
observer associates schemata with certain frames, may influence the way in which a
demonstration is framed. Motivational factors act at a more psychodynamic level.
These factors operate on an observer's wants, and needs, to influence the way in
which that demonstration is framed. Social factors consist of the interpersonal
pressures bearing on the observer. Such pressures may also influence an observer the
framing of a demonstration. Each of these factors will be discussed in turn.
2.2.2.1 Cognitive factors which influence the framing process
The following sections will discuss how the framing of a demonstration may be
influenced by the observer's internal cognitive representations of the claimant, and
claim (referred to, respectively, as 'claimant schemata' and 'claim schemata').
2.2.2.1.1 Claimant schemata
This section describes some aspects of the observer's claimant schemata, and outlines
how such schemata may influence the framing of a demonstration.
First, these schemata may contain information concerning the capability, and
resources, needed to engage in a certain type of trickery, as well as a claimant's
capability, and resources, to carry out such fraud. For example, Hasted (1981) has
25
discussed the strength required within a claimant's hands, if he/she is to use physical
force to fabricate certain types of PK metal bending. To figure out if a claimant was
capable of such fraud, a parapsychologist may wish to evaluate the strength possessed
within that claimant's hands. Alternatively, the claimant may need to possess a
certain degree of physical dexterity, or agility. For example, Kurtz (1985) has noted
how Eusapia Palladino would have required considerable athletic skills to fake certain
of her seance phenomena (e.g., being able to manipulate various objects, placed inside
her 'spirit cabinet', with her feet). The observer may also wish to assess the
claimant's knowledge of conjuring and psychic fraud. Relevant information may
include a claimant's membership to conjuring or pseudo-psychic organisations (such
as The International Brotherhood of Magicians, The Magic Circle, or the Psychic
Entertainers Association), and acquaintance with conjurors or pseudo-psychics.
Finally, the observer may assess if the resources, needed to carry out certain types of
trickery (such as financial backing and personal contacts), are, or were, available to
a claimant. The resulting schemata can influence the framing process. For example,
a psychic claimant who is capable of engaging in trickery is more likely to be seen
as pseudo-psychic, as compared to a claimant who does not appear to possess such
capability.
Second, an observer may develop schemata relating to a claimant's motivation for
engaging in a demonstration of ostensible macro-PK. A claimant may be motivated
by a range of possible goals, such as the need to further science, to help individuals
suffering from illness, or to entertain. An observer may view some types of
motivation as associated with certain frames. For example, a claimant only motivated
by fame, or financial reward, may be seen as a pseudo-psychic, or magician. In
contrast, claimants who stand to gain little financial reward from a demonstration may
be more likely to be seen as genuine psychics. Thus Inglis (1984), when discussing
the possibility of fraud within the Goligher family, notes:
What would be the purpose? These were private seances. They could
bring neither fame nor financial reward to the Golighers. (p. 78).
Also, Randi (1982a) has noted that some individuals were reluctant to accuse the two
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girls involved in the fraudulent production of the Cottingley fairies as tricksters, partly
because the girls had no apparent motive to deceive.
Third, an observer's schemata may relate to a claimant's willingness to engage in
fraud. Relevant information may concern aspects of the claimant's personality. For
example, the observer may decide that the claimant is honest or dishonest, sincere or
insincere, likable or unpleasant. A psychic claimant, who is perceived as honest,
might be framed as a genuine psychic. In contrast, a psychic claimant who appears
dishonest may be seen as a pseudo-psychic. For example, W.J. Crawford, when
investigating the apparent physical phenomena produced by the Goligher family, notes
that the family were:
...eminently upright, honourable and likable people of the best type -
quite incapable of practising a mean and objectless trickery. (Cited in
Inglis, 1985, p. 78).
In addition, Hanlon (1974), in discussing Uri Geller, has noted:
The whole phenomena is dominated by Geller's own personality. He
exudes sincerity and a childlike innocence and desire to please which
makes people really want to like and believe in him. (p. 171).
Whilst, Harris (1985) also notes:
I met Uri Geller backstage after one of the shows on his first
Australian tour. He was an all-encompassing character. Smooth and
charming, the ladies were falling all over him. He was the sort of
person who gave you the impression that he wouldn't deceive you for
the world (p. 13).
When attempting to assess a claimant's willingness to engage in fraud, the observer
may also be influenced by the social standing, and profession, of the claimant. For
example, Carrington (1907) in discussing the preacher, and physical medium, Stanton
A
Moses, noted:
Certainly Mr Moses did not produce the phenomena in the usual
fraudulent manner - his social position, both public and private, forbids
our considering such a thing for a moment (p. 14-15).
Finally, some observers may also take into account the claimant's age. For example,
Professor John Hasted has noted that:
To me children are more genuine than adults, and with adults there
may be a chance that the chap is hoaxing you or defrauding you, as
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seems to happen sometimes (Cited in Couttie, 1988, p. 59).
In an active analysis, an observer may complete the above schemata from written
material. For example, a claimant may be featured in newspaper articles, magazine
articles, academic papers and books, and 'publicity' material. In addition,
information may be gleaned through media coverage of the claimant, or through
individuals who have had personal contact with the claimant. Also, the observer may
personally meet the claimant. For example, Couttie (1988) describes his first meeting
with Uri Geller, noting:
...[Geller] looked older than he should have done. At thirty nine,
there were white flecks in his hair, now cut short, military style. He
seemed almost painfully thin - he is a vegetarian - but with a wiry
muscularity...I liked him immediately. He has a boyish vulnerability
and charm...He came in barefoot, wearing shorts and a sports shirt, (p.
7-8).
When attempting a retrospective analysis, the observer may have to reconstruct
relevant information from written material, photographs, film footage, and from
individuals who were in personal contact with the claimant. For example, Tietze
(1973) commenting, retrospectively, on Mina Crandon's personality, writes:
Humour has been called the essence of her personality. Friends who
remember her today agree that she was an utterly charming woman.
It is the only element on which both friends and critics agree, (p. 7).
2.2.2.1.2 Claim schemata
This section will describe some aspects of the observer's claim schemata, outlining
how such schemata may influence the framing of a demonstration.
First, the observer's claim schemata may contain information relating to the system
that the claimant intends to influence, or has influenced (referred to as the 'target').
This target may be a physical object, such as a piece of cutlery, or musical
instruments that have been placed in the seance room. Alternatively, the target may
be a biological system. For example, a faith healer might claim to be able to
psychically remove diseased tissue from a patient. The target may influence the way
in which an observer frames a demonstration. For example, some claimants work
with objects that are associated, by some, with demonstrations of apparently genuine
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psychic ability (e.g., cutlery, watches, Ouija boards). In contrast, other claimants
may work with targets that are traditionally associated more with a magic show (e.g.,
highly decorated boxes, rabbits, doves).
Second, the observer's claim schemata may contain information relating to the time
and place in which the demonstration occurs, as well as the individuals, and objects,
contained within this area. This will be referred to as the 'target system'. Spatially,
the target system could be defined in several ways. For example, the walls of the
seance room might act to define the area inside that room as the target system. An
area can also be defined by observational boundaries. For example, Delanoy (1987)
notes that, in a study testing the 'fire raising' ability of one subject, the target (i.e.,
'some crumpled-up newspaper topped by some balls of cotton-wool placed on a metal
tray') were placed within a 'target area', which was defined by the area within a video
camera's field of vision. The target system will also be defined by temporal
parameters. Such parameters may include the year in which the demonstration is
taking place, or has taken place. It may also include more specific information
concerning the year, month, date and time of a demonstration. When defining the
temporal aspects of a demonstration an observer must employ some form of 'start',
and 'stop', points. These points may be demarcated in several ways. For example,
when watching a stage magician, the observer may believe that the demonstration
(i.e., the magician's act) commences as the curtains open, and ends when they close.
When testing an alleged psychic, the investigator may announce when a test session
begins, and when it ends. The investigator may then regard any events outside this
time frame as being irrelevant to the test session. The 'contents' of the target system
consist of the individuals, and objects, located within that system. For example, at
the start of a seance, the observer may note all the sitters, and furniture, present in
the seance room. When framing a demonstration, the observer may associate certain
target systems with trickery (e.g., the theatrical setting of the magician), whilst
associating others with apparently genuine macro-PK (e.g., a seance room).
The observer's claim schemata may also contain information relating to the apparent
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macro-PK that the claimant intends to demonstrate, or has demonstrated. Both
parapsychologists (e.g., Price, 1939, Rush, 1986a), and magicians (e.g., Fitzkee,
1944, Warlock, 1956) have attempted to classify the range ofmacro-PK abilities that
could, theoretically, be possessed by a claimant. Although there is some disagreement
among these writers, the following six categories appear in much of this literature,
and appear to possess some heuristic value. First, 'appearances' consist of the
production of a target within the target system. For example, magicians apparently
produce small objects (e.g., coins and playing cards) from their empty hands. On a
larger scale, some mediums claim to have produced full figure materializations (e.g.,
Florence Cook). Such appearances may occur suddenly (see, e.g., the 'Appearing
Cane'15), or gradually (see, e.g., 'Pepper's Ghost' illusion16). The second category,
'vanishes', entails the claimant apparently making a target disappear from the target
system. For example, a magician may apparently place a coin in his/her closed hand,
whereupon it vanishes. Again, such objects may apparently disappear suddenly (see,
e.g., the 'Strike Vanish'17), or gradually (see, e.g., 'Pepper's Ghost' illusion
described above). As such, this category is the opposite of 'appearances'. The third
category, 'transportations' is essentially a combination of the first two categories,
involving the disappearance of a target from one location within the target system, and
its subsequent reappearance at a second location, outwith or within the target system.
For example, the 'Cups and Balls' trick involves a magician apparently placing a ball
under one cup, only to have it suddenly reappear under a different cup. This category
has often been labelled 'teleportations' by parapsychologists. The fourth category is
that of 'penetrations'. This occurs when a target appears to penetrate some form of
15An 'Appearing Cane' consists of a coiled steel spring, tempered such that, when
released, it springs into the shape of a full walking cane (see Page, 1976, p. 250).
16'Pepper's Ghost' is a stage illusion which secretly utilises a large sheet of glass
onto which the figure of an individual is projected. The strength of projection can be
varied to give the impression that the individual is gradually appearing, or
disappearing (see Sharpe, 1985, p. 143-146).
17The 'Strike Vanish' consists of an instant vanish of a small object held in the
magician's hand (see Williamson, 1981).
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barrier, without either the target or barrier being damaged. The barrier itself may be
a physical object (see, e.g., the 'Chinese Linking Rings'18), or a biological system
(when, e.g., the magician appears to saw another individual in half). A fifth category
is that of 'modifications'. This occurs when the target undergoes some apparent
transformation in type, property, form, size, or colour. The target involved may be
a physical object (e.g., a magician may transform low denomination currency into that
of high denomination), or a biological system (e.g., the famous medium, D.D. Home,
was reportedly able to modify himself, such that he was able to pick up hot coals in
his bare hands, without harm). Finally, the sixth category consists of the apparent
application of force. This category includes several diverse phenomena, such as the
apparent levitation of a target, the adherence of one target to an object, and the
animation of a target. The vast range of 'telekinitic' effects apparently displayed by
many mediums would fall into this category, as would the stage levitations often
performed by magicians. The ostensible macro-PK displayed by a claimant may
influence the way in which an observer frames a demonstration. For example, an
observer who is extremely sceptical of the paranormal may frame any ostensible
macro-PK as either a magic trick, or a pseudo-psychic hoax. Alternatively, an
observer may believe that some individuals may possess certain types of macro-PK
ability (e.g., the ability to move objects), but not others (e.g., the ability to
materialise objects). If this were the case, a claimant stating that he/she can perform
telekinesis might be seen as a genuine psychic, whilst a claimant stating that he/she
can produce a full figure materialisation might be perceived as a pseudo-psychic.
Finally, the observer's claim schemata may also contain information relating to the
conditions apparently required to elicit ostensible macro-PK. Such information could
relate to the necessity for certain physical conditions. For example, mediumistic lore
may demand that any white light in the seance room could be physically damaging,
if not fatal, to the medium. Other schema may relate to the necessity for the observer
to be in a certain psychological condition. For example, a psychic claimant may infer
18A classic effect within conjuring, involving the magician appearing to
inexplicably link, and unlink, a number of solid metal rings.
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that it is more difficult to produce macro-PK in front of observers who are sceptical
of psi. Other claimants may require certain observational conditions. For example,
Taylor (1980) once noted that many children cannot demonstrate their apparent macro-
PK under direct observation, labelling this phenomena the 'shyness effect'19.
Finally, some claimants may wish to engage in some form of ritualised behaviour.
For example, the magician may wave a magic wand to bring about the appearance of
a rabbit in a hat. Other claimants may feel the need to engage in some form of
ceremony, verbal incantations etc. The framing of a demonstration may depend, in
part, on how the above conditions compare with the conditions believed by the
observer to elicit genuine macro-PK. For example, an observer may be suspicious
of a claimant who states that psychic phenomena are only forthcoming under bad
lighting conditions, knowing that such conditions often give rise to trickery.
An observer about to undertake an active analysis, might form the above schemata in
several ways. For example, the observer may research a claimant's past
performances, assuming that the phenomena produced at a forthcoming demonstration
will be similar to phenomena produced in the past. Alternatively, the claimant may
state which phenomena will occur at a demonstration, or the observer may request that
certain phenomena are produced. An observer, attempting a retrospective analysis,
may have to reconstruct the above information from eyewitness testimony, fdm,
videotape, photographs, and written reports. The resulting schemata may contain
information that ranges in both quantity, and quality. For example, before starting
a trick, a magician may not state the nature of the target, or apparent psychic
influence. Also, when reconstructing a past claim, the observer may discover that
eyewitnesses are unable to remember certain details of a past demonstration. In both
cases the observer's schemata will be impoverished. In other situations (e.g., at the
start of a formal experimental test of a well known psychic, or when a past
demonstration has been recorded in great detail) these schemata may be both
qualitatively, and quantitatively, rich in data.
19It should be noted that John Taylor later renounced his belief in this phenomena
(see Kurtz, 1985).
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2.2.2.2 Motivational factors involved in the framing of a demonstration
An observer may be motivated to frame a demonstration in a certain way. The needs,
and wants, which fuel such motivation, may vary enormously between observers. For
example, an observer may have a strong need to witness phenomena which 'prove'
the validity of a certain religious belief system. Thus, if a claimant appears to
provide such proof (perhaps through performing apparently paranormal feats predicted
by that religion) the observer may be motivated to frame that claimant as genuine.
For example, physical mediums, operating around the turn of the century, maintained
that the phenomena produced in the seance room constituted proof of spirit entities.
L
As such, an observer wishing to believe in the tenants of the Spiritualist Church may
have been motivated to frame such a claimant as genuine.
Other claimants may say they are able to employ their abilities to solve an observer's
emotional, or physical, problems. For example, a faith healer may claim to be able
to cure a patient's physical illness. Alternatively, a medium may apparently place an
observer in contact with recently deceased friends and relatives. In both examples,
the observer may be motivated to believe the claimant genuine, especially when that
claimant is represents a last resort for the observer.
Other observers may realise that, if a claimant's ability is valid, it would have
significance for our scientific understanding of the world. For example, some
claimants may assert that their abilities are derived from, and therefore proof of,
extraterrestrial beings. Uri Geller (1977) has noted how his powers only emerged
when, as a small child, he had a strange encounter with a UFO. Other observers have
noted that the validity of psychic ability may support certain scientific theories. For
example, Professor Zollner felt that the physical medium, Henry Slade, provided
evidence of 'a space with four dimensions' (see Randall, 1982). An observer, wanting
such a theory to be true, may be motivated to frame a claimant as genuine (and vice
versa).
Finally, an observer may be motivated to believe the validity of a claimant for reasons
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of increased self-esteem. For example, the claimant may say he/she is able to teach
an observer to be psychic, or that the observer is already psychic, and that the
claimant can elicit these powers. An observer, with a need to believe in the validity
of his/her own psychic powers, or frame himself/herself as being psychic, may be
motivated to frame the claimant as genuine. Harris (1985) notes that Uri Geller uses
this strategy, writing:
Geller's presentation was such that he allowed or forced the spectators
to participate in the experiment....He gave the impression that the
experiment would not be successful without the audience mentally
willing it to be so...if the experiment was a success, the audience, as
participants would not only credit Geller, but would also credit
themselves. Thus, an element of ego involvement is introduced. This
provides psychological incentive for belief, (p. 8-9).
2.2.2.3 Social factors involved in the framing of a demonstration
An observer's framing of a demonstration may also be influenced by interpersonal
pressure. Such pressure may be imposed by the claimant. For example, a claimant
may firmly state that his/her demonstrations are the result of genuine psychic ability.
The observer may feel a social pressure not to appear to disbelieve the claimant.
Alternatively, the pressure may be bought about by other individuals. For example,
at a seance, the observer may be surrounded by individuals (e.g., researchers and
other sitters) who strongly believe in the validity of the phenomena being produced.
Such individuals may pressure the observer into framing the demonstration as genuine
(and vice versa).
2.2,3 Factors influenced by the framing process
The framing of a demonstration may influence the way in which the observer assesses
that demonstration. For example, an observer may believe that a demonstration will
definitely contain some form of trickery (i.e., it is a magic trick, or a pseudo-psychic
hoax). If this is the case, the observer may be more likely to attempt to detect,
and/or counter, such deception. This point has been noted by several writers. For
example, Carrington (1907) wrote:
It must be remembered that the observer, at a spiritualistic seance, is
not in a normal state of mind, but is in a condition of more or less
suppressed excitement, induced by the conditions of the seance
34
itself...Needless to say, therefore, this attitude of mind makes it easy
for the medium to entrap his sitters...To just that extent the medium
has an advantage over the conjuror, since, in the latter case, the
spectators already know that the effects they see are merely the result
of fraud, and come prepared to detect the trick, (p. 58),
whilst Dingwall (1921) has also noted:
...the frame of mind in which a person goes to see magic and to a
medium cannot be compared. In one case he goes either purely for
amusement or possibly with the idea of discovering 'how it was done',
whilst in the other he usually goes with the thought that it is possible
that he will come into direct contact with the other world (p. 211).
The framing of a demonstration may also influence the way in which an observer
attributes meaning to any inexplicable macro-PK produced during that demonstration.
For example, the observer may have framed the demonstration as magic show, or a
pseudo-psychic hoax. If this is the case, that observer may decide that inexplicable
phenomena are the result of some form of trickery. Alternatively, the observer may
have framed a demonstration as a genuine psychic demonstration. If this is the case,
the observer may decide that any inexplicable phenomena are genuine macro-PK.
Finally, if the observer is unsure how to frame a demonstration, he/she may be
equally uncertain whether any inexplicable phenomena are genuine, or fake.
2.3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF COUNTER-EXPLANATIONS
2,3,1 Introduction
This section outlines how an observer develops hypotheses that account for the way
in which a demonstration may be, or may have been, fabricated. These hypotheses
will be referred to as 'counter-explanations'. This step of the assessment procedure
has been remarked upon by various writers. For example, Beloff (1985) has stated:
Whenever one is confronted with a claim, from whatever source, that
has certain paranormal implications, one should ask oneself what
normal explanation there could be that would obviate the necessity of
invoking anything of a paranormal nature, (p.361).
Whilst Inglis (1979) has noted that 'Donkin's Law'20:
20This 'law' is based upon the comments made by Horatio Donkin during the trial
of the slate writing medium, Henry Slade.
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...demands that every known mode of explanation of the facts should
be exhorted before the possibility of an unknown mode is considered,
(p. 373).
In an active analysis the observer may develop counter-explanations at a number of
points in time. For example, the observer may form some hypotheses before the start
of a demonstration. This may be the case when the observer has prior information
concerning the nature of the forthcoming demonstration. Alternatively, the observer
may not be able to anticipate the nature of the demonstration, and so have to develop
counter-explanations during the demonstration. In a retrospective analysis the
observer is forced to develop counter-explanations after a demonstration has occurred.
Counter-explanations can vary in both number, and specificity.
The number of counter-explanations may range on a continuum. For example, a
rO
claimant may state he/she will cause a table, levitate into the air. If this were the case,
some observers may only develop one counter-explanation, perhaps believing that the
claimant may use very thin thread to fabricate the levitation. Alternatively, other
observers may form many counter-explanations believing, for example, that the
claimant may use thread, hooks, or verbal suggestion to fabricate the levitation.
The specificity of each counter-explanation also ranges on a continuum. For example,
a magician may announce that he/she is about to cut a rope into two pieces, and then
magically restore the rope. If this is the case, an observer may expect the magician
to engage in some form of suspicious behaviour, at some point, during the magic
trick. Such an observer will have formed only a very general counter-explanation
(e.g., that the actions of the magician will be important). The opposite end of this
continuum will consist of counter-explanations that are far more detailed. In the case
above, an observer may, for example, expect that the magician to switch the cut rope
for a duplicate (uncut) piece of rope. Such an observer may suspect that the magician
will perform the switch at a certain time (e.g., when the rope is placed into a bag),
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and in a certain way (e.g., by using a bag with a secret partition, in which the
duplicate rope was initially concealed).
The number, and specificity, of the counter-explanations depends, in part, upon the
observer's claim schemata (outlined in section 2.2.2.1.2), causal schemata (i.e.,
schemata relating to the methods used to fabricate macro-PK) and perceived adequacy
of prior counter-explanations. Each of these factors will be discussed in turn.
2.3.2 Claim schemata
The number, and specificity, of counter-explanations will depend, in part, upon the
information contained within the observer's claim schemata. If this information is
quantitatively, and qualitatively, rich, the observer should be better able to form a
larger number of more specific counter-explanations. If however, such information
is impoverished, the development of counter-explanations may be hindered. This
section will discuss how an observer's claim schemata may influence the development
of counter-explanations during an active, and a retrospective, analysis.
2.3.2.1 Active analysis
The amount of information contained within an observer's claim schemata may vary.
On some occasions the observer's schemata may be relatively impoverished. For
example, the observer may only be aware that the claimant will attempt to
demonstrate some form of macro-PK, on some type of target, at some point in time.
This may be the case, for example, when a claimant states that his/her macro-PK
ability is not at all predictable, and thus he/she is unsure exactly when, and what, will
occur. As such, the observer's claim schemata will not contain a great deal of
detailed information, and the observer may be unable to develop appropriate counter-
explanations before a demonstration. Instead, the observer may have to wait until the
demonstration is in progress, or has finished. Alternatively, the observer's schemata
may contain a relatively large amount of information. For example, an alleged
psychic may be able to predict the exact nature of a forthcoming demonstration, or
repeatedly perform the same type of ostensible macro-PK. If this is the case, the
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observer may have more enriched claim schemata and thus be able, before a
demonstration commences, to form a larger number of more specific counter-
explanations.
2.3.2.2 Retrospective analysis
When carrying out a retrospective analysis, the observer has to reconstruct a claim
from past evidence. Such evidence may vary in quantity. For example, the observer
may base a reconstruction on primary sources of information (i.e., information
obtained first hand). Such information may include, for example, the observer's own
recollections of a demonstration, testimony obtained directly from other eyewitnesses,
and original photographic or film material. The observer may also use secondary
sources of information (i.e., information obtained second hand). Such information
may include, for example, descriptions of eyewitness testimony conveyed to the
observer by other individuals, and photographic material that has already been edited
before being shown to the observer.
Depending upon the nature of such material, the information within an observer's
claim schemata may vary in both the quantity, and quality. If such schemata do not
contain the information needed to reconstruct a claim, the observer may conclude that
the claim cannot be analyzed further. This might be the case when important
information is absent, ambiguous or unreliable. For example, Carrington (1907) has
noted how:
In reading through descriptions of slate writing seances, we very
seldom find the statement made as to who placed the slates on the
table, or under the table etc., generally the account reading 'the slates
were then placed on the table,' without any qualifying statement as to
who placed them there. Accounts of this kind are absolutely worthless,
from an evidential standpoint, (p. 53-54).
More recently, Hanlon (1974) has noted that, when investigating phenomena produced
by Uri Geller:
I found it extremely difficult to go back and find out just what
happened in a Geller event, because of the...problem of getting
accurate descriptions of the event, (p. 173).
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In contrast, an observer may believe that a claim can be reliably reconstructed (i.e.,
the information upon this reconstruction is based appears complete, unambiguous and
reliable), and thus will continue with the analysis.
2.3.3 Causal schemata
The nature of the observer's causal schemata (i.e., schemata regarding the strategic,
and tactical, fabrication of macro-PK) will influence the counter-explanations
developed by the observer. Observers with more enriched causal schemata may be
more likely to produce a greater number of more specific counter-explanations, as
compared to observers who possess inferior causal schemata.
2.3.4 Adequacy of prior counter-explanations
The development of counter-explanations may also be influenced by the perceived
adequacy of hypotheses that have already been developed. For example, the observer
may believe that one particular counter-explanation has a high likelihood of being
correct, and thus refrain from forming additional explanations. Alternatively, the
observer may believe former explanations to be inadequate, and continue to develop
additional hypotheses.
2.4 THE PLAUSIBILITY OF COUNTER-EXPLANATIONS
2.4.1 Introduction
This section will outline some of the factors which may effect the way in which an
observer assesses the plausibility of any counter-explanations which are being, or have
been, developed. The outcome of this analysis can have a considerable effect on the
assessment process, as an observer is likely to spend little time considering, or
countering, any hypotheses which appear to be implausible.
2.4.2 Claimant capability
An observer may assess a counter-explanation in terms of whether the claimant is, or
was, capable of carrying out the trickery required by an hypothesis. This may
involve, for example, assessing the physical strength, dexterity or knowledge of
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conjuring that would be required to perform a certain type of trickery. The observer
would then compare this 'required capability' with the actual capability of the claimant
(contained in the observer's claimant schemata [see section 2.2.2.1.1]). A counter-
explanation would be seen as implausible if it entails the claimant engaging in trickery
of which he/she is incapable, and vice versa. For example, if a claimant is relatively
old, an observer may spend little time considering any hypotheses which entail this
claimant engaging in any acts of great physical agility.
2.4.3 Simplicity, or obviousness, of explanation
The observer may reject a counter-explanation that appears too obvious, simple or
straightforward. For instance, the observer may assume that, if the claimant is an
accomplished sleight-of-hand performer, he/she will be unlikely to use fake apparatus,
when it is possible to accomplish the same trick via sleight-of-hand.
2.4.4 Past methods
The observer may assess the plausibility of a method with regard to the type of
trickery that the claimant has used, or been accused of using, in past demonstrations.
For example, an alleged psychic may have performed in several earlier
demonstrations. During these demonstrations he/she may have been accused of
fabricating macro-PK using one particular method. The observer may assume that the
claimant will attempt to use similar types of subterfuge forthcoming demonstrations,
and thus reject counter-explanations that do not entail such trickery.
2.5 THE (REfCONSTRUCTION OF CONTROLS
2,5.1 Introduction
Counter-explanations allow an observer to predict when, where, and how, a claimant
may engage, or have engaged, in deception. However, a complete assessment of a
claim does not simply entail accounting for that claim via one, or more, counter-
explanation(s). This point was noted by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, when he wrote:
...I should warn the critic, however, not to be lead away by the
sophistry that because a professional trickster, apt at the game of
deception, can produce a somewhat similar effect, therefore the
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originals were produced in the same way. (Cited in Randi, 1982a, p.
15).
Instead, the observer must counter (or, in the case of a retrospective analysis, assess)
the likelihood of trickery by (re)constructing the controls (i.e., measures designed to
prevent, or detect, deception) which will be, or were, used in a demonstration. This
section will first outline some general types of control. It will then describe how an
observer may construct, or reconstruct, such controls when conducting active, or
retrospective, analyses.
2,5.2 Categories of controls
This section will identify, and discuss, three aspects of control.
First, some controls are designed to eliminate fraud from occurring (referred to as
'barriers'), whilst others are designed to monitor it's occurrence (referred to as
'detectors'). For example, a parapsychologist may wish to prevent a psychic claimant
physically bending a target object (e.g., a spoon). To do so, the observer may place
the spoon within a sealed test tube. As such, the observer will have placed a barrier
(in this case, consisting of glass) around the target. Alternatively, the
parapsychologist may wish to detect, as opposed to prevent, the physical bending of
the target. For this reason, the parapsychologist may use some form of monitor (such
as a film, or video, camera) to observe any instances in which the claimant handles
the spoon.
A second distinction can also be drawn between physical, and observational, controls.
Physical controls consist of a physical object that is used to counter deception. For
example, to prevent the possibility of an accomplice entering a seance room, the
investigator may lock all the doors leading to the room. As such, these doors and
locks would all classify as physical barriers. Alternatively, the investigators may
place some form of light beam inside the doors such that, should the beam be broken,
a sound will be activated. The apparatus involved in the production, and monitoring,
of this 'beam' would classify as a physical detector. Observational controls counter
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deception by placing the target, or target system, under close supervision. For
example, a claimant may hold a piece of cutlery between his/her fingers, and, to show
that he/she (i.e., the claimant) does not apply physical pressure to the metal, the
observer may closely watch the claimant's hands.
A third distinction can be drawn between 'open' and 'hidden' controls. Whereas
'open' controls are accessible to the claimant, 'hidden' controls are concealed from
the claimant. For example, an experimenter may wish to detect a psychic claimant
applying physical force to a piece of cutlery. To do so, an experimenter may choose
to use only open controls. For example, the claimant may be informed that a
demonstration will be closely filmed. Alternatively, the experimenter may use hidden
controls to detect such deception. For example, Hasted (1981) notes that:
Of course it is not unknown for a child to exert more manual force [to
a target] than he should do. I have devised a rather wicked test for
such behaviour. I offer a piece of a special metal that, although in
appearance soft and elastic, is in fact brittle and cannot be bent quickly
without a precisely monitored dynamic force. If the metal-bender
attempts to use force, then there is an extremely strong probability he
will break the specimen, (p. 39).
2,5.3 The (reconstruction of controls
This section will discuss the (re)construction of controls during an active, and a
retrospective, analysis.
2.5.3.1 Active analysis
In an active analysis, the observer must develop effective controls, and ensure that
such controls can be properly implemented during the forthcoming demonstration.
For example, to help detect certain types of sleight of hand, the observer may ask a
jr
magician to observe the claimant during a forthcoming demonstration. \yi this were
the case, the observer may wish to ensure that the magician will actually act as a
competent detector of such trickery, perhaps taking into account the magician's
physical well being (e.g., his/her state of health, level of alcohol or drugs, and degree
of fatigue), psychological state (e.g., his/her knowledge of conjuring and level of
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stress) and the conditions under which the demonstration will take place (e.g.,
lightning conditions, distance from event to be observed, potential obstructions to
observation). The observer should also assess the effectiveness of any physical
controls which will be used in the forthcoming demonstration. For example, the
observer may intend to prevent the claimant secretly gaining access to target material
being held in a locked box. This may be achieved by the observer ensuring that the
various measures used to seal the box cannot be easily overcome by the claimant. In
addition, the observer should ensure that controls cannot be removed during a
demonstration. As noted above, the observer may ask a magician to observe the
claimant during the demonstration. If this is the case, the observer should ensure that
the magician will not allow his/her attention to be relaxed during this period. For
example, the magician may only be able to apply a limited amount of intense attention
during a demonstration. This occurred to John Hasted (1981), when attempting to
observe one of Uri Geller's key bending performances. After just two minutes of
observation Hasted notes:
Although the operation [Geller apparently bending a key] had taken
little more than two minutes, the strain of the close observation was
beginning already to tell on me. I do not think that I could have
continued at this intensity for very much longer, (p. 11).
Also, the observer should ensure that any controls will be properly implemented
during the demonstration. This may prove problematic for several reasons. First, the
observer may be limited by ethical considerations. For example, Morris (1986a) has
noted that:
Addressing the social ethics of psychic fraud is not necessarily easy,
however. If we burst into a mediumistic camp and grab great handfuls
of cheesecloth to show that Aunt Joan is not really available in spirit
form, have we necessarily made the world a happier place?..With
disillusionment may come despair and worse, (p. 73).
Second, an observer may not be able to implement certain controls due to social
limitations. For example, Couttie (1988), in discussing the famous medium D. D.
Hume, notes:
...in order to put the lack of exposure of Hume in context it is
important to realise that in the circles in which he moved, making a
fuss was a sin. It would have been very difficult for anyone who saw
43
him cheat to make his voice heard and still remain acceptable in polite
society, (p. 28).
One should not underestimate the strength of such social forces. For example,
Mayhew (1906) describes how, during one seance, he became suspicious of the
medium (Mr Craddock) and requested that a search of the medium be undertaken.
Mayhew reports that:
Rear-Admiral Moore [another sitter], who was 'in charge' now
assumed command, with the approval of all, and appointed a search
committee to search the medium and his wife. The door was locked
and the key given to Admiral Moore...The medium however, refused
to be searched, and ordered us out. Mrs Craddock attacked Admiral
Moore with the fire shovel in her attempts to get the key from him.
Admiral Moore again demanded a search of Craddock, who placed
himself in a fighting attitude and threatened to 'set about' any one who
touched him. (p. 267).
If an observer cannot construct, or implement, effective controls, he/she will conclude
that the demonstration cannot be assessed. In such a case, the observer will believe
that he/she has thought of a way in which trickery might occur in a demonstration,
and is unable to counter such deception. If, however, the observer believes that
effective controls have been developed, the observer will continue with the analysis.
2.5.3.2 Retrospective analysis
When carrying out a retrospective analysis, the observer has to reconstruct the
controls that were in place during a past demonstration. The observer may also wish
to reconstruct information pertaining to the implementation of past controls. This may
entail the observer discovering if the claimant could have gained access to, and
therefore tampered with, controls before the start of a demonstration. For example,
if entry to a seance room was being prevented by the doors of that room being locked,
the observer may wish to discover if a claimant could have gained prior access to the
doors, and locks, in question. Also, a past demonstration may have used 'hidden'
controls. If this were the case, the observer may wish to discover if the claimant
could have gained prior knowledge of such controls, perhaps by accessing any
documentation which describes these controls. In addition, the observer may also
wish to reconstruct information relating to whether previous controls could have been
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removed during the demonstration. For example, as described above, a previous
study may have involved a magician observing the claimant in order to detect
evidence of trickery. If this were the case, the observer may wish to discover if the
magician's attention could have been relaxed during the demonstration, perhaps after
a relatively long period of close observation.
The issues involved in this reconstruction process are similar to those outlined in
section 2.3.2.1.2 (describing the reconstruction of a past claim). For example,
information concerning past controls may take the form of the observer's own
recollections, the recollections of others, diagrams and photographs, and film or
videotape. Additional evidence may also be derived from secondary sources, such as
descriptions of eyewitness testimony conveyed to the observer by other individuals,
and photographic material that has already been edited before being shown to the
observer.
The observer will want to reconstruct past controls in enough detail to assess the
effectiveness of such measures. This may involve the observer discovering the
construction, and working, of the objects used as physical controls. For example, as
noted above, a previous study may have secured target material by locking it inside
a small box. If this were the case, the observer may wish to discover the exact way
in which the box was secured. Also, an observer may wish to reconstruct the nature
of previous observational controls. For example, as noted above, a previous study
may have involved a magician observing a claimant for any evidence of trickery. If
this were the case, the observer may wish to discover the physical, and psychological,
state of that magician, as well as the conditions under which such observation took
place. Once reconstructed, the observer would then assess the effectiveness of such
controls, as outlined in section 2.4.3.1. In carrying out this analysis, the observer
may conclude that past controls were ineffective. This happened, for example, when
Jastrow (1900), analyzed Professor Zollner's testing of Henry Slade. Jastrow
concluded that the observational controls enforced at the time of the demonstration
were ineffective, noting that:
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.. .it is somewhat unexpected to read in the report of a reliable observer
who interviewed Zollner's associates, that 'of the four eminent men
whose names have been made famous by the investigation, there is
reason to believe one, Zollner, was of unsound mind at the time, and
anxious for an experimental demonstration of an already accepted
hypothesis (the fourth dimension of space); another, Fechner, was
partly blind, and believed because of Zollner's observations; a third,
Scheibler, was also afflicted with defective vision, and not entirely
satisfied in his own mind as to the phenomena; and a fourth, Weber,
was advanced in age, and did not even recognise the disabilities of his
associates'. None knew anything about conjuring, and...they were
certainly not fitted to compete with a professional like Slade' (p.
139)21.
The reconstruction outlined above may prove problematic. For example, the observer
may discover that important information is either missing, ambiguous, or unreliable.
If this is the case, the observer will believe that he/she has thought of a counter-
explanation for a past demonstration, and is unable to reconstruct the controls used
during this demonstration. Alternatively, the observer may have reconstructed the
controls used in a previous demonstration, and discovered that such controls were
ineffective, or not correctly implemented. If this is the case, the observer will believe
that he/she has thought of a counter-explanation for a past demonstration, and the
controls used in that demonstration were insufficient to counter such trickery. Either
of these scenarios will result in the observer believing that a past demonstration cannot
be assessed further. If, however, an observer believes that past controls have been
accurately reconstructed, and appear effective, the observer will continue with the
analysis.
2.6 THE ASSESSMENT OF THE CONDITIONS APPARENTLY NEEDED TO
ELICIT MACRO-PK
2.6.1 Introduction
This section of the model is concerned with the way in which the observer assesses
if the conditions of a demonstration will be, or were, psi conducive.
21 It should be noted that this interpretation of the Zollner investigation has been
challenged by a number of writers including Inglis (1977) and Randall (1982).
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2,6.2 Active analysis
When conducting an active analysis, the observer must ensure that the conditions,
apparently needed to maximise the occurrence of psi, are present during the
demonstration. This process may often be quite problematic. The claimant may
object to certain controls. For example, Hanlon (1974) has noted that, in Puthoff and
Targ's testing of Uri Geller, the experimenters were:
...so eager to keep Geller around that they worked themselves into a
box by meeting his every whim. If he threatened to walk off they
would relent and do what he wanted. Of course, they lost control of
the situation and it got worse and worse and worse, (p. 180).
If this is the case, the observer may have to modify the counter-explanations being
considered, and develop additional controls. The process of protocol development can
entail a considerable amount of back and forth communication between claimant and
observer. Eventually either party may decide that such a protocol cannot be
developed, and the demonstration aborted. Alternatively, a protocol, acceptable to
both parties, may be developed and the demonstration undertaken.
2-6.3 Retrospective analysis
In a retrospective analysis, the observer must first assess if ostensible macro-PK was
produced at the demonstration in question.
If such phenomena was produced, the observer can continue with the analysis, despite
whether or not the conditions of the demonstration were psi conducive. If, however,
no apparent macro-PK was produced, the observer must decide if the conditions,
under which the demonstration took place, were psi conducive. If the observer
decides that conditions were not psi conducive, he/she will conclude that the original
demonstration was not well designed and that the claim was not properly assessed.
However, this may be a hard decision to make, as the observer has to assess whether
the conditions of the demonstration were clearly understood, and agreed to, by the
claimant. This decision may be based, in part, upon relevant statements made by the
claimant before, during, or after, the demonstration. For example, Marks and
Kammann (1980) note that, when Uri Geller failed to reproduce a drawing sealed
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inside an envelope, Geller:
.. .protested that it [the target drawing] was difficult because it was 'not
clear' and stated that he could have got it right if it wasn't shaded
inside...He [Geller] said he could never get drawings if they were
shaded in. (p. 100).
If an observer believes these statements, he/she may conclude that the study was badly
designed, and was not a fair test of the claimant's ability. Alternatively, the observer
may conclude that the conditions of a demonstration were psi conducive. If this is the
case, the assessment procedure will continue.
2.7'ASSESSING THE RUNNING. AND RESULTS. OF A DEMONSTRATION
2.7.1 Introduction
This section will first detail some of the factors involved in assessing the running of
an active demonstration. Second, the section will outline the way in which the results
from both an active, and retrospective, analysis are assessed.
2.7.2 Running a demonstration
When running an active demonstration, the observer has to ensure that controls were
properly implemented during that demonstration. This may entail the observer
ensuring that the claimant did not tamper with controls before they are used in a
demonstration. For example, when securing a box containing target material, the
observer may ensure that the box has already been tampered with by the claimant,
such that it can easily be opened at a later point in time. In addition, the observer
may wish to minimise the likelihood that the nature of any hidden controls have been
concealed from the claimant, perhaps by placing them in an especially secure location.
If the observer discovers that controls were not properly implemented, he/she may
conclude that the demonstration cannot be assessed further. However, if controls
were implemented properly, the observer will continue with the analysis.
In the case of a retrospective analysis, the reconstruction, and assessment, of the way




The procedure involved in assessing the outcome of a demonstration differs, according
to the type of controls employed during that demonstration. This section will discuss
the assessment procedure for demonstrations involving barriers, and detectors.
2.7.3.1 The use of barriers as controls
If the demonstration used 'barriers' as controls (see section 2.5.2), the observer must
first decide if any apparent macro-PK was produced during the demonstration (in a
retrospective analysis, this process will already have been carried out [see section
2.6.3]). If no ostensible macro-PK was produced, the observer will conclude that the
claimant has failed. Alternatively, the observer may conclude that such phenomena
were produced, and, given that the various barriers precluded trickery, such
phenomena will appear inexplicable.
2.7.3.2 The use of detectors as controls
If the demonstration used 'detectors' as controls (see section 2.5.2), the observer must
decide if any apparent macro-PK was produced during the demonstration (again, in
a retrospective analysis, this process will already have been carried out [see section
2.6.3]). If no ostensible macro-PK was produced, the observer may conclude that the
claimant has failed. If this was the case, the observer may appraise any evidence of
fraud, detected during the demonstration. If evidence of fraud is discovered, the
observer may consider any hypotheses that might provide an alternative explanation
for such evidence. For example, Inglis (1984) describes how, in the Scientific
American tests of the Mina Crandon, the experimenters discovered a carpenter's rule
(which could have been used to fabricate the phenomena produced during the seance)
inside the box constructed to constrain the medium. In an attempt to explain away
this discovery, Mina Crandon accused one of her investigators, Harry Houdini, of
placing the ruler inside the box to discredit her.
Alternatively, ostensible macro-PK may have been produced during the demonstration.
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If this was the case, the observer will have to decide if any apparent evidence of fraud
was detected during the demonstration. If no evidence of fraud was discovered, the
phenomena produced will appear inexplicable. If apparent evidence of fraud was
discovered, the observer will have to consider if such evidence explains away the
ostensible macro-PK. For example, Inglis (1984) describes how William Crawford
noted that on some occasions the pseudo-pods, apparently produced by Kathleen
Goligher, were able to leave impressions in bowls of clay. However, Crawford also
noted that the end of the pseudo-pod appeared to be covered in a material similar to
the medium's stockings and that, after the seances 'various marks are left by the clay
on the medium's stockings and shoes' (cited in Inglis, 1984, p. 80). As noted by
Inglis:
The discovery of the fabric impressions on clay, and still more of clay
on the medium's person, would have been regarded, even by many of
those who accepted materialisations, as proof of fraud, (p. 80),
yet notes that Crawford believed that:
...as the ectoplasm emerged from her it occasionally took on the
appearance of whatever fabric she was wearing, and then carried bits
of it, along with fluff, to the clay; and brought back traces of the clay
to the point at which the ectoplasm re-entered her body. (p. 80).
If the observer is unable to account for the ostensible macro-PK by evidence of fraud,
he/she will conclude that the phenomena produced were inexplicable. A vital part of
this process will involve assessing any hypotheses that might provide an alternative
explanation for apparent evidence of fraud.
2.8 SUMMARY
This chapter has briefly outlined a proto-model that accounts for the way in which an
observer analyses a demonstration of ostensible macro-PK. First, the chapter
discussed how an observer may frame a demonstration as either a magic trick, a
pseudo-psychic hoax or a display of genuine macro-PK. The three major factors (i.e.,
cognitive, motivational and social) which influence this framing process were
discussed. In addition, the chapter outlined the way in which such framing may
influence an observer's analysis of a demonstration. The chapter next outlined how
an observer develops counter-explanations for a demonstration, noting how such
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hypotheses depended upon the observer's claim schemata, causal schemata and
perceived adequacy of prior counter-explanations. Next, the chapter outlined how
such counter-explanations were assessed for plausibility. Following this, the chapter
discussed how an observer may develop controls designed to counter the trickery
predicted by the various counter-explanations. Three types of control were discussed,
namely detectors/barriers, physical/observational and open/hidden. The chapter next
outlined how the assessment process can be influenced by consideration of the
conditions apparently needed to elicit psi. Finally, the chapter noted how an observer
assesses the running, and outcome, of a demonstration.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE FABRICATION OF MACRO-PK
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter described a proto-model that outlined how an observer analyses
ostensible macro-PK. This chapter will build upon that work, noting how this
i
analyses can be exploited by both pseudo-psychics, and magicians (collectively
referred to as 'fake claimants').
The chapter will briefly restate portions of the proto-model, and, step by step,
describe how an observer can be deceived during both an active, and retrospective,
analyses.
3.2 MISFRAMING A DEMONSTRATION
3.2.1 Introduction
Section 2.2 described how an observer may frame ostensible macro-PK as either a
magic trick, a pseudo-psychic hoax or a display of genuine psychic ability. Most
magicians, and genuine psychics, wish the observer to frame their demonstrations
correctly. In contrast, the pseudo-psychic wishes to deceive the observer into
misframing his/her fake demonstration as genuine. This section will discuss how a
pseudo-psychic may manipulate various cognitive, motivational and social factors
(outlined in section 2.2) to achieve this goal.
3.2.2 Exploiting the observer's claimant, and claim, schemata
Section 2.2.2.1 described how an observer's framing of a demonstration depends, in
part, on the degree to which that observer associates the claimant, and claim, with
certain schemata. This section will discuss how this process is exploited by a pseudo-
psychic.
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3.2.2.1 Exploiting an observer's claimant schemata
Section 2.2.2.1.1 outlined some of the information contained within an observer's
claimant schemata. The section also noted how such schemata may influence the way
in which an observer frames a demonstration of ostensible macro-PK. The pseudo-
psychic manipulates the content of these schemata, to increase the likelihood of the
observer viewing him as a genuine psychic. Such manipulation may take several
forms.
First, the pseudo-psychic may appear incapable of the type of trickery required to
fabricate macro-PK. For example, the pseudo-psychic may conceal any manual
dexterity he/she possesses. Thus, Fuller (1975), when advising pseudo-psychics how
to behave in the company of those they aim to deceive, notes:
Don't act like a magician...Act clumsy with your hands...You can do
a double lift22 and some easy coin moves, but never let anybody know
that you can do any sleight of hand. (p. 11).
A pseudo-psychic may also attempt to conceal previous evidence, or accusations, of
trickery. For example, Hansen (1990) describes how Steve Shaw (one of the pseudo-
psychics involved in Project Alpha) had been accused of trickery prior to Project
Alpha (see McBurney & Greenberg, 1980), yet did not mention this to investigators
i
at the McDonne^ Parapsychology Laboratory. Also, a pseudo-psychic may conceal
the true extent of his/her knowledge of conjuring, or psychic fraud. For example,
'Tim', the pseudo-psychic investigated by Delanoy (1987) was a member of the
International Brotherhood of Magicians, but failed to mention this whilst being
investigated.
In addition, the pseudo-psychic may conceal evidence that suggests he/she has any
motivation to engage in psychic fraud. For example, a fake faith healer may assure
an observer that he/she never accepts payment for his/her services, insinuating that
he/she has no motive to deceive. However, as noted by Thomas (1989):
22A 'double lift' is a sleight that involves simultaneously picking up the top two
cards of a deck as if they were a single card, (see Whaley, 1989, p. 227).
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Apparent lack of financial inducements is no guarantee against
fraudulent practise. Randi reports that 'psychic surgeons' did not
charge a fee for their services: they received a registration fee and
donations, (p. 382).
Also, an observer may not realise the range of factors that motivate an individual to
deceive. For example, various authors have suggested that some individuals deceive
simply for enjoyment (e.g., Moss, 1977, Ekman, 1985). It has been suggested that
this, in part, may account for the success enjoyed by the two girls who fabricated the
'Cottingley' fairies (see, e.g., Randi, 1982a, Cooper, 1990). For example, Randi
notes how some observers believed that:
The two girls had no stake in the deception that could have brought
them money...The assumption made is that only money and notoriety
are plausible motives. Ego and just plain fun are not thought to be
sufficient, (p. 37).
In addition, Morris (1986b) has noted how a pseudo-psychic may be motivated by
personal fame, raised self-esteem, a desire to be socially helpful, and/or increased
personal power. The skilled pseudo-psychic may be able to conceal some, or all,
aspects of his/her motivation from an observer.
The pseudo-psychic may also attempt to convince observers that he/she would not
engage in psychic fraud, even if capable of doing so. This may involve the pseudo-
psychic fabricating certain personality traits, such as honesty, sincerity, and
friendliness. For example, Fuller (1980), in his manual of pseudo-psychic trickery,
advises:
...when you're being tested by a parapsychologist, you'll catch him
doing something stupid - like leaving unguarded a sealed envelope with
a target drawing. When this happens, bawl the hell out of him. It will
impress him no end with your honesty. It will prove to him you can't
be a charlatan, (p.68).
Also, Delanoy (1987), in writing about her work with one pseudo-psychic, writes
that:
I felt I had come to know Tim [the pseudo-psychic] fairly well. We




.. .[Tim] devoted a great deal of time to working with us, and also had
a relatively long journey getting to and from our lab. These things,
particularly when combined with his very cooperative and friendly
manner may well have biased me towards liking him. This in turn
may have coloured my perspective in viewing his claims, (p.255).
Finally, the pseudo-psychic may fabricate some of the physical characterises (such as
dress and speech content) that the observer associates with a genuine psychic. For
example, Corinda (1958), in his classic text on mentalism and spirit magic, writes:
Personal appearance has a lot to do with the way in which the audience
regard you. Consider what you want them to think of you. If you
wish to present your mentalism as supernatural phenomena, then you
are almost obliged to appear supernatural...Question people and ask
what they think a Medium looks like (p. 392),
as well as noting that a pseudo-psychic should always use the type of language that
the observer associates with a genuine psychic:
Reference to the audience or place of performance is made with
phrases such as 'Meeting, Gathering, Sitting or Seance' and direct
reference to the audience is made by 'Sitters, Friends or The
Gathering' (avoid 'Ladies and Gentlemen).. .Never use the term 'Trick'
or 'Effect'. Always refer to the actions of a performance as 'Psychical
Experiments, Mediumistic Tests, Phenomena etc', (p. 276).
3.2.2.2 Exploiting an observer's claim schemata
Section 2.2.2.1.2 outlined some of the information contained within an observer's
claim schemata. In addition, the section noted how these schemata may influence the
way in which an observer frames a demonstration of ostensible macro-PK. The
or
pseudo-psychic may manipulate the contentAhis/her claim, such that it is more likely
to be perceived as genuine. Such manipulation may take several forms.
First, the pseudo-psychic may claim to produce the type of macro-PK that the
observer finds believable. Thus, an observer may believe that PK can rarely be used
to produce really large physical effects. As such, the pseudo-psychic may only fake
effects that appear (when compared to those of the magician) fairly trivial. As noted
by Truzzi (1983):
...it is perhaps actually the very triviality of such an action that lends
it plausibility, (p. 18).
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Also, when being formally assessed, a sophisticated pseudo-psychic might discover
trends in previous investigations of macro-PK, and conform to those patterns. Randi
(1986) has noted that part of the success of Project Alpha rested upon the two pseudo-
psychics discovering, and then conforming to, their investigators' notions concerning
the nature of psi. For example, Randi notes how:
Steve and Mike [the two pseudo-psychics] complained about the
electronic equipment putting out 'bad vibes'.. .to satisfy this established
bit of mythology....Also, they were careful to mention that in early
childhood both had experienced electric shocks, after which they had
become aware of their psychic powers, (p. 164).
Finally, the pseudo-psychic may state that his/her psychic ability is only elicited under
the conditions that the observer associates with the production of genuine macro-PK.
Thus, many pseudo-psychic manuals advise their readers to seek out, and conform to,
the conditions under which an observer believes genuine psi might occur. For
example, 'Invocation' (a magazine devoted mainly to bizarre magic) contained articles
that advised it's readers on how to fabricate certain types of unusual rituals which
some observers (e.g., those interested in occultism) may find particularly convincing
(e.g., Kirke, 1977, Karnak, 1977). Also, Corinda (1958), when discussing how to
create a fraudulent seance, notes:
Start off by creating strange and exotic smell - use Joss Sticks or
Oriental Incense which gives a weird, and mysterious odour strange to
the atmosphere...Concentrate on unusual lighting schemes. Make
particular use of red lamps for any part of the seance that involves
physical manifestations, (p. 277).
3-2.3 Exploiting the motivational factors which influence the framing process
Section 2.2.2.2 discussed how various motivational factors may influence the way in
which an observer frames a demonstration. The pseudo-psychic may attempt to
exploit these factors. For example, the pseudo-psychic may exploit an observer's
physical, and emotional, needs. An observer may have a serious illness and thus a
strong need to recover. As such, a pseudo-psychic may claim to possess psychic
healing powers, in the hope that the observer will be strongly motivated to frame the
demonstration as genuine. Also, if an observer has recently suffered a bereavement,
he/she may be exploited by a fake medium who promises some form of
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communication with deceased friends, and relatives. Two additional points should be
noted. First, the flexible pseudo-psychic may modify his/her claim to satisfy the
needs of a particular observer, or set of observers. Second, researchers may not be
immune from such forms of manipulation. For example, Delanoy (1987), after
working with one pseudo-psychic, noted:
We are all familiar with the difficulties arising from the so-called
'elusive nature of psi'. In short, we cannot study a phenomenon unless
we can first produce it. Thus, Tim's [the pseudo-psychic] claims, that
he could produce macro PK at will, suggested exciting possibilities.
I wanted his claims to be true and this desire may have influenced mv
evaluation of his performance. [Emphasis mine] (p. 256).
3.2,4 Exploiting the social factors which influence the framing process
Section 2.2.2.3 noted that the framing process may be influenced by interpersonal
pressure. The pseudo-psychic may exploit this process by firmly stating that he/she
believes his/her psychic ability to be genuine. Delanoy (1987) notes how one pseudo-
psychic was able to employ consummate acting skills, and firmly appeared to believe
in the validity of his abilities. In addition, the pseudo-psychic may ensure that, when
the observer attends a demonstration (e.g., a fake seance), he/she is surrounded by
individuals who are convinced of the claimant's validity.
3.3 PREVENTING DEVELOPMENT OF CORRECT COUNTER
EXPLANATIONS
3-3.1 Introduction
Section 2.3 outlined how an observer may develop a number of counter-explanations
to account for the way in which ostensible macro-PK may be fabricated. This section
will discuss how both magicians, and pseudo-psychics, may prevent the observer from
developing the 'correct' hypothesis (i.e., the hypothesis that correctly accounts for the
trickery involved in a demonstration). The fake claimant can then showp' these
erroneous explanations to be wrong, and thus the observer will have no ready
hypothesis to account for the phenomena produced.
Section 2.3 noted that the development of counter-explanations can be influenced by
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the observer's claim schemata, causal schemata (i.e., schemata relating to the methods
used to fabricate macro-PK) and perceived adequacy of prior counter-explanations.
This section will outline how fake claimants exploit one, or more, of these factors.
3.3.2 The manipulation of claim schemata
This section will note how a fake claimant may manipulate an observer's claim
schemata during both an active, and a retrospective, analysis.
3.3.2.1 Active analysis
During an active analysis, a fake claimant may manipulate an observer's claim
schemata in one of two ways.
First, the fake claimant may prevent the observer from forming a detailed
representation of the claim. For example, a fake claimant may not state, before the
demonstration, the nature of the target, target system or intended psychic influence.
This strategy is frequently utilised by magicians. Henri Decremps (1785), noting the
first of his 'general principles' of conjuring, writes:
Never acquaint the company before-hand with the particulars of the
feat you are about to perform, (p. 123).
The same advice can also be found in other standard textbooks ofmagic, written both
at the turn of the century (e.g., Robert-Houdin, 1878), and more recently (e.g.,
Tarbell, 1953, Wilson, 1988). The pseudo-psychic may conceal the nature of a
forthcoming demonstration by stating that he/she has little control over his/her psychic
ability, and therefore cannot predict the phenomena that might occur23. Without
23This strategy may also help the fake claimant, should a demonstration not go
according to plan. This point was clearly noted by Robert-Houdin (1878), who notes:
However skilful the performer may be, and however complete his
preparations for a given trick, it is still possible that some unforseen
accident may cause a failure. The only way to get out of such a
difficulty is to finish the trick in another manner. But to be able to do
this, the performer must have strictly complied with this important
rule: never announce beforehand the nature of the effect which you
intend to produce, [emphasis mine] (p. 33).
58
detailed claim schemata, it is problematic for an observer to develop specific counter-
explanations. As a result, the observer may have to wait until during, or after, the
demonstration before developing such hypotheses.
Second, the fake claimant may manipulate the observer into forming incorrect claim
schemata. This may involve deceiving the observer as to the nature of the intended
target. For example, the magician may remove a pack of playing cards from his/her
pocket, stating that he/she has the ability to make objects shrink in size. The
magician then removes the cards from the card case. The observer may assume that
the magician intends to influence the size of the playing cards, and thus focuses
his/her attention on these cards. However, the magician may suddenly reveal that it
is the card case, not the cards, which has shrunk in size. Given that the observer
concentrated his/her attention on the cards, the magician was free to manipulate the
card case without fear of detection. A fake claimant may also deceive the observer
regarding the psychic influence that he/she intends to produce. Magicians
occasionally utilise this strategy. For example, at the start of Ascanio's 'knives and
colour-blindness' routine (described in Torre, 1975), the magician states that he/she
is about to make a penknife vanish, and places the knife into his/her hand. However,
in reality, the magician does not intend not to make the knife vanish, but rather
change colour. As such, the observer may be likely to form erroneous counter-
explanations. For example, the observer may suspect, for example, that the magician
is secretly going to move the knife from his/her hand to a place of concealment (e.g.,
his/her jacket pocket). This hypothesis, along with all others based upon the
'vanishing knife' scenario, are likely to be incorrect.
3.3.2.2 Retrospective Analysis
When carrying out a retrospective analysis, an observer has to reconstruct information
relevant to claim schemata. A fake claimant may use two stratagems to deceive the
observer during this process.
First, a fake claimant may deceive the observer into reconstructing incorrect claim
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schemata. This may be achieved in several ways, depending upon the type of
information around which the reconstruction is based. The second stratagem involves
a claimant preventing the observer from being able to reconstruct a past demonstration
at all. Each of these stratagems will be discussed in turn.
The observer may be basing a reconstruction upon his/her own recollections of a past
demonstration. The magician, and pseudo-psychic, may use various stratagems during
a demonstration to bias the observer's later recollection of that demonstration. For
example, to manipulate an observer into forgetting the part of a demonstration that
contained trickery, magicians utilise the notion of 'time misdirection'. This has been
described by Leech (1960) as:
...the ruse of allowing a certain amount of time to elapse between the
accomplishment of a secret sleight or movement and it's ultimate
result, (p. 10).
Thus a magician may appear to pass a coin from his/her right hand into his/her left
hand, yet in reality, secretly retain the coin in his/her right hand. If the magician
were using 'time misdirection', he/she may allow a few seconds to pass before
opening his/her left hand to reveal that the coin has apparently vanished. The time
lag, between the magician apparently placing a coin in his/her hand and then showing
that the coin has vanished, is designed to manipulate the observer into forgetting
where the coin was last actually seen. As noted by Ammar (1983), if the magician
were to show that the coin has vanished immediately after apparently passing the coin
into that hand:
...the spectators try and reconstruct by asking themselves where they
last knew the coin to be and what actions or motions have taken place
since that time...and..they'11 probably have you. On the other hand,
if Time Misdirection is employed...the we can further mislead the
audience to the point that reconstruction is virtually impossible, (p. 8).
In addition, magicians, and pseudo-psychics, may use 'verbal recapping'. This has
been described by Nardi (1984):
...in recapping the sequence a magician often inserts events that have
not occurred, yet go unquestioned by the audience, (p. 32).
This techniques is often used by pseudo-psychics. For example, Fuller (1975) notes:
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Keep saying things to distort their [the observers] memories. If you
declare in a loud voice that you never touched a key when it bent,
that's what they'll remember. They'll never remember that you had
the key in your hands a few minutes before, (p. 15).
An observer's recollection of a demonstration may also be distorted by the fake
claimant's use of 'in transit' actions. These have been defined by Lehn (cited in
Tamariz, 1988):
In all actions there is a main action, and a series of minor actions that
you [the magician] have to perform in order to execute the main
action. These minor actions are in-transit, 'on the way', and when it
is possible to realise sleight during these intermediate actions, they will
pass unnoticed. Ex: Your attention is drawn to a piece of lint on the
table, and in order to remove it with your right hand, you leave the
(double24) card in your right hand on top of the deck in your left., but
your attention is still on the main action, the removal of the lint. You
remove it and take the card back in your right hand (single card) and
place it on the table. The dumping of the extra card occurred during
an action 'in transit' that the audience will probably forget, (p. 184).
The extent to which an observer's testimony may be made unreliable should not be
underestimated. For example, Hodgson & Davey (1887), in their classic study of
eyewitness testimony in relation to fake slate writing phenomena, consistently found
that sitters often recalled events that did not occur, did not recall events that did occur
and incorrectly recalled the order of events (this work will be described in detail in
Chapter Four).
Additional sources of bias may be encountered by the observer who bases a
reconstruction upon the testimony of other individuals. For example, if an eyewitness
watches a pseudo-psychic, and believed the claimant to be genuine, that eyewitness
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may not wish the observer to 'debunk' (i.e., produce a counter-explanation) the
demonstration. If this were the case, when relating the event to an observer, the
original eyewitness may omit, or distort, information that suggests possible trickery.
Randi (1982a), accuses a Life magazine reporter of producing an inaccurate
description of the conditions under which the alleged psychic, Ted Serios, performed:
In 1967, writer Paul Welch had a piece on Serios in Life
24Two cards held as one.
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magazine...The paper tube, which Serios called his 'gismo' and was
used to conceal his optical device, was never mentioned. Although it
was prominent in all of Seric/s work, and showed up in most of the
photos, Life chose to censor all reference to it to make a better story,
for once the 'gismo' was made known it would not be hard to figure
out that the experimenters were allowing rather wide latitude for
procedure in their 'scientific tests'25, (p 223-224).
The observer may also reconstruct information from photographs, or diagrams. Such
evidence may be fabricated, or biased, in several ways. For example, a fake claimant
may use some form of trick photography to create evidence of ostensible macro-PK.
For example, short exposure photographs can be used to fabricate evidence of
apparent human levitation (Herbert, 1939). In addition, Sharpe (1985) outlines how
photographic evidence can be fabricated by the use of double exposure, and the
retouching of negatives. The fake claimant may bias, as opposed to fabricate, such
evidence. For example, a pseudo-psychic may have successfully deceived a
researcher into believing that a display of fake macro-PK was genuine. If this were
the case, the researcher may wish to take a photograph of the laboratory in which
such phenomena were produced. However, the pseudo-psychic may realise that this
photograph may, to certain observers (e.g., magicians), contain clues as to the type
of trickery used in the demonstration (e.g., the photograph may reveal the presence
of a small 'gimmick'26 that has not been noticed by the researchers). If this is the
case, the pseudo-psychic may attempt to remove such evidence from the photograph,
or conceal it from view. This could entail, for example, the pseudo-psychic noting
that he/she is very tired and asking that any photography is postponed until the next
morning. In the meantime the pseudo-psychic returns to the laboratory and removes
the gimmick.
The observer may also reconstruct information based on film, or videotape,
25It should be noted that one of the main experimenters concerned, Jule Eisenbud,
has disputed that Serios could have fabricated all his phenomena in this manner (see
Eisenbud, 1989).
26Any secret device (usually a small object) used within a magic trick (see Whaley,
1989, p. 312).
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recordings. Again, such evidence could be fabricated, or biased. A fake claimant
may fabricate evidence of ostensible macro-PK via fake photography (see, for
example, Sharpe's [1985] description of how stop motion photography can be used
to fabricate macro-PK). The fake claimant may also bias such evidence. For
example, Harris (1985), in his advice to individuals who fake PK metal bending,
notes:
.. .the cameraman is only a human being looking through a lens system.
He is just as prone to misdirection as a spectator...When the camera
comes in for a close-up shot, which is a must for any small effect such
as a Geller effect, it can only concentrate attention on a very small area
or field. This area may consist of the left hand, leaving the right hand
well out of audience view, enabling it to perform all sorts of useful
tasks. In other words, if one can draw attention and hold it in a close-
up on one hand, the other hand is free to secretly bend a key or a
spoon or to ditch something in a pocket. This is of course very basic.
It can become more involved...a monitor...allows the performer to
actually watch what the spectators at home are seeing...It acts like a
mirror which allows any angle adjustments necessary to be made. The
performer of magical tricks has never had it so good. (p. 21-22).
Finally, an observer may reconstruct a claim based around 'secondary sources' of
information (i.e., information obtained second hand). Such information may include,
for example, descriptions of eyewitness testimony conveyed to the observer by other
individuals, and photographic material that has already been edited before being
shown to the observer (see section 2.3.2.2). The information, upon which these
secondary sources are based, may be biased by any of the factors outlined above. In
addition, secondary sources may be vulnerable to extra sources of bias. Secondary
source may not contain important information that was included in it's primary
source. For example, film footage may be edited such that important information has
been omitted. Alternatively, the secondary source may have mis-interpreted
information contained within the primary source.
A second stratagem, used to bias the reconstruction of a claim, involves a claimant
preventing the observer from being able to reconstruct a past demonstration at all.
This stratagem is used to prevent a retrospective analysis from taking place and may
involve, for example, the fake claimant creating confusion, and chaos, during the
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demonstration. Fuller (1975), in his advijfe to pseudo-psychics, notes:
Nobody but nobody can remember exactly what happened during a
trick...When you're working for a group, keep talking and moving
fast. Create maximum chaos. Flit from one task to another.. .Things
get so confused that nobody'11 be able to remember anything clearly.
(p. 15).
If this occurs, an observer will be unable to reconstruct, and therefore reassess, the
demonstration in question.
3.3.3 The exploitation of inappropriate causal schemata
Section 2.3.2 described how an observer may use causal schemata (relating to both
the strategic, and tactical, fabrication of macro-PK27) to develop counter-
explanations. If such schemata are incomplete, or inaccurate, an observer may be
unable to form appropriate counter-explanations. A fake claimant may be aware of,
and thus be able to capitalise on, such inadequacies.
First, the observer may not be aware of the different strategies used by fake claimants
to fabricate macro-PK. Second, the observer may have an incomplete, or inaccurate,
understanding of the tactics that can be used to implement the strategies discussed
above. For example, the observer may not appreciate the myriad of tactics that may
be secretly used to apply force to cutlery during a demonstration (see, for example,
Harris, 1985). Also, the claimant may use a piece of apparatus of which the observer
is unaware. As Harold Kelley (1980) has noted:
...some of the gimmicks of the magic art are interesting because they
are difficult to imagine. In a sense they are unthinkable. This
property seems to derive from there being a sharp incongruity between
the audience's conception of a particular object and a property it is
constructed actually to have, as is the case with a folding coin28 or
hollow dice. (p.31).
27See section 1.2.2.3 for the distinction between tactical, and strategic,
explanations of fabricated psi.
28A coin faked by sawing it into two or more strips and hinging them together,
usually by the use of a small elastic band running around the perimeter of the coin,
(see Whaley, 1989, p. 292).
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Alternatively, the observer may be unaware of the esoteric means by which a target
can be influenced. For example, when attempting to assess strange physiological
effects produced by a claimant, an observer may be unaware of the various ways in
which an individual can influence the working of his/her own body by normal means
alone (see, e.g., Fisher, 1979). For example, the performer may place a small ball
under his/her left armpit and, by pressing his/her left arm against the ball, cause the
pulse in his/her left wrist to cease. Magicians, and pseudo-psychics secretly employ
many esoteric scientific, medical, and mathematical principles during their
demonstrations. Indeed, this stratagem has a long history, with Triplett (1900) noting:
The priests exploited the secrets of science for a thousand years.. .Some
of the positive sciences had their birth in the temples of the ancient
religions. The miracles performed during the initiatory rites of the
sacred mysteries are to be explained as physical and chemical
effects.. .Sir David Brewster says on this subject that there can be little
doubt that the concave mirror was the principal instrument used in
connection with the pretended apparitions of the gods and goddesses in
the ancient temples, (p. 449-450).
Conjurors also use this stratagem when attempting to fool fellow magicians. Some
of the leading inventors ofmagic have developed their methods in isolation from other
magicians. For this reason, such methods deceive magicians whose causal schemata
consist of the 'mainstream' methods of magic. For example, Tony Slydini devised
a new style of 'lapping'29 and, because of this, consistently deceived lay audiences,
and experienced magicians, alike (see Ganson, 1960). Perhaps, as noted by Truzzi
(1983):
...the real lesson to be learnt from doing magic is that everyone is
fallible, that everyone can be fooled, (p. 34).
To prevent observers improving their causal schemata, fake claimants ensure that
many secrets of conjuring, and pseudo-psychic trickery, remain clandestine. This is
achieved in several ways. For example, many magic organisations have their
members swear an oath of secrecy. In addition, fake claimants may not mention, or
even hint at, the type of trickery that is being used during a demonstration. This is
o
29A form of magic wherein the conjurgr, seated behind a table, is able to secretly
move small objects to, and from, his lap (see Whaley, 1989, p. 389).
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epitomised in a well known phrase among magicians30, 'don't run when nobody is
chasing you'. As explained by Dai Vernon:
Many magicians consider that it is desirable for even the most innocent
looking piece of apparatus to be examined. They often create
suspicion by the mere fact that, having an article examined, they
suggest to an audience that the article could be faked. (Ganson, 1958,
p. 36).
Also, many handbooks of conjuring advise magicians against mentioning specific
tactics of trickery during a demonstration, even if that demonstration does not involve
such trickery. As noted by Robert-Houdin (1878):
Many conjurors make a practice, in the course of their performances,
of indicating such and such expedients of the art, and of boasting that
they themselves do not use employ the method in question. 'You
observe' they will remark, 'that I don't make the pass - that I don't
change the card' etc.: and yet, a moment later, they use in some other
trick the expedient they have just revealed. It follows, as a natural
result, that the spectator, being thus made acquainted with the artifices
of which he would otherwise have known nothing, is put on his guard,
and is no longer open to the deception, (p. 34).
Whilst Fitzkee (1945), in agreement, wrote:
Nothing the performer says should suggest, directly or indirectly, a
clue to the method... If you are doing a rope trick it is not advisable to
mention secret loops, cement, fasteners, substitutions or any other of
the numerous contrivances magicians have and do apply to this trick,
(p. 102).
3.3.4 'Sucker' tricks
Section 2.3.4 noted how an observer's development of counter-explanations may be
influenced by the perceived adequacy of prior explanations. For example, if an
observer has developed an explanation that he/she believes to be correct, he/she may
cease to develop any additional hypotheses to account for the claim. Fake claimants
exploit this mechanism by the use of 'sucker tricks'. These have been defined by
Whaley (1989) as:
A double bluff; the method of leading the audience to believe they
30This phrase has been credited to A1 Baker (see, for example, Ganson, 1958, p.
36).
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have detected a trick's method and the pulling a double bluff to
surprise them even more. (p. 659).
For example, in one effect, known as 'Where Did the Ducks Go?', the magician may
announce that he/she will make several ducks disappear. The magician displays a
table covered with a cloth that (suspiciously) hides the large space underneath the
table. On top of the table rests a large box. Several ducks are placed into the box.
Each side of the box is then dismantled and removed from the stage. The ducks have
apparently disappeared. However, because of the suspicious nature of the table cloth,
the audience believes that the ducks may be concealed beneath the table. The
magician then removes the cloth to reveal that this is not the case. Thus, because the
audience were led to believe that one counter-explanation (i.e., that the ducks were
concealed beneath the table) was correct, they failed to develop alternative hypotheses
(e.g., that the ducks may have been concealed behind one side of the box as it was
dismantled, and removed from the stage).
3.4 ERRONEOUS ASSESSMENT OF AN EXPLANATION'S PLAUSIBILITY
3.4.1 Introduction
Section 2.4 discussed the various ways in which an observer assesses the plausibility
of a counter-explanation. Even if the observer develops the correct strategy or tactic,
a fake claimant may be able to manipulate that observer into erroneously rejecting the
hypothesis as implausible. This section will discuss how such a stratagem may be
achieved.
3.4.2 Erroneous assessment of claimant capability
Section 2.4.2 noted that an observer may reject a counter-explanation as implausible,
if the claimant does not appear capable of performing the trickery required by such
an hypothesis. As such, a fake claimant may deceive an observer in two ways. First,
the observer may be deceived into underestimating the claimant's capability to engage
in deception. For example, the observer may correctly assume that a claimant would
have to possess great manual dexterity to fake a certain type of macro-PK (e.g., the
continual production of small objects). The fake claimant may possess this expertise,
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but conceal it from the observer. As such, the observer may erroneously assume the
claimant incapable of such sleight-of-hand. Second, the observer may underestimate
the necessary skills, resources etc., needed to carry out a counter-explanation. For
example, the observer may assume that a certain sleight-of-hand would take many
years to perfect when, in reality, this is not the case. Again, this may cause an
observer to erroneously reject an hypothesis as implausible.
3.4.3 Rejection due to simplicity/obviousness
Section 2.4.3 noted how an observer may reject counter-explanations that appear too
simple or obvious. Fake claimants may exploit this assumption by purposely choosing
a method which is likely to be reject by an observer on the grounds of simplicity.
For example, Hanlon (1974) does not consider some of the simpler methods by which
Geller could have attempted to fake some of his demonstrations (outlined, for
example, by Randi, 1982b), instead proposing far more complex methods (e.g., the
use of a radio receiver concealed within Geller's tooth, and a faked 'radio die' which
electronically signals which of it's faces is uppermost). Also a fake claimant may
manipulate an observer into rejecting an explanation as obvious. For example, a fake
claimant may be highly skilled at faking certain types of macro-PK by using magnets
concealed on his person (e.g., built into a finger ring). Before the start of a
demonstration, the fake claimant may briefly mention that some fake psychics use
concealed magnets to fabricate macro-PK. These comments may 'double bluff the
observer into rejecting the notion that the claimant would himself employ such
methods.
3.4.4 Restriction of past methods
Section 2.4.4 noted how an observer may reject a counter-explanation if it does not
entail the type of trickery that the claimant had used, or been accused of using, during
previous demonstrations. A fake claimant may exploit this assumption, by developing
a number of ways of fabricating a certain type of macro-PK, and then switching
methods both within, and between, demonstrations. For example, many texts on
magic, and pseudo-psychic trickery, contain several different methods for achieving
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just one effect. Tamariz (1988) has described eighteen methods for performing the
'oil and water' card effect31, whilst Harris (1985) explains a whole range of methods
that may be employed to fabricate PK metal bending. The fake claimant may then be
able to manipulate the observer into being suspicious of just one of these methods,
thus rejecting as implausible the method which the fake claimant intends to employ.
This strategy can be very effective. As noted by Leech (1960):
Nothing can be more bewildering than the repetition of an effect three
or four times, each repetition dependent upon a different principle.
This is psychological misdirection of the highest order, (p. 7).
Diaconis (1985), labels this approach the 'bundle of sticks phenomena', noting:
An effect is produced several times under different circumstances with
the use of a different technique each time...the weak points of one
performance are ruled out because they were clearly not present during
other performances. The bundle of sticks is stronger than any single
stick, (p.572).
As noted by Tamariz (1988), the success of this strategy rests on the fact that some
observers erroneously assume that 'the same causes produce the same effects', and not
that a single effect may be produced by many, quite different, methods. A fake
claimant may then use several stratagems to manipulate an observer into expecting a
certain method. For example, when investigating an alleged psychic, the observer
may watch the claimant perform during several informal pilot studies. On these
occasions, the pseudo-psychic may fabricate phenomena using the same method
(provided this repetition did not significantly increase the risk of him/her being
caught). In this way, should the observer become suspicious of this method (and thus
guard against it during a formal experiment) the pseudo-psychic can switch to a novel
type of trickery. Alternatively, the fake claimant may discover the counter-
explanations that have been developed by the observer, and then select a method
accordingly. For this strategy to be successful, the fake claimant must have feedback
from the observer, as to the methodology that observer expects the claimant to
employ. For example, Dingwall (1926), in his investigation of Mina Crandon, notes
31A card trick where a packet of playing cards, consisting of two different
coloured suits, is mixed up, yet appear to sort themselves by colour, (see Whaley,
1989, p. 480).
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that certain conditions had to be agreed upon, before the investigation could
commence. One condition entailed that:
The investigator shall supply the doctor [Mina Crandon's husband]
with a signed copy of his notes of each seance, before he attends the
next seance, (p. 88).
As noted by Dingwall, this meant that, if Mina Crandon was fraudulent, she would
have access to the investigators' thoughts concerning possible trickery. Thus Dingwall
concludes:
Thus, if the phenomena are not supernormal [this rule]., gives the
other parties full information as to the discoveries made by the
investigator. For example, if a touch is experienced in the third
seance, and the investigator remarks certain facts which lead him to
suppose that a reaching rod is being employed, then these fact must
become the property of the persons concerned in the manipulation of
that rod before the next sitting. These persons can in this way keep
themselves au fait with all the investigator's discoveries,and since they
are virtually in entire charge of the sittings... discovery of the methods
employed is rendered absolutely impossible, (p. 89).
Alternatively, the fake claimant may inspect the controls employed by an observer,
figure out the methods that are being countered, and then select a different method.
Several magicians have written about some of the techniques involved in this
'improvisational', or 'jazz' magic (see, e.g., Hopkins, 1940, Lang, 1981). For
example, Lang (1981) outlines a number of sleight-of-hand moves which are flexible
enough to be used within extemporised routines of card tricks.
The use of such 'multiple methods' may also allow the fake claimant to switch
methods during a demonstration, should one method prove problematic. Indeed,
magicians often consider the ways in which a trick may go wrong, and develop
various ways to switch the method of that trick, to salvage the demonstration. These
are referred to as 'outs' and, as noted by magician Jerry Mentzer:
If the performer knows enough outs, he will never fail to bring a trick
to successful conclusion. (Cited in Whaley, 1989, p.489).
For example, a magician may have a card selected, and apparently shuffle the card
back into the pack. In reality, the magician secretly controls the chosen card to the
top of the pack. The magician may have planned to palm the card off of the top of
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the pack, and, under the cover of returning a pen to his/her pocket, secretly place the
card into his/her wallet. However, the magician may be aware that sometimes he/she
replaces the pen in his/her pocket earlier in his/her act, and thus has no logical reason
to place his/her hand into his/her jacket. If this is the case, the magician may keep
a card inside one section of his/her wallet. If the magician has mistakenly placed the
pen back into his/her pocket, he/she can still complete the trick by removing his/her
wallet and openly taking out the extra card, being careful not to show it's face to the
spectators. The magician then secretly swaps this card for the chosen card (on top of
the pack), thus making it appear that the chosen card has magically travelled from the
pack to the wallet.
3.5 ERRONEOUS (RECONSTRUCTION OF EFFECTIVE CONTROLS
3.5.1 Introduction
Section 2.5 noted how an observer may (re)construct, and assess, a number of
controls (i.e., measures designed to counter trickery). One main stratagem, used both
by magicians and pseudo-psychics, involves deceiving the observer into erroneously
believing that these controls will be, or were, effective safeguards against deception.
This section will outline the ways in which this stratagem may be implemented. The
following sections will discuss the development of ineffective controls based upon
both erroneous, and correct, counter-explanations.
3.5.2 Controls based upon erroneous counter-explanations
As noted in sections 3.3, and 3.4, the observer may not have developed, or developed
but not taken seriously, the method that the fake claimant intends to use, or has used,
during a demonstration. If this is the case, the observer is unlikely to implement
controls that are intended to counter such deception32.
32There are two exceptions to this rule. First, an effective control may occur by
accident. For example, John Nevil Maskelyne (1910) noted that when he was
watching some ostensible macro-PK being produced by the 'Davenport Brothers', a
piece of drapery fell ffom a window and the resulting ray of light revealed the way
in which the Brothers were faking the phenomena. Second, two methods may be
countered by the same control. The observer may think of the incorrect method, not
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Inappropriate controls
The observer may apply controls at an inappropriate moment in time. Thus, an
observer may not expect the magician to engage in deception before the start of the
trick. To deceive such an observer, the magician may secretly gain prior access to
the target, or target system. Fitzkee (1945) labels this 'anticipation', noting that:
...the critical thing is done before the spectator's attention is fixed
upon it (p. 165).
o
This technique was often used by the world renowned Scottish conjurer, John
Ramsey, to fool fellow magicians. As noted by Galloway (1969):
Another John Ramsey saying was 'Hold and Hide'. It simply meant,
be prepared well in advance. Before John went into company, he
always palmed a coin or a thimble so that if anyone asked him to do
a trick, he was ready...At one of the conventions he was having tea
with some of his 'disciples'.. .They asked him if he would perform his
cups and balls routine...John took out the cups and wand and went
straight into the routine. This puzzled the onlookers because they
knew that according to John's book, at the start of the effect the
performer must have four balls palmed in the right hand and they had
not seen him make any steal. The explanation was simple. John had
them palmed long before his friends asked him to do the trick. In fact
he had eaten a meal with the balls concealed in his hand. (p. 2-3).
Fuller (1975) has noted how pseudo-psychics may also use this technique, especially
when they find themselves working on television. Fuller notes how it is usually
possible to be able to gain access to target materials before the start of a
demonstration. These objects may be left laying around, although the observer,
watching the television show may not suspect that this is the case. Alternatively, an
observer can be deceived by a fake claimant engaging in deception after a
demonstration has apparently terminated. Fitzkee (1945) has referred to this as
'premature consummation', noting that:
...the critical thing is done after the attention has relaxed, (p. 165).
realising that by controlling against this method, he/she is also countering the correct
method.
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For example, at the conclusion to 'The Miser's Dream'33, the magician may produce
a flurry of coins, and then bow to the audience. As such, the audience may assume
that the trick has finished, and relax their vigilance. The magician may utilise this
lapse in attention to steal34 a final load of coins. These coins can then be suddenly
produced as the audience are applauding.
Absent controls
The observer may not have developed the tactic by which the claimant intends to
fabricate macro-PK. Again, this may lead an observer to apply inappropriate
controls. For example, the observer may believe that any trickery taking place during
a demonstration will appear suspicious. If this were the case, such an observer would
be deceived if the fake claimant is able to use trickery that appeared quite natural.
Magicians have labelled this stratagem the 'principle of naturality'. One of its most
well known practitioners, magician Dai Vernon, has stated:
.. .watch a good performer and note that he is perfectly at ease because
he is doing the things that are natural to him.. .he has adapted the tricks
so that they fit him like a glove ...Every action he makes is a natural
action; if he picks up an object that he is going to make vanish, then
he does not pick it up in a way that only takes into account the position
he needs to hold it to perform the sleight; he has altered the sleight so
that when he picks up the object in the way that is natural to him it is
already in position to be vanished. (Ganson, 1958, p. 32).
Fitzkee (1945) also advocated the importance of the principle, writing:
Here is an example where an unnatural appearance on the part of the
performer would awaken the suspicions of his spectators: The
magician^ is smartly groomed. He is polished, refined, confident,
poised. It would be natural that his costume would be well-fitting and
smartly cut. But this particular magician desires to produce a large
rabbit. He wants to use a rabbit bag under his arm. If the dress suit
he wears were to be shaped to his contours, there would be an
unsightly bulge. This would be visible. It would act as a stimulus to
33A classic stage production routine in which a seemingly endless supply of coins
are plucked from the air and dropped into some form of receptacle (see Whaley,
1989, p.454).
34Any sleight used by magicians to secretly gain possession of an object, or
number of objects (see Whaley, 1989, p. 645).
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the minds of the spectators, (p. 87).
To achieve such naturality, fake claimants may exploit the types of actions, and
objects, which the observer encounters in everyday life. For example, in discussing
the psychology behind fake PK metal bending, Harris (1985) notes that:
...if a common everyday object is used, the audience can identify with
that object, and they automatically and naturally assume that the item
is free from deception, (p. 11).
Alternatively, the fake claimant may actually create certain 'norms', which an
observer will not then find suspicious. These norms can be created through repetition.
C
Mulholland (1929) notes the use of this strategy by the well known Chinese magician,
Ching Ling Foo. Foo was well known for the production of a large fish bowl under
a scarf that had previously been shown to be empty. For the production to be
successful, Foo had to secrete the bowl between his legs, beneath a full length
Chinese robe. However, when the bowl was in place Foo was restricted to rather a
'straddle legged walk'. To prevent the audience being suspicious of this, rather
unusual, movement Foo formed the habit of always walking in this way, regardless
of whether or not he had the bowl secreted between his legs!
Magicians strive to utilise the 'principle of naturality' throughout all aspects of their
performances. For example, if a magician has to employ fake apparatus (e.g., a
'bottomless glass'35, or a 'mirror box'36) the performer may disguise it as an
'everyday' object. Fitzkee (1945) in his advice to magicians, notes:
Some pieces of apparatus...are tricky looking. Spectators are certain
to regard them with utmost suspicion... The device looks just like what
it most obviously is - something with which to do tricks....No frankly
looking magical device is nearly as deceptive as a device which looks
like an ordinary thing familiar to the spectator. This is because, since
the device is a special contrivance, it must be suspected, (p. 111- 112).
35'A tumbler of clear glass faked by being completely open at the lower end'.
(Whaley, 1989, p. 98).
36'A production box fitted with an angled mirror to provide a concealed load
chamber occupying half of the volume of the box, which can be shown apparently
empty' (Whaley, 1989, p. 451).
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A magician also attempts to make his/her sleight-of-hand appear perfectly natural,
going to great lengths in order to do so. For example, Dai Vernon has noted how one
well known sleight-of-hand performer, Charlie Miller would:
...sit up twenty hours if necessary, just to make a movement look
natural - and that's after he has learnt how to do that actual sleight
(Ganson, 1958, p. 34).
In addition, Ascanio (1982), an Italian master of magic, notes that:
Naturalness..is the normal way people behave in their gestures,
postures and actions...if the magician, who is keeping a card palmed,
achieves this naturalness of gestures, postures and actions, the palm
will not be suspected. The attentive eye of the spectator will not see
anything, it will slide over the palming hand, like the look of a warlike
observer over a well hidden gun: nothing unusual is seen as the eye
rests its look on it. (p. 5).
In support of his argument, Ascanio advises magicians to create both static37, and
dynamic38, actions that appear natural. Part of such naturality entails the magician
appearing to have a logical reason for carrying out an action. For this reason,
magicians often employ the concept of the 'ruse', defined by Fitzkee (1945) as:
.. .disguising purposes rather than things. It supplies a false reason for
doing something, for example, and thus conceals the true purpose of
the action. It is a crafty expedient, devised and contrived to divert
attention from one's real intent, (p. 152).
For example, a magician may appear to place a ball from his/her right hand into
his/her left whilst, in reality, retaining the ball in his/her right hand. He/she then
reaches into his/her pocket with his/her right hand (containing the concealed ball),
apparently to fetch a magic wand. However, the real reason for moving his/her right
hand to his/her pocket is to enable him/her to ditch the concealed ball into the pocket.
The magician then taps his/her left hand with the magic wand, both hands can be
shown empty, and the ball has apparently vanished. To help magicians structure their
performances in this way, Ascanio advises performers to perform sleight of hand as
'in transit actions' (see section 3.3.2.2).
37The stationary postures, and stances, utilised by magicians during their
performances.
38The gestures, and movements, made by a magician during his performance.
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Also, whilst performing any type of trickery, magicians make their speech appear as
natural as possible. For example, one of the most basic rules of conjuring dictates
that one should never describe a piece of faked apparatus as 'ordinary'. As noted by
Sharpe, (1988):
Many teachers of conjuring warn their students against describing
articles as 'ordinary' knowing that such assertions are more likely to
raise doubts th£n if no comment had been made. (p. 55),
whilst Fitzkee (1945), in agreement, writes:
One naturally stresses that a thing is ordinary only when there is a
reason to suspect that it isn't, (p. 44).
Fitzkee also warns magicians against altering the delivery of speech when engaging
in any form of trickery. Fitzkee notes that the rate of delivery, style of enunciation,
pitch and tempo must all remain natural, noting:
It does not take the spectator long to realise that these variations from
the norm 'telegraph' the approach of some crisis for the magician. It
is an indirect way for the performer almost to say to the spectator, 'I
am now approaching the critical phase in the accomplishment of this
trick. If you are alert and observing, you may catch me', (p. 95-96).
In a similar vein, many manuals of magic advise the magician not to engage in any
action which might 'telegraph' when any form of trickery is taking place. This entails
a magician being able to control a large range of verbal, and non-verbal, signals. As
noted by Leech (1960):
...never permit yourself to get yourself into that very bad habit...that
of making some facial contortions at the moment of the sleight. Some
blink, some twitch their face, some stick out their tongue, some clench
their teeth...such involuntary movements gives away what they are
doing, (p. 8).
In short, this section has described how a fake claimant may overcome controls
enforced against the incorrect counter-explanation. The section first noted that
controls were often absent as the trickery occurred at the wrong moment in time, that
is, either before or after the observer expected some form of deception. The section
then noted that incorrect counter-explanations may also cause the observer to
implement inappropriate controls. This point was illustrated by describing the various
ways in which magicians, and pseudo-psychics, strive to ensure that their actions, and
speech, appear perfectly natural, even when performing some type of trickery.
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3.5.3 Controls based upon the correct counter-explanation
The observer may have developed the correct counter-explanation (i.e., the hypothesis
which the magician, or pseudo-psychic intends to employ, or has employed, during
the demonstration). If this is the case, the fake claimant must attempt to surmount
controls designed to counter this hypothesis. This section will discuss the way in
which this is achieved during both active, and retrospective, analyses.
3.5.3.1 Active analysis
First, the observer may have developed the correct method, but ineffectual controls
to counter this method. If this is the case, the fake claimant may engage in trickery
without fear of hinderance, or detection. The conjuring, and pseudo-psychic,
literature contains many examples of this stratagem.
First, the fake claimant may be able to anticipate the controls which will be used
during a demonstration, and thus be able to secretly overcome them. For example,
the magician may say he/she will tear up, and then restore, a napkin. The observer
may correctly realise that one method would involve the magician secretly swapping
the torn napkin for a duplicate, whole, napkin. In an attempt to prevent the magician
using this method, the observer may take note of some identifying mark on the
original napkin. However, the magician can overcome this measure by marking the
duplicate napkin in an identical way as the original.
Second, the fake claimant may, whilst the demonstration is occurring, identify which
controls are being applied and be able to secretly overcome them. For example,
magicians have realised that, after they have made a small object (e.g., a coin)
apparently vanish, the observer may be suspicious that they have the object concealed
in their hands. If the observer is correct, the magician has to show his/her hands as
apparently empty whilst, in reality, concealing the presence of the object. Magicians
have devised several different sleight-of-hand movements for exactly this purpose,
labelling them 'acquitments' (Whaley, 1989, p. 34). Most of these entail shifting the
object between various locations within the hands, as the hands are apparently shown
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empty (see, for example, Galloway, 1969).
Third, controls may also be ineffective because they can be removed. In the case of
physical controls, this can occur when the controls are obvious, or can be identified
from close inspection. For example, when describing some of the trickery involved
in 'Project Alpha', Randi (1986) notes how:
[the two pseudo-psychics]...were also given small, transparent, sealed
plastic boxes to take home with them, containing various objects they
were asked to affect paranormally. The sealing was done by drilling
holes into the box and lid, passing fine wire through the holes so as to
secure the lid, and sealing the joining of the wire loop with sealing-
wax impressed with a symbol. The subjects found no difficulty in
popping off the seal, opening the box, 'affecting' the contents, and
replacing the seal.. .All three of us were astonished that the impression
was formed by means of a standard 39 cent stationary-store seal...For
less than a dollar, we were able to defeat the security of a half-million-
dollar project! (p. 162).
In another example from Project Alpha, Randi notes that:
During one type of telepathy test, a subject would be given a sealed
envelope containing a picture drawn from a target pool. Left alone
with the envelope, the subject would subsequently surrender the
envelope to an experimenter, who would examine it for signs of
tampering. The subject would then announce his selection from the
target pool. This series of tests was quite successful.. .The method was
easy. Since the envelopes were 'sealed' only with a few staples, they
[the pseudo-psychics] removed them, peeked, then replaced the staples
through the original holes!39 (p. 159-160).
Both magicians, and pseudo-psychics may also be able to remove, or lessen,
observational controls. This often entails the fake claimant manipulating the intensity,
or direction, of the observer's attention. Each of these stratagems will be discussed
in turn. Both magicians, and pseudo-psychics, employ a wide range of techniques
designed to lower the intensity of an observer's attention. For example, Fuller (1975)
advises pseudo-psychics to take a long time before attempting any form of trickery.
This large time lag is designed, in part, to lower an observer's overall vigilance.
39Although this example relates to a test of telepathy, it is easy to imagine how the
task could have been one of macro-PK. For example, the experimenters may have
asked for the order of the ESP cards to be re-arranged, as opposed to divined.
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Fitzkee (1945) has labelled this strategy 'monotony'. Alternatively, magicians reduce
an observer's intensity of attention by causing the observer to laugh at a specific point
in time. Thus Leech (1960) notes:
Amusement itself is a weapon in the magician's psychological
armoury. When people are amused, their perceptions are relaxed and
they are less analytical, (p. 12).
Second, a fake claimant may manipulate the direction of an observer's attention,
steering it away from areas in which the observer is likely to detect trickery.
Magicians refer to this stratagem as 'physical misdirection'. Fitzkee (1945) has
presented a good overview of some of the techniques used to misdirect an observer's
attention. For example, Fitzkee labels one category 'diversion', and includes any
technique that diverts an observer's attention via the substitution of a new and stronger
interest, providing that it 'lures away the attention in such a manner that the change
in course seems to the spectator to be voluntary'. Nelms (1969) outlines how a
magician may utilise movement, brightness, colour or sound to attract an observer's
attention to one location. Also, Ascanio (1982) has proposed a Taw of priority of
movement', noting that:
...when two bodies start moving almost simultaneously within the
visual field, the spectator look always follows the object which started
to move. Thus.. .when separating the hands after having palmed a card,
the hand which conceals the card should not move, while the other
hand (the free hand) withdraws, (p. 5).
The magician may also divert an observer's attention via the exploitation of
'social'40, as opposed to 'physical', cues. For example, Dessoir (1897) notes that:
A specially successful method of diversion is founded on the human
craze for imitation. We are inclined to imitate all action which we
have witnessed. The conjurer counts on this in many cases. He
always looks in the direction where he wants the attention of the
public, and does everything himself which he wants the public to do.
(p.28-29).
This point has been noted by a number of writers, and has been developed to near
perfection by two highly respected magicians, namely Tony Slydini and Albert
^That is, cues which dictate where one individual should attend, on the basis of
another individuals behaviour.
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Goshman. The magician may also divert an observer attention by the use of body
language. For example, Nelms (1969) outlines how the positions of the magician's
feet, and hands, can help 'point' an observer's attention to certain locations. Leech
(1960) has also noted that the magician can misdirect by the use of 'negative
misdirection', or 'the deliberate casting of suspicion on something which is innocent'.
Fitzkee categorises other methods of physical misdirection as 'distractions'. Thus,
whereas diversion involved the observer not realising that his/her attention has been
removed, 'distraction':
...forces the attention from the significant thing. Often it is violent.
(Fitzkee, 1945, p. 166).
For example, the magician may suddenly instigate a loud noise, or flash of light, on
one part of the stage, whilst performing some type of trickery in another location.
Also, magicians may arrange for some type of intentional, or prearranged, mishap.
As noted by Leech (1960):
There can be no stronger misdirection than the carefully planned
accident. Blackstone has been using this principle for years in his duck
vanish. The ducks are shooed into a little house near one wing of the
stage. One of the ducks, however, waddles away and a uniformed
assistant dashes after it. He clips and falls as he makes a flying tackle
for the recalcitrant duck.. .While all this has been going on, an assistant
offstage slides the rest of the ducks out of the house. The misdirection
is perfect. What normal human being could resist watching a man
chase a duck? (p. 74.).
Finally, Fitzkee also notes the use of 'confusion', in which:
...so many varied individual interests are presented for the spectator's
observation that it is impossible for him, in the limited time available,
to select the significant from the insignificant, (p. 166).
For example, Fuller (1945) recommends the use of this technique in his manual of
pseudo-psychic trickery, noting:
When you're working for a group, keep talking and moving fast.
Create maximum chaos. Flit from one task to another. Fail on one
thing, put it aside, try something else, then go back and try again, and
so on. (p. 15).
For any of these stratagems to be successful, the observer must not realise that his/her
attention has been lessened, or directed to a specific location. As such, the
manipulation of attention must appear natural, and, to this end, Hugard & Braue
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(1974) advise magicians that:
It is always advisable to invent your own misdirection, for the ruses
which are suitable for one personality are rarely natural when used by
another, (p. 429).
Fake claimants may be skilled at both creating, and utilising, the exact moment that
observational controls are either relaxed, or removed. For example, Maven (1986)
describes how he observations of a faith healer named Philip Malicdon led him to
believe Malicdon was skilled at noting exactly when observers were not paying full
attention to the demonstration, and performing crude sleight of hand at this point in
time. Also, fake claimants may not perform any trickery before being quite sure that
they will not be caught doing so. For example, when discussing the magician Max
Malini, Vernon (1975) noted:
One of Malini's greatest secrets is contained in a statement he made to
Charlie Miller. Miller asked him, 'Suppose you have a card palmed
and you see that a spectator is keeping his eye on the hand that holds
the card. What do you do Max?'
'Wait' was the answer.
'How long do you wait?' Charles said.
'A week!' was the answer.
In other words, Malini would not make a move until he knew his
misdirection was covering any secret action the mechanics of a trick
forced him to make. (p. 151).
3.5.3.2 Retrospective analysis
As noted in section 2.5.3.2, during a retrospective analysis, the observer has to
reconstruct, and assess, the controls used in a past demonstration. This may involve,
for example, the observer piecing together the construction, and working, of objects
used as physical controls. If a past study used observational controls, the observer
may wish to reconstruct the physical, and psychological, state of such observers, as
well as the conditions under which observation took place.
One stratagem, employed by both magicians and pseudo-psychics, involves deceiving
an observer into believing that past controls would have countered trickery when, in
reality, this was not the case. Thus a fake claimant may deceive an observer into
reconstructing controls that appear more effective than they actually were. The issues
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involved in this stratagem are similar to those outlined in section 3.3.2.2. For
example, the observer may be basing a reconstruction upon his/her own recollections
of a past demonstration. Such recollections may be biased in several ways. A
pseudo-psychic may, in part, use 'verbal recapping' (see section 3.3.2.2) to distort the
observer's recall of the controls present at the demonstration. For example, towards
the end of a demonstration a fake medium may increase the amount of lighting in the
seance room. After a short while the medium may erroneously announce that the
lighting conditions have been good for most of the seance. Such a statement may be
made in the hope that, when reconstructing the seance, the observer will erroneously
believe that the lighting was high enough to make certain types of trickery (e.g., the
use of accomplices) impossible. In addition, after a demonstration has terminated, the
observer may be suspicious that the demonstration was faked in a certain way, and
that incriminating evidence of trickery can be discovered. However, the sophisticated
fake claimant may have already modified this evidence, such that it is no longer
incriminating. As noted by Sharpe (1988):
A simple and frequently used example of this principle consists of
switching a prepared card, or pack of cards, for normal ones before the
conclusion of a magical experiment, so that they may then...be
examined...should any suspicious character want to inspect them. (p.
62).
Additional sources of bias may be encountered by the observer who reconstructs past
controls upon the testimony of other individuals. For example, if an eyewitness
watches a pseudo-psychic, and believed the claimant to be a genuine psychic, that
eyewitness may not wish the observer to 'debunk' (i.e., produce a counter-
explanation) the demonstration. If this were the case, when relating the event to the
observer, the original eyewitness may unintentionally omit, or distort, information,
such that past controls appear more effective than they actually were.
The observer may also reconstruct information from photographs, or diagrams. Such
evidence may be biased in several ways. For example, a fake medium may have
successfully deceived a researcher into believing that a display of fake macro-PK was
genuine. During the demonstration, the medium may have been constrained by being
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tied to a chair. However, such tying may have been ineffectual, such that the medium
was able to free a limb, and fake telekinesis. The researcher may wish to take a
photograph of the controls (i.e., the tying up of the medium) used during the
demonstration. However, the pseudo-psychic may realise that this photograph may,
to certain observers (e.g., magicians), contain clues as to the type of trickery used in
the demonstration. To overcome this problem, the medium may ensure that the type
of restraint shown in the photograph is more effective than that used in the actual
demonstration.
An observer may reconstruct controls based on 'secondary sources' of information
(see section 2.3.2.2). The information, upon which these secondary sources are
based, may be biased by any of the factors outlined above. In addition, secondary
sources may be vulnerable to extra sources of bias. For example, the secondary
source may distort the original information upon which it is based, such that past
controls appear more effective than they actually were. For example, the secondary
source may not contain important information that was included in it's primary
source. Thus film footage may be edited such that important information has been
omitted. Alternatively, the secondary source may have mis-interpreted information
contained within the primary source.
In addition, even if controls that have been accurately reconstructed, the observer still
has to assess the effectiveness of these controls, and thus may be deceived by any of
the stratagems outlined in section 3.5.3.1.
3.6 EXPLOITING THE CONDITIONS APPARENTLY NEEDED TO ELICIT
MACRO-PK
3.6.1 Introduction
Section 2.6 noted how the assessment process may be influenced by whether the
conditions under which a demonstration will take or, has taken, place are regarded as
psi conducive. This section will note how a fake claimant may be able to exploit this
process during both an active, and retrospective, analysis.
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3.6.2 Active analysis
Section 2.6.2 noted how, before carrying out an active analysis, an observer may
ensure that the conditions, under which the demonstration will occur, are psi
conducive. However, a pseudo-psychic may believe that he/she will be unable to
fabricate macro-PK under such circumstances. If this is the case, the fake claimant
may attempt to alter such circumstances by stating that such conditions are not psi
conducive. The observer may be unwittingly manipulated into accepting these
conditions, not realising that such alterations aid the deception process. For example,
Randi (1986) describes how in Project Alpha, the two pseudo-psychics complained
about electronic equipment putting out 'bad vibes', such that the researchers were not
able to videotape the demonstrations. In addition, Burger (1986) outlines how fake
mediums insist that all of the sitters must link hands during a seance. The fake
medium may state that this is necessary to bring forth spirit communication. In reality
it is designed to prevent curious sitters from reaching out into the seance room, and
possibly discovering various forms of trickery (such as reaching rods and
accomplices).
3.6.3 Retrospective analysis
During a past demonstration, a fake claimant may have been unable to fabricate
macro-PK. If this were the case, the claimant may attempt to explain away such
failure by stating that the conditions of the demonstration were not psi conducive.
For example, Burger (1986) notes that, if a fake medium is unable to fabricate
phenomena, he/she can state:
'Well, my friends, conditions sometimes are just not right for this sort
of thing'. You see...there's always an 'out' - a non-humiliating, non-
embarrassing, perfectly reasonable (given the folk-accepted assumptions
about seances and how they 'work'), perfectly acceptable out for a
failure, (p. 107).
Also, Harris (1985) accuses Geller of using this strategy when he writes:
...[Geller] gave the impression that the experiment would not be
successful without the audience mentally willing it to be so...This
approach gave Geller a perfect 'out' or 'asylum'. If the experiment
failed, rather than accept the blame himself he could pass it on to the
spectators via the excuse that they weren't concentrating hard enough.
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Or possibly that there were 'negative' forces present, (p. 8-9).
Such a strategy manipulates the observer into discounting the demonstration, rather
than concluding that the claimant has failed.
3.7 ERRONEOUS ASSESSMENT OF THE RUNNING. OR RESULTS OF A
DEMONSTRATION
3.7.1 Introduction
Section 2.7 noted the stages involved when an observer assesses the running, and
results, of a demonstration. This section will outline how this process may be
disrupted by both magicians and pseudo-psychics.
3.7.2 Erroneous running of a demonstration
Section 2.7.2 noted how, when running an active analysis, an observer has to assess
if the controls, used in a study, were properly implemented during that study. Fake
claimants may deceive the observer into believing that certain controls were properly
implemented when, in reality, this was not the case. A pseudo-psychic may secretly
tamper with physical controls before, or during, a demonstration and render them
ineffective. For example, Randi (1986) discusses how the two pseudo-psychics
involved in Project Alpha were able to gain overnight access to the McDonnell
Parapsychology Laboratory, and tamper with the test equipment. In addition, a
pseudo-psychic may be able to discover the nature of 'hidden' controls, and thus be
in a better position to overcome such measures.
3.7.3 Erroneous assessment of results
Section 2.7.3 noted how an observer assesses the outcome of a demonstration. A vital
part of this process involves judging if any apparent evidence of fraud could be
accounted for by 'non-fraud' hypotheses. Fake claimants use two stratagems aimed
at exploiting this process.
First, the fake claimant may manipulate the observer into selecting controls which are
likely to produce evidence of fraud that can be explained away in such a way that the
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claimant doesn't appear to be a trickster. It has often proved problematic to
unambiguously accuse a claimant of fraud based on a photograph. For example, In
1933 Harry Price accused Rudi Schneider of fabricating the apparent psychic
movement of a handkerchief by freeing an arm during a seance. Price supported his
allegations with a single photograph, taken at the seance, and which apparently
showed Schneider's arm to be free of his controllers. However, whether or not this
photograph does show Schneider engaging in fraud has been the topic for a long
debate, with proponents of Schneider arguing, for example, that a photographic flash
may have caused Schneider to jerk his arm away from his controllers (for a detailed
overview of this entire episode, see Gregory, 1977). Given the difficulties involved
in accusing an individual of fraud on the basis of a still photograph, a pseudo-psychic
may encourage an observer to use such a control.
Second, the fake claimant may create several excuses to 'explain away' evidence of
fraud discovered by an observer. This may entail the pseudo-psychic quickly thinking
of an hypothesis during the demonstration itself. For example, Baggally, Johnson,
Feilding, Taylor and Lobb (1906) report how, during a seance given by the pseudo-
medium Christopher Chambers, a false moustache (used to fabricate materialisations
of spirits) was discovered in the seance room. Chambers attempted to explain away
such evidence by telling sitters that it was difficult to materialise whiskers and
moustaches, so the 'guide' had made a false moustache, and left it as a souvenir!.
Indeed, the fake claimant may make such excuses part of the 'lore' which govern
his/her psychic ability. For example, Randi (1982a) has reported that one researcher,
Dr P. J. Lincoln (a specialist in blood group serology and forensic medicine at
London Hospital Medical College), investigated the claims being made by Filipino
psychic surgeons. Lincoln surreptitiously obtained some of the apparently 'bad tissue'
removed from a patient, by an alleged psychic surgeon, and analyzed it. Lincoln
discovered that the blood sample was from a cow, and that the 'tumour' was a piece
of chicken intestine. However, the surgeons attempted to explain away this evidence
stating that it was a well known fact that 'supernatural forces' convert the tumours
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into innocuous substances once they have left the patient's body.
3.8 SUMMARY
This chapter discussed how the proto-model, outlined in the previous chapter, can be
used to categorise the stratagems employed in the fabrication of macro-PK. The
chapter first discussed how a pseudo-psychic may deceive an observer into misframing
a fake demonstration as genuine. This included a discussion of the way in which a
pseudo-psychic manipulates the cognitive, motivational and social processes involved
in the framing of a demonstration. The chapter next outlined how both magicians,
and pseudo-psychics, may deceive an observer into not forming the correct counter-
explanation to account for the way in which trickery will be, or has been, used to
fabricate macro-PK. These stratagems centred around the exploitation of the
observer's claim schemata, causal schemata, and perceived adequacy ofprior counter-
explanations. The chapter also noted how, even if such an explanation is developed,
it may erroneously be rejected by an observer as implausible. The chapter next
discussed the ways in which an observer can be deceived into erroneously believing
that a demonstration will contain, or has contained, effective controls against
deception. The following section outlined how a fake claimant may manipulate the
conditions, apparently needed to elicit psi. In an active analysis, such manipulation
may increased the possibility for trickery. In a retrospective analysis, such
4-0
manipulation can persuade an observer,reject an unsuccessful demonstration (i.e., one
at which fake macro-PK could not be performed) as non-evidential. Finally, the
of
chapter noted how a fake claimant may be able to exploit affect the running of a
study, and 'explain away' evidence of fraud which might be uncovered during, or
after, a demonstration.
The following chapter will elaborate upon, and experimentally assess, just one portion
of the proto-model outlined in both this chapter and chapter two, namely; the way in
which an observers belief in psi effects their recall of pseudo-psychic demonstrations.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE OBSERVATION, AND RECALL, OF PSEUDO-PSYCHIC
TRICKERY: AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS41
4.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes the experimental examination of one section of the proto-model
outlined in the previous two chapters.
Section 2.3.2.2 noted how observers often use information recalled from memory to
reconstruct a past demonstration of ostensible macro-PK. Section 3.3.2.2 then
discussed how this reconstruction process may be biased by a number of factors, such
as 'verbal recapping', and 'in transit actions'. The section also noted that it is
difficult to judge the true effect that these factors have on recall, primarily because
so little previous research has examined this issue. This section will first briefly
review this small amount of research, and then outline the rationale for undertaking
the studies described in the remainder of the chapter.
4,1-1 Previous research
Within parapsychology, only three studies have experimentally investigated the
observation, recall and assessment of ostensibly psychic demonstrations. The first of
these, carried out by Hodgson & Davey (1887), examined the reliability of testimony
relating to fake slate writing phenomena. Davey held several fake seances for
unsuspecting sitters, requesting that each sitter should write a description of the seance
after it had terminated. Davey then published these accounts, carefully noting all of
the errors made by sitters (e.g., the fact that many events were omitted completely,
recalled in an incorrect order etc.). Although, this study was pioneering, its
usefulness is limited because the authors made no real attempt to isolate the conditions
affecting reliability. The second paper, written by Besterman (1932), drew results
41The experiments described in this chapter were presented in a paper at The
Parapsychological Association 34th Annual Convention, Heidelberg, 1991.
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from forty-two sitters, who attended one of six seances. Sitters sat facing a table, on
which a number of objects (mostly musical instruments) were placed. The lights were
lowered, and the 'seance' began. During the seance, the medium moved (by 'normal'
means) various objects on the table, and a flash photograph was taken. After the
termination of the seance, the sitters were asked questions relating to the various
phenomena that had occurred. Besterman reports that sitters had a slight tendency to
underestimate the number of persons present in the seance room, often failed to report
major disturbances which took place (e.g., the movement of the experimenter to, and
from, the seance room), were unable to recall the conditions under which given
phenomena took place, and occasionally experienced the illusionary movements of
objects. Also, many sitters were unable to correctly report the scene when it was
briefly lit up by the photographic flash. In addition, Besterman examined individual
differences in recall among the sitters. He found little differences when comparing
the scores of experienced to inexperienced sitters, or those that experienced illusions
during the seance, to those that did not. The third study (Singer & Benassi, 1980),
focused upon the assessment, as opposed to the recall, of a pseudo-psychic
demonstration. Singer & Benassi had a pseudo-psychic perform to two groups of
students. The experimenter informed one group that they were about to see a
magician, and told the other group they were about to see a 'demonstration of psychic
abilities'. After the demonstration, all Ss were asked to note whether they believed
the performer was a genuine psychic, or a magician. A high percentage
(approximately two thirds) of both groups stated they believed the performer to be a
genuine psychic. In a follow-up experiment the researchers added a third 'strong
magic' condition, wherein the experimenter stressed that the performer was definitely
a magician. However, fifty eight percent of the Ss in this group still stated they
believed the performer to be a genuine psychic. This lack of research within
parapsychology is surprising, especially given the potential benefits which the area
may gain through such work. For example, it is vital for parapsychologists to
minimise the effects of bias on the observation, and recall, of a demonstration of
ostensible psychic ability. Also, it is important for thep to be able to accurately assess
the affect that such bias may have on eyewitness testimony relating to these types of
89
demonstrations which have occurred in the past. In short, parapsychologists need to
fully understand the factors, both psychological and environmental, that can interfere
with observation.
Within cognitive psychology, researchers have devoted much of their time to
examining the biases which influence the observation, and recall, of a wide variety
of complex stimuli (see Matlin [1989] for a general overview of this work). Many
studies have employed verbal stimuli, often in the form of narrative. For example,
Greene (1981) asked Ss to read unsolved crime stories, and examined how the recall
of that story was distorted by Ss judgement as to which of two suspects were guilty.
Other research has employed short descriptive passages as stimuli. For example, in
1977, Anderson, Reynolds, Schallert & Goetz (described in Wilson & Anderson,
1984) asked two groups of Ss to read a short passage describing an individual
planning his escape from some form of restraint. Ss in one group were not pre¬
selected on any specific criteria, and, for the most part, interpreted the passage as
pertaining to a convict trying to escape from prison. Ss in the second group were all
preselected for their interest in the sport of wrestling, and perceived the passage as
pertaining to a wrestler caught in a 'hold'. When asked to recall the passage, theme-
related distortions appeared, even though instructions emphasised reproducing the
exact words of the original text. Other research has employed visual stimuli. For
example, in a now 'classic' study (described in Buckhout, 1974), Gordon Allport
asked Ss to look at a drawing of several people sitting on a subway train, including
a white man (holding a razor) arguing with a black man. Allport discovered that fifty
per cent of Ss later reported that the razor was in the hand of the black man. Massad,
Hubbard & Newtson (1979) asked Ss to watch a/ianimated film which showed various
shapes (e.g., a large triangle, a small triangle and a circle) moving, and interacting,
with one another. Before viewing, Ss were asked to perceive the movement of the
shapes as symbolising either the large triangle guarding treasure from, or as a bully
harassing, the other two shapes. Ss recall of the film was influenced, in part, by the
instructive set under which they viewed the film. As reflected in the above examples,
much of the research concerned with observational bias has focused on how
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individuals' expectations can induce them to interpret stimuli in a certain way, and,
in turn, bias their recall of such stimuli. However, one of the major problems faced
by this line of research has been the construction of stimuli which can be interpreted
in more than one way, but does not appear too contrived (see Wilson & Anderson,
1984). Given that pseudo-psychic demonstrations can be perceived as either a genuine
psychic occurrence or as trickery, and are clearly naturalistic phenomena (see section
1.5), they seem ideal candidates to act as stimuli in this type of research. As such,
it is perhaps surprising that only two studies have employed pseudo-psychic
phenomena in this way. Jones, Russell & Nickel (1976) had both believers in psi
(Sheep42) and disbelievers (Goats) watch a demonstration of ESP. In one condition
the demonstration was successful (i.e., ESP appeared to occur), in the other it was
unsuccessful. All Ss were then asked to recall the study. Sheep who saw the
unsuccessful study distorted their memories of it, and often stated that ESP had
occurred. Goats correctly recalled the study, regardless of its success. In a follow
up study, Russell & Jones (1980) showed both Sheep and Goats a report of an ESP
experiment. Ss in one condition were told that the results showed no ESP, Ss in the
other condition were told exactly the opposite. All Ss were then asked to recall the
report. In the 'ESP disproven' condition Goats recalled more of the report than
Sheep. In the 'ESP proven' condition, their was no difference in recall between
Sheep and Goats. In short, pseudo-psychic phenomena seem ideal candidates to act
as stimuli in experimentation examining the factors which interfere with the
observation, and recall, of complex events. However, despite such promise, very few
studies have been carried out in this area.
4,1.2 Rationale for present experimentation
Given the small amount of previous work in this area, it was decided to undertake a
42This chapter will adopt the convention, often used within parapsychology (see,
e.g., Schmeidler & McConnell, 1958), of referring to individuals who express a belief
in psi as 'Sheep', and individuals who express a disbelief in psi as 'Goats'. However,
it should be noted that experiments in this area often employ quite different measures
of belief/disbelief in psi (see section 4.2.2.3).
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number of studies which further investigated the observation of pseudo-psychic
phenomena. The studies concentrated upon how just one factor (namely; observers'
belief in psi) affects the observation, and recall, of a pseudo-psychic demonstration.
This factor was chosen for three reasons. First, previous research has demonstrated
that observers' beliefs can influence the observation, and recall, of complex stimuli.
For example, Hastorf & Cantril (1954) asked Ss to view, assess, and recall, a film
of an important American football game. The recall of Ss' supporting one team
differened in many ways from the recall of Ss supporting the opposing team. Second,
the two previous studies which have examined the way in which belief in psi interacts
with the observation, and recall, of pseudo-psychic phenomena (i.e., Jones, Russell
& Nickel, 1976, Russell & Jones, 1980) have found it to be an important factor.
Third, previous research suggests that an individuals' belief in psi may correlate with
their performance on certain measures of cognitive ability. For example, Alcock &
Otis (1980) report finding that Goats score significantly higher than Sheep on Watson
& Glaser's Critical Thinking Appraisal Inventory. Also, Blackmore & Troscianko
(1985) have reported differences in Sheep/Goats performance on tasks which involve
assessments of probability. For example, in one question, relating to the well known
'birthday question' (i.e., How many people would you need to have at a party to have
a 50:50 chance that two people have the same birthday?), Goats gave the correct
answer (twenty-two) significantly more often than Sheep. Given all of the above, it
seemed reasonable to expect an individual's belief in psi to interact with his/her
observation, and recall, of a pseudo-psychic demonstration. An understanding of how
belief/disbelief in psi influences such observation/recall, could help parapsychologists
wishing to accurately observe psychic claimants during active investigations, and
assess testimony relating to past demonstrations of ostensibly psychic phenomena. In
addition, the findings from such studies may help cognitive psychologists understand
more about the way in which an individual's belief interacts with the observation, and
recall, of a novel type of complex event.
4.2 PILOT STUDY 1
4,2,1 Introduction
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This pilot study examined how observers' belief in psi influences the observation,
recall, and problem solving performance, of a videotaped pseudo-psychic
demonstration.
Ss first completed a questionnaire regarding their belief in the existence of genuine
psychics. All Ss then watched a videotape of a pseudo-psychic demonstration. After
watching the videotape, all Ss were asked to assess the videotape for paranormal
content. It was assumed that Ss would perceive the demonstrations in accordance with
their own beliefs in psi. Thus Goats would view the demonstrations as magic tricks,
whilst Sheep would see them as genuine paranormal phenomena. For this reason, it
was hypothesized that Sheep would rate the demonstrations as significantly more
paranormal than Goats.
Next, Ss were asked to postulate either 'paranormal', and/or 'normal', explanations
for the demonstrations on the videotape. It was assumed that Goats would offer
hypotheses pertaining to trickery, whilst Sheep would offer hypotheses which involved
genuine psychic functioning. These protocols were scored with regard to the actual
method of trickery used by the pseudo-psychic on the videotape. Thus, it was
hypothesised that Goats would score significantly higher than Sheep on the problem
solving task.
Ss were then asked to recall two categories of information from the videotape:
'important' information (i.e., information central to the methodology of the tricks on
the videotape) and 'unimportant' information (i.e., information that was
inconsequential to the methodology of the tricks). As noted in the beginning of this
chapter, a number of studies concerned with the effect that expectation has on the
recall of complex material have found that information which is relevant to a Ss'
expectancy is better recalled than information which is irrelevant (for a brief review
of this 'importance effect', see Alba & Hasher, 1983). It was assumed that Goats
would frame the demonstrations as magic tricks, and would correctly recall
significantly more 'important' information than Sheep. Sheep and Goats were
93
expected to recall the same number of 'unimportant' information.
If this differential occurred, it could be interpreted in several ways. One possibility
is that the differences in belief primes the Ss to encode43/store qualitatively different
types of information from the videotape. A second possibility is that the processes
involved at the encoding/storage stages are quite similar, but that different 'retrieval
sets' (i.e., attempting recall whilst believing the demonstration to be either a genuine
psychic event, or a magic show) may lead to the recall of different types of
information. To tease apart these explanations, Ss were then told that the videotape
did not contain genuine psi, but magic tricks. Without seeing the videotape for a
second time, Ss were then asked to complete a second set of recall questions (half of
which were 'important', half 'unimportant'). If the differential recall, assumed to be
present in the first recall period, was due to differences in the encoding/storage stages
of memory one would expect the Sheep still to show a deficit for the recall of
'important' information. If this differential recall was due to differences in retrieval
set one would expect the Sheep and Goats to recall equivalent amounts of 'important'
information. Previous research on this problem (see Taylor & Crocker, 1981, for a
brief review of the literature) has found 'encoding effects' to play a larger role in
influencing recall than 'retrieval effects'. Thus it was hypothesised that Goats would
still recall significantly more 'important' information than Sheep. Again, differential
recall for 'unimportant' information was not expected.
4-2.2 Method
4.2.2.1 Design
This study was a 2x2 mixed design. The between factor (grouping Ss with regard to
their belief in genuine psychic ability) had two levels (Sheep and Goats). The within
factor (whether or not the Ss were explicitly informed that the videotape contained
trickery) had two levels (i.e., Ss attempted recall both before, and after, they were
43The term 'encode' is being used to include cognitive processes such as attention
and perception, as well as the memorial processes involved in the actual encoding of
a trace.
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told that the videotape did not contain genuine psychic phenomena).
There were three dependent variables. First, Ss rated each of the demonstrations for
'paranormal content'. Second, Ss completed a problem solving task. Third, Ss
attempted to recall specific features of the videotape.
4.2.2.2 Subjects
Ss (N=28) were recruited from the undergraduate population of the psychology
department of Edinburgh University. They were recruited via a poster simply asking
for Ss for an experiment being run within the Koestler Chair of Parapsychology.
4.2.2.3 Materials
Belief in the Paranormal Questionnaire (BPQ)
Many questionnaires measuring belief in the paranormal have been constructed for
studies investigating how such belief in psi may effect scoring on an ESP, or PK, task
(see, e.g., Palmer, 1986, Rush, 1986a). As noted by Palmer (1972), these
questionnaires often contain components relating to issues outside of simple belief in
psi, asking, for example, if the S believes that he/she possesses psychic ability. As
such, these questionnaires were deemed unsuitable for this present study, and instead
the 'Belief in the Paranormal Questionnaire' (BPQ) was constructed. This consisted
of six questions, each asking about the possibility that certain individuals may possess
different types ofparanormal ability (e.g., clairvoyance, telepathy etc.). Ss responded
to each question on a five point scale, indicating the degree to which they believed
such individuals to exist. This questionnaire was scored by allotting a score between
1 (strong agreement) 5 (strong disagreement) to each of the six questions. All Ss fell
onto a continuum between 6 (strong Sheep) and 30 (strong Goat). To sub-divide the
Ss into 2 groups, those scoring between 6-17 were classified as Sheep, and those
scoring between 19-30 as Goats. Ss scoring exactly 18 were omitted from the data.
A copy of this questionnaire, along with further details, concerning the inter-
correlations of questions on this scale, are contained in Appendix B.
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Stimuli videotape
The stimuli videotape lasted eight minutes and contained a magician (who performed
the tricks), and an interviewer (who guided the magician from one trick to another).
Both interviewer and magician were seated at a table throughout the videotape.
The videotape contained three magic tricks. Two of the tricks fabricated macro-PK
(i.e., key bending, and cutlery bending/breaking), whilst the other trick fabricated
ESP (i.e., the divination of ESP cards). All three tricks were selected to fulfil a
number of criteria. First, they did not require more than two individuals (i.e., one
performer, one spectator) for their performance. Second, none of the tricks required
either individual to leave the table. Third, the procedures which had to be openly
carried out by both magician and spectator (e.g., choosing of cards, choosing of
cutlery) were easily seen and understood. Fourth, the videotape had to hold the
interest of the observer, and thus some parts of the tricks (e.g., the bending of the
fork as it is rubbed by the magician) were visually dramatic.
The videotape was filmed from a single camera position (approximately seven foot
from the performers) and was made in one take, such that there was no editing of the
footage. The videocamera did not cut away from the magician when he performed
any form of trickery, and thus each of the tricks could be 'solved' (without extensive
knowledge of conjuring, or psychic fraud) from the information contained on the
videotape. A brief description of this videotape is contained in Appendix C.
'Paranormal content' rating
All Ss were asked to rate each demonstration for paranormal content. The rating scale
ranged between 1 (definitely paranormal) to 7 (definitely not paranormal). For each
S, all four ratings (i.e., one per. demonstration) were summed to provide an overall
rating score which ranged between 4 and 28.
Problem solving material
The free response problem solving task entailed Ss writing down any suggestions as
to how the ostensible psychic phenomena on the videotape may have been achieved.
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To score the resulting protocols, the methodology of each trick was broken down into
a general principle, and a number of more specific elements. Ss were given one mark
for correctly noting the overall method of the trick, and a further half-mark for each
correct specific detail of method. This method of scoring had been pretested during
a previous pilot study, and found to be practical. The scoring system for each trick
is contained in Appendix D.
Recall material
For each of the two recall periods (i.e., before and after being told that the videotape
contained trickery), there were three sets of recall questions, one set for each
demonstration and four questions in each set. Each question consisted of a statement
about the videotape, followed by a five point scale on which the S could indicate the
degree to which she/he felt the statement to be true, or false. The questions were
constructed such that, for each set of four questions, two of the questions were (in the
opinion of the author) 'important' to the methods of the tricks in the demonstration.
The two other questions were seen as 'unimportant' on the same criteria. These
'important', and 'unimportant', questions were counter-balanced with regards to the
number of correct 'true' verses 'false' answers required. To score these questions,
Ss were given one mark if they indicated the correct answer to a question. For
example, if the correct answer to a question was 'true', Ss were given one mark if
they had responded either 'definitely true' or 'probably true'. All other responses
were marked incorrect, and no marks awarded. A copy of these recall questions is
presented in Appendix E.
4.2.2.4 Set-up
Ss (N=28) were group tested in two groups, with each group containing 14 Ss. Both
groups were tested, in a small lecture room in the Psychology Department of
Edinburgh University, at identical times (10 a.m.), on consecutive days. Ss watched
the videotape on a single 26 inch colour monitor connected to a Panasonic D80
videotape player. All Ss sat at separate tables, in two rows of approximately 14 Ss
per row. The front row of Ss sat approximately six feet away from the monitor,
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whilst the back row sat approximately three feet behind the first row, thus giving all
participants a good view of the television screen.
4.2.2.5 Procedure
Ss were first asked to complete the 'Belief in the Paranormal' Questionnaire. E then
carefully explained that the videotape which was about to be shown contained an
individual claiming to have psychic ability. E also explained that the videotape was
taken as a first step in assessing this claim, and that the Ss should watch the videotape
as carefully as possible. E stated that there was absolutely no collusion between the
interviewer and claimant, and that all objects used in the videotape were supplied by
Edinburgh University. Ss were shown the videotape, and were then asked to rate the
'paranormal content' of each demonstration. Ss were then given five minutes to
complete the free response problem solving task. Ss then completed the first set of
recall questions. E collected these booklets (to prevent Ss changing their answers after
being told the tape did not contain a psychic) and handed out the second booklet. E
explained that the videotape did not contain a psychic, but rather a magician skilled
at faking psi phenomena. Ss were then asked to complete the second set of recall
questions.
4,2,3 Results
4.2.3.1 Belief in the Paranormal Questionnaire
The mean score on the BPQ (min=6, max=30, mid-point= 18) for Sheep (N=17)
was 14.88 (sd=2.2), and for Goats (N=9) was 22.77 (sd=4.21).
4.2.3.2 Paranormal content rating
It was hypothesised that Sheep would rate the demonstrations as significantly more
paranormal than the Goats. This hypothesis proved correct, and Table 7.1 contains
the summarised data for this analysis.
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Table 7.1: Means and standard deviations (in brackets), t- score
(unpaired) and probabilities for rating of demonstrations by Sheep and










t-score (1 tailed, df=24) -1.92
P 0.03
4.2.3.3 Problem solving
It was hypothesised that the problem solving scores of the Goats would be
significantly higher than that of Sheep. Although Goats did score higher than Sheep,
the difference was not significant. Table 7.2 contains the summary data for this
analysis.
Table 7.2: Means, standard deviations (in brackets), t- scores (unpaired)











t-scores (1 tailed, df=24) -1.59
P 0.06
4.2.3.4 First recall period
In the first recall period, it was predicted that Goats would recall significantly more
'important' items that Sheep. Sheep and Goats were not expected to differ in their
recall of 'unimportant' questions. Goats did recall more 'important' information than
Sheep but this difference was not significant. Sheep tended to recall more
'unimportant' information than Goats, but again this difference was not significant.
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Table 7.3 contains the summary data for these analyses.
Table 7.3: Means, standard deviations (in brackets), t- scores (unpaired)
and probability of 'important' and 'unimportant' questions recalled (first














t-scores (df=24) -1.37 (1 tailed) 1.48 (2 tailed)
P 0.09 0.14
4.2.3.5 Second recall period
In the second recall period it was hypothesised that Goats would recall significantly
more 'important' items than Sheep. Goats and Sheep were not expected to differ in
their recall of 'unimportant' information. There were no significant differences,
between groups, for the recall of either 'important', or 'unimportant', information.
Table 7.4 contains the summary data for these analyses.
Table 7.4: Means, standard deviations (in brackets), t- scores (unpaired)
and probability for 'important' and 'unimportant' questions recalled














t-scores (df=24) -0.05 (1 tailed) 0.94 (2 tailed)
P 0.48 0.92
In summary, Sheep rated the demonstrations as significantly more paranormal than
Goats. Goats scored higher than Sheep on the problem solving task, but the
difference was not significant. In the first recall period, Goats did recall more
'important' items than Sheep, and Sheep more 'unimportant' items than Goats.
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However, neither of these differences reached significance. In the second recall
period, there were no significant differences, between Sheep and Goats, for the recall
of either 'important', or 'unimportant', items.
4.2.4 Discussion
Goats rated the demonstrations as significantly less paranormal than Sheep. This
indicates that Sheep are more likely than Goats to erroneously attribute psychic ability
to a psychic claimant.
As predicted, Goats performed better than Sheep in both the problem solving task,
and the recall of 'important' items during the first recall period. However, despite
these differences being fairly large, they failed to reach significance. This lack of
significance may be due to the small number of Goats (N=9) in this study. Future
research should provide a more complete test of these hypotheses, by employing a
larger subject pool.
In the second recall period, there were no differences, for recall of either 'important',
or 'unimportant', information. This is suggestive that the differences, found in the
first recall period, were due to Sheep and Goats employing different 'retrieval sets',
as opposed to differences in encoding/storing strategies. Once these differences in
retrieval set are removed (i.e., both groups told that the videotape contains trickery),
the Sheep seemed able to recall as much 'important, and 'unimportant', information
as the Goats. Again it should be noted that this pilot study employed a small number
of Goats, and thus the above result may be unreliable.
Two methodological points should also be noted for future research.
First, recall questions were not counterbalanced between first, and second, recall
periods. This makes clear cut interpretation of any results problematic, simply
because any difference in recall between the first, and second, recall period could be
due to difference in recall conditions (e.g., the fact that the Sheep now knew the
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demonstrations to be fake), or the fact that the first set of 'important' recall questions
were different to the second set (i.e., those employed in the second recall period).
Future research should control for this by counterbalancing questions across both the
first, and second, recall periods.
Second, as noted in section 4.1.1, Singer and Benassi (1980) discovered that some Ss,
when told that an apparent psychic is really a magician, choose to ignore this
information, and still believe the individual to be psychic. If this is the case, it seems
possible that Sheep, when told that the videotape contained trickery, simply ignored
this information and went on believing the magician to be psychic. Future research
should control for this problem by having the experimenter stress that the individual
on the videotape is a magician.
In short, this investigation found that Goats rated the demonstrations as significantly
less paranormal than Sheep. In the first recall period, Goats recalled more 'important'
information than Sheep, and scored higher on the problem solving task. These
jeve
differences was large, but not significant. This lack of significance was attributed to
the small number of Goats in the study. In the second recall period, no difference,
for the recall of either 'important', or 'unimportant', information was discovered.
This result suggests that the difference in recall, during the first recall period, might
be due to Sheep and Goats employing different 'retrieval sets'. However, such an
interpretation should be made with caution, again because of the small number of
Goats in the study. Two methodological,, were also made. First, future
experimentation should counter balance recall questions across both first, and second
recall periods. Second, the E should provide a stronger disclaimer, as to any psychic
powers possessed by the magician, to decrease the possibility that Sheep continue to
believe the magician is a psychic, during the second recall period.
4.3 EXPERIMENT 1:
4.3.1 Introduction
There were four main differences between the design of this first experiment, and the
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initial pilot study.
First, the experiment used a larger number of Ss. Second, due to the limited time
available for each session, Ss did not complete a problem solving task. Third, recall
questions were counterbalanced across both first, and second, recall periods. Finally,
after the first recall period, the E strongly emphasised that the individual in the
videotape was a magician, and not a genuine psychic.
The hypotheses remained identical to those in the previous pilot study. It was
hypothesized that Sheep would rate the demonstrations as significantly more
paranormal than Goats. In the first recall period, it was hypothesized that Goats
would recall significantly more 'important' information than Sheep. In the second
recall period, it was hypothesised that Goats would recall significantly more
'important' information than Sheep. Sheep and Goats were expected to recall the
same amount of 'unimportant' information in both first, and second, recall periods.
4.3.2 Method
4.3.2.1 Design
This study was a 2x2 mixed design. The between factor (grouping Ss with regard to
their belief in genuine psychic ability) had two levels (Sheep and Goats). The within
factor (whether or not the Ss were explicitly informed that the videotape contained
trickery) had two levels (i.e., Ss attempted recall both before, and after, they were
told that the videotape did not contain genuine psychic phenomena).
There were two dependent variables. First, Ss rated each of the demonstrations for
'paranormal content'. Second, Ss attempted to recall aspects of the videotape in both
first, and second, recall periods.
4.3.2.2 Subjects
Ss (N=35) were recruited from the undergraduate population of Aberdeen University




The videotape used in this experiment was an edited version of the videotape used in
the pilot study described above. Due to the limited time available for each session,
the videotape contained only two, of the three, original demonstrations (i.e.,
divination of ESP cards and fork breaking). These two were chosen as the third
demonstration (the key bending) was the longer of the three. The resulting videotape
lasted approximately six minutes and, although edited, still contained all of the
information needed to solve both of the remaining tricks.
The 'Belief in the Paranormal Questionnaire', and rating scales, remained identical
to those employed in the previous pilot study.
Recall material
The recall questions used were identical to those used in the previous pilot study. As
before, each recall question consisted of a statement about the videotape, followed by
a five point scale on which Ss indicated the degree to which they believed the
statement to be true or false. The questions were rated (by two independent
magicians) as either being 'important', or 'unimportant', to the tricks methodology
(inter-rater reliability=0.94). Recall questions were counter-balanced across the first,
and second, recall periods. This counter balancing was performed in such a way that
no S received the same questions in the second recall period, as he/she had received
in the first recall period. The marking of the recall questions was identical to that
outlined in the previous pilot study.
4.3.2.4 Set-Up
Ss (N=35) were group tested in a single session. The group was tested in a large
lecture room in the Psychology Department of Aberdeen University, at approximately
5.30 p.m.. Other students who were attending the lecture, but not taking part in the
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experiment, were located at the back of the lecture hall. Ss taking part in the
experiment were sat at the front of the lecture hall, in three rows of approximately 11
Ss per row. All Ss watched the videotape on a single 26 inch colour monitor
connected to a Panasonic D80 videotape player. All Ss sat at separate tables, with the
front row of Ss sitting approximately six feet away from the monitor. The second
row was approximately three feet behind the first row, and the third row
approximately two feet behind the second row.
4.3.2.5 Procedure
Ss first completed the Belief in the Paranormal Questionnaire. Next, Ss watched the
videotape and then rated the 'paranormal content' of each of the demonstrations. Ss
then completed the first set of recall questions, and, after these questions were
collected, the experimenter stressed that the demonstrations were the result of trickery.
Finally, Ss were asked to complete the second set of recall questions.
4.3.3 Results
4.3.3.1 Belief in the paranormal questionnaire
The mean score on the BPQ (min-6, max=30, mid-point= 18) for Sheep (N=22)
was 13.09 (sd=3.29), and for Goats (N= 13) was 22.61 (sd=3.04). Thus, the Goats
in this study were approximately as sceptical as the Goats in the previous pilot study.
The Sheep in this study exhibited a slightly stronger belief in psi than those in the
previous pilot study.
4.3.3.2 Paranormal content rating and first recall period
The first hypothesis, namely that Sheep would rate the demonstrations as significantly
more 'paranormal' than Goats, was confirmed, as indicated by the rating column of
Table 7.7. In the first recall period, it was predicted that the Goats would recall
significantly more 'important' information, than Sheep. This was not confirmed.
There were no significant differences between the number of 'unimportant' questions
correctly recalled by Goats and Sheep. Table 7.5 contains the summary data for these
analyses.
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Table 7.5: Means, standard deviations (in brackets), t-scores (unpaired)




Sheep 7.45 2.23 2.59
N=22 (2.52) (1.02) (1.05)
Goats 10.30 2.31 3.15
N= 13 (2.59) (1.12) (1.68)
t-scores (df=33) -3.20 -0.22 -1.22
(1 tailed) (1 tailed) (2 tailed)
P 0.001 0.42 0.24
4.3.3.3 Second recall period
In this second recall period, it was predicted that Goats would recall significantly
more 'important' information than Sheep. This hypothesis was confirmed. There
were no significant differences between the number of 'unimportant' questions
correctly recalled by the Goats and Sheep. Table 7.6 contains the summary data for
these analyses.
Table 7.6: Means, standard deviations (in brackets), t-scores and














t-scores (df=33) -2.09 (1 tailed) 0.81 (2 tailed)
P 0.02 0.42
In short, Goats rated the demonstrations as significantly less paranormal than Sheep.
In the first recall period, there were no significant differences, between Sheep and
Goats, for the recall of either 'important', or 'unimportant' information. In the
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second recall period, Goats recalled significantly more 'important' information than
Sheep, and there was no significant difference in the recall of 'unimportant'
information.
4,3.4 Discussion
Sheep rated the demonstrations as being more paranormal than Goats. Again, this
supports the notion that an observer's belief system can significantly influence the
attribution of psychic ability. These results support the notion that Sheep are more
likely than Goats to erroneously attribute psychic ability to a psychic claimant.
The fact that there were no significant differences for recall of 'important' questions
in the first recall period, could be explained in a number of ways. First, it could be
that the hypothesis proposed in the introduction is incorrect, and that there is no
significant difference in the amount of 'important' information encoded, stored or
retrieved by Sheep and Goats. Second, it may be that the hypothesis was correct but
that an unexpected factor has meant that it has not received proper testing. For
example, it could be hypothesized that, because the recall questions were asked very
soon after the videotape had been seen, the Sheep had not yet lost access to 'surface'
memory for 'important' information on that tape. Two factors provide circumstantial
support for this notion. First, the predicted difference in recall of 'important' items
appears after Ss were told that the tape contains trickery. Second, in the pilot study,
the predicted difference (although not significant) was found. It could be speculated
that the problem solving task, located between recall periods, helped Sheep to lo^se
'surface' memory for 'important' information. This notion should be tested in future
experimentation.
Methodologically, there is an additional alternative explanation of the above result.
It is possible that Sheep/Goat differences are not stemming from recall per se., but
rather from differences in 'response set'. Thus Goats may be looking out for
questions which hint at trickery (e.g., questions involving 'target' items, such as the
fork, going out of sight on the videotape) and then answering those questions in a way
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compatible with the idea that trickery was afoot (e.g., the Goat might infer that the
fork probably did go out of sight, thus allowing it to be secretly bent by the
pseudo-psychic, regardless of whether these details can actually be recalled). If Goats
were responding in this way, and Sheep were not, differential recall of 'important'
items might be obtained. Although the idea of the 'response set' is important in it's
own right (in that it might give insight into how best to quiz observers who have
experienced anomalous events), it is important that this factor is controlled for in
future research.
Finally, the marking system employed in this study was fairly crude, in that it did not
take account of the Ss confidence in recall. For example, if the answer to a recall
question was 'true', Ss responding both 'probably true' and 'definitely true' were both
given one mark; future research should perhaps employ a more refined marking
system.
In summary, it appears that Sheep and Goats processed the information about the
pseudo-psychic demonstration in different ways. First, Sheep rated the demonstrations
as paranormal, Goats rated them as not being paranormal. Second, it appears that
Goats may be able to recall more 'important' information than Sheep. However, in
this experiment, such differential recall was found in the second, but not the first,
recall period. It was hypothesised that this may be due to a 'window' of time in
which Sheep can still gain access to 'surface' memory and thus recall important
information. However, once the access to this surface memory has been lost, Sheep
can no longer access it, despite being told the tape contained trickery. Finally, the
methodological problem of 'response set' should be tackled in future studies.
4.4 EXPERIMENT 2
4,4,1 Introduction
There were three main differences between the design of this second experiment, and
the first experiment.
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First, after watching, and rating the videotape, Ss were asked to spend a little time
noting down any explanations that they might have for the demonstrations on the
videotape. This was designed to provide time for Ss to lose 'surface' memory of the
videotape. Second, in addition to 'important' and 'unimportant' questions, the recall
period contained 'pseudo-important' questions which were constructed to control for
the problem of response set. 'Pseudo-important' questions were worded such that one
might assume that they referred to aspects of a tricks methodology, but would be
answered incorrectly by anyone making this assumption (see the method section,
below, for more detail concerning the construction of these questions). Third, to help
provide a more detailed picture of the results, Ss scores for pseudo-PK demonstrations
were analyzed separately from those of pseudo-ESP demonstrations.
Based on previous research, a number of hypotheses were made. First, it was
predicted that Sheep would rate the demonstrations as significantly more paranormal
than Goats. Also, it was predicted that Goats would score significantly higher than
Sheep on the problem solving task. In the first recall period it was expected that Goats
will recall significantly more 'important' items than Sheep. Sheep and Goats were
expected to recall the same number of 'unimportant' items. If the above hypotheses
are true, then the recall of the Goats and Sheep on the 'pseudo-important' questions
(for the first recall period) can be compared. If the differential recall was due to
accurate remembering one would expect there to be no significant difference between
Goats and Sheep recall of 'pseudo-important' questions. If however, the differential
recall was due to a 'response set' one would expect the Goats to recall significantly
less 'pseudo-important' questions than the Sheep. In the second recall period it is
hypothesized that Goats will still recall significantly more 'important' items than the




This study was a 2x2 mixed design. The between factor (grouping Ss with regard to
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their belief in genuine psychic ability) had two levels (Sheep and Goats). The within
factor (whether or not the Ss were explicitly informed that the videotape contained
trickery) had two levels (i.e., Ss attempted recall both before, and after, they were
told that the videotape did not contain genuine psychic phenomena).
There were three dependent variables. First, Ss rated each of the demonstrations for
'paranormal content'. Second, Ss completed a problem solving task. Third, Ss
attempted to recall various aspects of the videotape.
4.4.2.2 Subjects
Ss (N=29) were recruited from the University of London (N=15) and Edinburgh
University (N = 14), via posters advertising an experiment in parapsychology.
4.4.2.3 Materials
Stimuli videotape
The videotape lasted nine minutes and contained footage of a magician performing
four pseudo-psychic effects. Two of the effect consisted of pseudo-PK, two of pseudo-
ESP. The two pseudo-PK consisted of the fake key bending and fork breaking, as
used in previous studies. The two pseudo-ESP effects were especially filmed for this
experiment, and had not been used in previous studies. They^two tricks were fulfilled
the same criteria set-out in section 4.2.2.3. A brief description of the pseudo-ESP
demonstrations is contained in Appendix F.
Although each of the demonstrations, of both pseudo PK and ESP, appeared to be
very similar (i.e., the divination of a chosen card and the influence of metal) different
methods of trickery were employed for each trick. For example, in the first
demonstration the pseudo-psychic 'forced' the interviewer to select a certain card,
whereas in the second demonstration the pseudo-psychic gained access to the design
drawn by the interviewer. For the pseudo-PK, the bending of a key was achieved by
the magician secretly switching a straight key for a bent one, whilst the bending of
the fork was achieved by the using a pre-stressed fork. Each demonstration was
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filmed in such a way that the first demonstration could not be accounted for by the
second explanation, and vice versa.
The Belief in the Paranormal Questionnaire, and rating scales, remained identical to
those used in the first experiment.
The problem solving material, for the two pseudo-PK effects remained identical to
that utilised in the pilot study. A similar marking scheme was constructed for the two
pseudo-ESP effects (see Appendix G).
Recall material
For each of the two recall periods, there were three recall questions per
demonstration. The recall questions for the two pseudo-ESP demonstrations were
identical, and likewise for the questions concerning the two pseudo-PK
demonstrations. Each of these sets of questions were structured such that they
contained one item concerned with an event important to the particular trick's
methodology (labelled 'important'), a second question concerned with an event
unimportant to the tricks methodology, but important to the other trick in question
(labelled 'pseudo-important') and finally, a third question concerned with event
unimportant to either tricks methodology (labelled 'unimportant'). All recall questions
were counter-balanced as explained in the first experiment. All of the recall questions
are contained in Appendix H.
The scoring procedure was slightly different to that utilised in the first experiment,
in that it took account of Ss confidence in recall. For each question, Ss recall was
given a score between 0 and 4. If, for example, the answer to a recall question was
'True', Ss were awarded no marks for responding 'Definitely False', 1 mark for
'Probably False', 2 marks for 'Cannot Recall', 3 marks for 'Probably True' and 4
marks for 'Definitely True'.
4.4.2.4 Set-Up
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Ss from the University of London were group tested in a single session in a small
lecture room at the Psychology Department of University College London. Ss sat in
two rows of approximately 7 Ss per row. All Ss watched the videotape on a single
26 inch colour monitor connected to a videotape player. All Ss sat at separate tables,
with the front row of Ss sitting approximately six feet away from the monitor. The
second row was approximately three feet behind the first row. Ss from Edinburgh
University were tested individually. All Ss watched the videotape on a 26 inch colour
monitor connected to a Panasonic D80 videotape player. All Ss sat at separate tables,
approximately six feet away from the monitor.
4.4.2.5 Procedure
Ss first completed the BPQ. Ss next watched the videotape and were then asked to
rate the 'paranormal content' of each demonstration. Ss then spent approximately five
minutes noting down any explanations for the phenomena, and then completed the
first set of recall questions. These responses were collected, Ss were clearly told that
the demonstrations were fake, and asked to complete the second set of recall
questions.
4,4,3 Results
Results for the two pseudo-PK demonstrations were analyzed separately from the two
pseudo-ESP demonstrations. For the former analysis Ss were grouped according to
their responses on the first three questions on the BPQ (regarding their beliefs about
telepathy, clairvoyance and precognition), whilst in the latter analysis they were
grouped according to responses on the latter three questions (regarding their beliefs
about micro, and macro, PK).
4.4.3.1 Pseudo-PK
Belief in the Paranormal Questionnaire
The mean score on the last three questions of the BPQ (min score=3, max score= 15,
mid-point=9) for Sheep (N=15) was 6.07 (sd=1.38), and for Goats (N = 14) was
11.57 (sd= 1.87).
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Rating and first recall period
The first hypothesis predicted that Sheep would rate the demonstrations as
significantly more 'paranormal' than Goats. Although the difference was in the
predicted direction, it was not significant and thus the hypothesis was not confirmed.
In this first recall period, it was predicted that Goats would correctly recall
significantly more 'important' questions than Sheep. This hypothesis was confirmed.
The difference between Sheep and Goats recall of 'unimportant' information just
missed significance. There was no difference in Sheep/Goat performance for the
recall of 'pseudo-important' questions. Table 7.7 contains the summary data for these
analyses.
Table 7.7: Means, standard deviations (in brackets), t-scores (unpaired)













































P 0.14 0.02 0.06 0.75
Problem solving
It was hypothesised that Goats problem solving score would be significantly higher
than that of Sheep. Although Goats did score higher than Sheep, the difference was
not significant. Table 7.8 contains the summary data for this analysis.
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Table 7.8: Means, standard deviations (in brackets), t- scores (unpaired)










t-scores (1 tailed, df=27) -1.48 (1 tailed)
P 0.07
Second recall period
In the second recall period, it was predicted that Goats would recall significantly more
'important' questions than Sheep. This hypothesis was confirmed. There was no
significant differences between Goats and Sheep, for the recall of 'unimportant'
questions. Also, there was no difference in the Sheep/Goat performance for the recall
of 'pseudo-important' questions. Table 7.9 contains the summary data for these
analyses.
Table 7.9: Means, standard deviations (in brackets), t-scores (unpaired)


























P 0.05 0.66 0.42
4.4.3.2 Pseudo-ESP
It should be noted that all of the following data is exploratory, as the subject sample
contained only four individuals who were sceptical of the possible existence of ESP.
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Belief in the Paranormal Questionnaire
The mean score on the last three questions of the BPQ (min score=3, max score= 15,
mid-point=9) for Sheep (N=24) was 6.12 (sd=1.70), and for Goats (N=4) was
13.25 (sd=2.06).
Rating and first recall period
The first hypothesis predicted that Sheep would rate the demonstrations as
significantly more 'paranormal' than Goats. Although the differences was in the
predicted direction, it was not significant and thus the hypothesis was not confirmed.
In this first recall period, the hypothesis that Goats would correctly recall significantly
more 'important' questions than Sheep, was not confirmed. There were no significant
differences between the number of 'unimportant', nor 'pseudo-important' questions
correctly recalled by Goats and Sheep. Table 7.10 displays the summary data for
these analyses.
Table 7.10: Means, standard deviations (in brackets), t-scores (unpaired)













































P 0.11 0.31 0.55 0.64
Problem solving
It was hypothesised that Goats' problem solving score would be significantly higher
than that of Sheep. Although Goats did scores higher than the Sheep, the difference
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was not significant. Table 7.11 contains the summary data for this analysis.
Table 7.11: Means, standard deviations (in brackets), t- scores (unpaired)










t-scores (df=26) -0.92 (1 tailed)
P 0.18
Second recall period
In the second recall period, the hypothesis that there would be a significant difference
between the number of 'important' questions correctly recalled by Goats and Sheep,
was not confirmed. The hypothesis that there would not be a significant difference
between the number of 'unimportant' questions correctly recalled by Goats and Sheep,
was confirmed. Also, there was no difference in Sheep/Goat performance for the
recall of pseudo-important questions. Table 7.12 contains the summary data for these
analyses.
Table 7.12: Means, standard deviations (in brackets), t-scores (unpaired)
and probability for recall (second recall period) of the pseudo ESP

























P 0.43 0.18 0.36
In short, for the pseudo-PK demonstrations, the results were almost exactly as
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predicted. Goats rated the demonstrations as less paranormal than Sheep, although
not significantly so. In the first recall period, Goats recalled significantly more
'important' information than Sheep. There was no significant difference for the recall
of 'unimportant', or 'pseudo-important' information. This suggests that the
differential recall of the 'important' items could not have been due to Sheep and Goats
employing different 'response sets'. Goats scored higher than Sheep in the problem
solving task, although not significantly so. In the second recall period, Goats recalled
significantly more 'important' information than Sheep. There were no significant
differences for the recall of 'unimportant', or 'pseudo-important' information. Again,
this suggests that the differential recall of the 'important' items could not have been
due to Sheep and Goats employing different 'response sets'. For the pseudo-ESP
demonstrations, there were no significant differences, between Sheep and Goats, for
any of the rating, recall or problem solving tasks. This last result was not surprising,
given the low number of individuals sceptical of ESP.
4,4,4 Discussion
The results for pseudo-PK and pseudo-ESP will be discussed separately.
4.4.4.1 Pseudo-PK
Although Goats rated the pseudo-PK demonstrations as less paranormal than Sheep,
the difference between the groups was not significant and overall, neither group
believed the demonstrations to be paranormal. This result was not in agreement with
previous experimentation.
In the problem solving task, Goats scored higher than Sheep, with the difference
almost reaching significance. This result is in accordance with the results of the
second pilot study. The result is not particularly surprising, given that more of the
Goats believed the demonstration to be based around trickery, and could recall more
'important' information than Sheep.
In the first recall period, as predicted, Goats recalled significantly more 'important',
but not 'unimportant' information, than Sheep. There was a very small, and non
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significant, difference in the recall of 'pseudo-important' information between the
groups. As such, the differential recall of 'important' information cannot be
accounted for in terms of Sheep and Goats utilising differing 'response sets' toward
the wording of the questions. However, given that both Sheep and Goats did answer
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some 'pseudo-important' incorrectly (with Goats scoring lower than Sheep), it appears
that both group were, to a small degree, basing their replies upon a somewhat
sceptical response set, with Goats more so than Sheep. However, overall these
findings support the notion that Goats are significantly more effective than Sheep at
either encoding, storing or retrieving 'important' information during the first recall
period before they have been told that the pseudo-psychic is fraudulent.
In the first recall period of the previous experiment, there was not a significant
difference between Sheep and Goat recall of 'important' information. Yet, this
difference was obtained in the present experiment, and, to a lesser extent, in the pilot
study. Thus both of the studies which placed a problem solving task, between Ss
viewing the video and attempting recall, obtained differential recall in the first recall
period. In contrast, the previous experiment, which did not include a problem solving
task after Ss had viewed the video, did not obtain such a finding. The above data
supports the hypothesis that there may be a 'window' of time in which Sheep (as well
as Goats) retain access to a surface trace of the videotape and thus recall the same
amount of 'important' information as Goats. Such an hypothesis should be the subject
of future research to confirm it and explore the factors responsible, perhaps by
varying the duration of, and activity during, the interval between observation and
recall.
In the second recall period Goats recalled significantly more 'important', but not
'unimportant', information than Sheep. Again, there was a very small, and non
significant, difference in the recall of 'pseudo-important' information between the
groups. As such, the differential recall of 'important' information cannot be
accounted for in terms of Sheep and Goats utilising differing 'response sets'.
However, given that both Sheep and Goats did answer some 'pseudo-important' items
incorrectly (with Goats scoring lower than Sheep), it appears that both group were,
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to a small degree, basing their replies upon response sets, with Goats more so than
Sheep, just as they were doing during the first recall period. Also, given that, at the
time of recall both Sheep and Goats knew the videotape to contain trickery (and were,
therefore attempting this recall under roughly equivalent retrieval sets), this finding
lends support to the notion that the differential recall of 'important' information is due
to factors acting at the encoding/storage stage of the memorial process, as opposed to
the retrieval stage.
4.4.4.2 Pseudo-ESP
There were no significant findings from either the rating or recall data pertaining to
the pseudo-ESP demonstration. This could be due to one of a number of factors.
First, the observed results may be due to the fact that there were very few Ss who fell
into the 'Goat' category. Second, the results may reflect a difference in the way in
which individuals process and structure information pertaining to demonstrations of
ESP, as opposed to PK phenomena. Again, this area is deserving of future research.
4,5 GENERAL DISCUSSION
The studies described in this chapter have examined the way in which observers'
belief in psi influences the observation, and recall, of videotaped pseudo-psychic
demonstrations.
Five findings have emerged from these studies.
First, Sheep tended to rate the demonstrations as significantly more paranormal than
Goats. This finding was obtained both in the initial pilot study, and the first formal
experiment. In the second experiment, the differences in rating were in the predicted
direction, but not significant. This finding suggests that Sheep are more likely than
Goats to erroneously attribute psychic ability to a pseudo-psychic. This effect could
be interpreted in several ways. For example, it is possible that when assessing the
validity of a psychic claimant, Goats are superior to Sheep, regardless of which
decision is the correct one (e.g., Goats are more likely to avoid both false positives
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and false negative errors). It is also possible that Goats' disbelief in psi caused them
to correctly view the claimant as a pseudo-psychic, and framed them accordingly
without necessarily considering the actual data. Future research should aim examine
these issues. For example, a future experiment could present Ss with a videotape of
a claimant performing phenomena which could not be explained by pseudo-psychic
trickery44. Ss would then be asked to rate the claimant's psychic ability. Such an
experiment may discover that Goats rated the claimant as a genuine psychic, or at
least were puzzled by his apparent abilities. This result, when combined with the
results of the studies described in the chapter, would indicate that, when assessing
psychic claimants, Goats can go against their natural bias, whereas Sheep cannot.
Further research could then examine why disbelief in the paranormal correlates with
the accurate assessment of psychic claimants. Such research could, for example,
examine how the cognitive abilities, and styles, of Goats might cause the accurate
attribution of psychic ability. Alternatively, the results from this hypothetical study
may reveal that Goats erroneously rate the claimant as a pseudo-psychic. Such a
finding would indicate that accurate attribution of psychic ability depends, in part, on
observers' belief in psi conforming to the validity of a claimant's actual psychic
ability.
A second finding centred around the results of the problem solving task, used in both
the pilot study, and the second experiment. On both occasions, Goats scored higher
than Sheep on this task, but neither difference was significant. These findings were
not surprising, given that, when the problem solving task was administered, the Ss
had not been told that the videotape contained trickery, and thus many more Sheep,
than Goats, would have believed the magician to have been a genuine psychic.
A third finding concerned the differential recall between Goats, and Sheep, in the first
"The resulting videotape would contain footage of the type which would be
obtained from a genuine psychic. In the case of macro-PK, this could be achieved
by carefully using some form of camera trickery. Film footage of ostensible ESP and
micro-PK could be obtained by continually filming tests of these abilities, and waiting
for an unlikely coincidence to occur.
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recall period. The initial pilot study and the second experiment, both found that
Goats recalled more 'important' information than Sheep45. This difference proved
significant in the second experiment, and this experiment demonstrated that the effect
was not accounted for by Sheep and Goats employing different 'response sets'. This
result could be interpreted in several ways. For example, it is possible that, when
recalling a demonstration of ostensible psi, Goats are superior to Sheep, regardless of
whether that demonstration is genuine or not. Alternatively, it is possible that Goats'
disbelief in psi caused them to either encode, store or retrieve more 'important'
information than Sheep. Future research should aim to tease apart these explanations.
For example, such research could show Ss a videotape that contain a claimant
performing ostensible psychic phenomena which could not be explained by pseudo-
psychic trickery (see above). Ss would then be asked to recall 'important', and
'unimportant' information (judged with respect to the trickery which could have been
used to fabricate the phenomena on the tape, even though the demonstrations were not
actually performed in this way). In addition, the experiment could also include
'pseudo-important' questions to examine the role played by response sets. Such an
experiment may discover that Goats correctly recalled more, or the same amount, of
'important' information as Sheep. If this result was not due to a response set, it
would, when combined with the findings of these present studies, indicate that Goats
are superior to Sheep at either encoding, storing or retrieving information from an
ostensibly psychic demonstration, regardless of whether that demonstration if genuine,
or fake. Further investigation of differences in cognitive abilities between Goats and
Sheep might lead to an understanding of why disbelief in psi correlates enhances this
accurate recall. Alternatively, the results from this hypothetical experiment may
reveal that Goats' natural bias caused them to misremember trickery which did not
occur on the tape, and thus score lower than Sheep on the recall of 'important'
questions. If this result was not due to response sets, it would indicate that accurate
recall of a demonstration depends, in part, upon a Ss' belief in psi conforming to the
45It should be noted this result should be treated with caution, given that in the
first experiment, although the Goats recalled more important items (in the first recall
period) than the Sheep, this difference was not significant.
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validity of the psychic phenomena being observed.
Fourth, differential recall for 'important', and 'unimportant', information only
occurred when a problem solving task had been inserted between the observation of
the videotape, and the first recall period. This supported the notion that there may
be a 'window' of time in which Sheep could still gain access to a 'surface' memory
trace, and thus still recall relatively large amounts of 'important' information. This
result could also be the subject of future research. Such research could vary the time
delay, between viewing of the video and first recall period, to ascertain when
differential recall starts to be obtained. Alternatively, such research could examine
the types of task which, when placed between observation of the videotape and initial
recall, either act to disrupt, or enhance, recall performance.
Fifth, the first and second experiment found that Goats still recalled significantly more
'important' information than Sheep during the second recall period. This result
suggests that the recall differences were due to factors acting at the encoding/storage,
rather than the retrieval, stage of the memorial process46. This finding lends tentative
support to the notion that encoding factors play a more important role in influencing
recall retrieval factors. This is in agreement with the majority of studies which have
compared the effects of encoding, verses retrieval, bias (see Taylor & Crocker, 1981).
In addition, this set of studies has developed a methodology which provides
researchers with a flexible, straightforward, and easy to apply, way of accurately
assessing various issues involved in the recall of complex material. This methodology
could be used to carry out some of the future work proposed above. In addition, this
methodology could be used to examine the observation, and recall, of other types of
ostensible psychic events (e.g., psychic surgery), and by different types of observers
(e.g., parapsychologists who have observed a large number of ostensibly psychic
demonstrations, magicians etc.). Also, the above studies could be repeated with
^It should be noted that this finding was not obtained in the initial pilot study and
as such, should treated with caution.
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'live', instead of videotaped, demonstrations. This type of research has already been
carried out in other areas of eyewitness testimony. For example, Yuille and Cutshall
(1984) compared recall of 'live' and 'videotaped' crimes. They discovered that the
live event resulted in witnesses reporting more action details, but not more descriptive
details, than did the video version of the event. In this way, it would be possible to
further assess how different frames, schemata, and scenarios affect the reconstruction
of a pseudo-psychic demonstration. This information could then be used both to
further elaborate on the proto-model outlined in this thesis, and, in turn, enhance both
the accurate observation of present ostensibly psychic demonstrations, and the
reassessment of past demonstrations. Finally, the methodology could be extended to




RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE ANALYSIS OF OSTENSIBLE
MACRO-PK
5.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter will outline recommendations for researchers wishing to carry out, and
report, an active, or retrospective, analysis of ostensible macro-PK. These
recommendations are based upon the previous three chapters, and relevant literature
from parapsychology (e.g., Lewis, 1886, Dingwall, 1927, Morris, 1986a, 1986b,
Hansen, 1990).
Two points should be noted. First, given that these recommendations require
researchers to have a relatively large amount of control over the running of their
studies, they apply more to laboratory, as opposed to field, investigations. Second,
the recommendations in this chapter are more conceptual than pragmatic. Thus the
chapter identifies general suggestions to minimise subject fraud, as opposed to
describing detailed procedures by which these suggestions can be implemented.
5.2 ASSESSING A CLAIMANT'S POTENTIAL FOR FRAUD
5-2,1 Introduction
Section 3.2 noted how pseudo-psychics may exploit various cognitive, motivational
and social factors to deceive researchers into believing that he/she is unlikely to cheat
during experimentation. This section will first discuss measures which help counter
this stratagem. Second, the section outlines how this assessment can affect whether
researchers work with the claimant, and the level of security employed, should they
decide to do so.
5.2,2 Assessing a claimant's potential for fraud
5.2.2.1 Cognitive factors
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Section 3.2.2 outlined how a pseudo-psychic can deceive researchers into believing
that he/she is unable and/or unwilling to engage in psychic fraud. The same section
also noted how a pseudo-psychic may consciously construct a claim that the observer
will believe plausible. Researchers should attempt to counter both of these
stratagems.
First, researchers should evaluate a claimant's ability to successfully engage in psychic
fraud. This should involve assessing a claimant's knowledge of conjuring, and
psychic fraud. Researchers should establish if the claimant has been, or is, a member
of any conjuring or pseudo-psychic organisations such as The International
Brotherhood of Magicians (IBM), The Magic Circle, or the Psychic Entertainers
Association (PEA). In addition, researchers should discover if the claimant has any
informal contacts within the magical, and pseudo-psychic, communities. Researchers
can use several techniques which maximise the likelihood of discovering such
information. For example, all claimants could be asked to complete a form which
explicitly requests them to state any connections they may have with the conjuring,
or pseudo-psychic, fraternity47. Also, researchers could check the membership lists
of both local, national and international conjuring organisations. Finally, researchers
should also attempt to develop informal contacts within the conjuring, and pseudo-
psychic, communities. This could be achieved in several ways, including forming
friendly links with local magic clubs, and attending some of the larger magic
conventions. Also, researchers should attempt to assess if a claimant possesses, or has
access to, the resources needed to fabricate the type of psychic phenomena which
he/she claims to possess. Researchers may wish to assess a claimant's sleight of hand
ability. This may involve, for example, informally observing the skill with which the
claimant manipulates small objects. Also, researchers may wish to assess the amount,
and sophistication, of apparatus that a claimant could employ in order to deceive
researchers. This could be achieved, in part, by informally asking a claimant about
""Researchers should ensure that such forms are not worded in such a way as to
put off any honest claimants (i.e., individuals who do not intend to deceive
researchers) from becoming involved in an investigation.
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his/her background, financial well being etc. Although these techniques may help
researchers detect some tricksters, the sophisticated pseudo-psychic can overcome
these methods by, for example, concealing any contacts or large amounts of finance,
he/she intends to employ during an investigation.
Second, researchers should decide if a claimant is likely to be motivated by any of the
factors which encourage pseudo-psychic trickery (see section 3.2.2.1). Again, the
sophisticated pseudo-psychic may bias this assessment by concealing certain
information. For example, a fake faith healer may assure an observer that he/she
never accepts payment for his/her services, insinuating that he/she has no motive to
deceive. However, as noted by Thomas (1989):
Apparent lack of financial inducements is no guarantee against
fraudulent practise. Randi reports that 'psychic surgeons' did not
charge a fee for their services: they received a registration fee and
donations, (p. 382).
Third, researchers should also attempt to discover if the claimant has been caught, or
been accused of, cheating during previous testing. All claimants could be asked to
fill out a form which explicitly requests them to state any previous situations in which
their alleged psychic ability has been assessed or investigated. Researchers could also
undertake a literature search (e.g., of parapsychology journals, popular magazines
etc.) for any articles which mention previous testing of the claimant. Researchers
should be aware that a pseudo-psychic could attempt to bias such a search by using
false names. Also, when evaluating reports which are discovered, researchers should
remember that some writers have been, and are, reluctant to report evidence of
possible subject cheating48. For example, Hansen (1990) notes how some researchers
protested at publishing discoveries of potential fraud by the well known medium, Eva
C. (e.g., see Lambert, 1954). To overcome this problem, researchers could establish
informal contact with other researchers, thus increasing the chances of discovering
possible evidence of fraud which has not been committed to print. In addition, a
48The motivation behind such reluctance may be complex and include, for
example, fear of being sued for defamation of character, given that anything less than
well documented evidence of fraud is unlikely to prove conclusive in a court of law.
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claimant should not be trusted simply because of his/her age, and/or social standing.
Instead, researchers should remember that claimants of all ages, and from all
socioeconomic groups, have shown themselves capable of psychic fraud (see, e.g.,
Nicol, 1979, Feilding, 1963, p. 1-8).
Finally, section 3.2.2 also noted how a pseudo-psychic may consciously construct a
claim such that researchers believes it plausible. To help counter this stratagem,
researchers should try to prevent themselves from viewing certain claims as any more,
or less, plausible than others.
5.2.2.2 Motivational factors
Section 3.2.3 noted how researchers may want (either consciously or unconsciously)
to believe that a claimant possesses genuine psychic ability. The section also noted
how these types of wants and needs may cause researchers to underestimate a
claimant's potential for fraud. Researchers should attempt to counter such bias by
preventing themselves from having any strong needs associated with the outcome of
an experiment. For example, researchers with a serious physical illness should not
investigate an alleged psychic healer who, if genuine, could cure them. Alternatively,
a researcher who possesses a strong need to believe in life after death should not
investigate Spiritualist mediums. However, this may prove problematic, given that
most researchers will have some level of emotional commitment, however small,
associated with the outcome of a study. As such, it may be more realistic for
researchers to make a conscious effort to prevent such factors influencing way in
which a claimant is assessed.
5.2.2.3 Social factors
Section 3.2.4 noted that researchers may also be deceived into trusty a pseudo-psychic
if he/she appears to be honest, and/or likable. However, as noted by Delanoy:
...researchers may feel that they have gotten to know their subjects
well, and a genuine friendship may develop...[but].. .this should not
blind researchers to the possibility that they may be more trusting of
subjects whom they like or feel they know well, [emphasis mine] (p.
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255).
In short, researchers should not trust a claimant, even if they believe they have
developed a genuine friendship with that individual.
5.2,3 Working with 'high' and 'low' risk claimants
After completing the assessments outlined above, researchers will have a rough
measure of the degree to which a claimant has the ability, motivation and willingness
to cheat. All claimants will fall on a high risk/low risk continuum.
Researchers faced with a 'high risk' claimant have to decide whether they wish to
work with such an individual. There are several disadvantages associated with such
an endeavour. Obviously, the likelihood of facing subject deception is increased. If
such cheating goes undetected, researchers could face many of the negative
consequences outlined in the introduction to this manual. Second, researchers may
believe that working with known tricksters encourages such behaviour. This view was
clearly possessed by Eleanor Sidgwick (1909), who noted:
So long as the fees of investigators...flow with unabated abundance
into the pockets of mediums who have been detected in deliberate
trickery, this trickery will also remain unabated, (p. 307).
However, there are a number of advantages associated with such subjects. First, as
noted by Beloff (1991) refusal to work with a high risk subject may result in missing
the opportunity to obtain, and record, genuine psychic phenomena. Beloff illustrates
his argument with a resume of the career of Eusapia Palladino. Second, Beloff (1984)
has also noted that researchers should perhaps seek out 'high risk' subjects, given that
some writers (e.g., Von Lucadou & Kornwachs, 1983, Batcheldor, 1966) have
suggested that a certain amount of trickery may be needed to act as a catalyst to
genuine psi. Obviously, researchers must decide for themselves whether the
advantages of working with a high risk claimant outweigh the disadvantages.
However, if researchers do decide to work with such individuals, it is vital that
maximum safeguards are enforced to counter potential trickery.
Alternatively, researchers may discover that a claimant appears to have little
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motivation, ability or willingness to engage in trickery. When investigating such 'low
risk' subjects, researchers may be tempted to employ few safeguards against trickery.
However, such temptation should be resisted, and researchers should design, and run,
their investigation assuming cheating will be attempted. As noted by Collins (1983):
A subject with a completely innocent history must be treated, as far as
experimental design is concerned, in exactly the same way as the most
notorious cheat.(p. 929).
This measure serves two purposes. First, it helps protect researchers from being the
victim of subject cheating, should they have underestimated the claimant's potential
for fraud. Second, this measure also helps protect the honest claimant from unfair,
and possibly hurtful, accusations of cheating. However, the implementation of such
measures may prove troublesome. For example, an honest claimant may be troubled
by researchers who does not appear to trust him. Also, researchers may feel awkward
when not trusting a claimant whom they do not expect to engage in fraud. Either of
these factors could serve to make researchers/claimant interaction socially difficult,
as well as possibly inhibiting genuine psi. These problems may be overcome, in part,
by both researchers and claimant reminding themselves, and each other, that critics
may fault a study unless such steps are taken.
5.3 CORRECT DEVELOPMENT OF COUNTER-EXPLANATIONS
5.3.1 Introduction
Section 3.3 outlined how a pseudo-psychic could mislead an observer into not
developing the counter-explanation that correctly accounts for the trickery thatwill be,
or has been, used in a demonstration. The section noted that the development of such
an hypothesis may be hindered by three factors. First, researchers' claim schemata
(i.e., schemata regarding the intended psychic influence, target, and target system)
may be either incomplete, or inaccurate. Second, researchers' causal schemata (i.e,
schemata relating to the methods used to fabricate macro-PK) may be inappropriate.
Third, researchers may erroneously believe one counter-explanation to be correct, and
thus refrain from developing additional hypotheses. This section will outline how
researchers may counter such stratagems.
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5.3.2 Claim schemata
This section will discuss recommendations which help researchers form an accurate
representation of a claim, during both an active, and a retrospective, analysis.
5.3.2.1 Active analysis
Section 3.3.2.1 noted two stratagems which may influence researchers' claim
schemata during an active analysis. Each of these stratagems will be discussed in
turn.
First, the claimant may state his/her claim in very general terms, perhaps noting that
he/she will attempt to demonstrate some form of macro-PK, on some type of target,
at some point in time. This may be the case, for example, when a claimant states that
his/her macro-PK ability is not at all predictable, and thus he/she is unsure exactly
when, and what, will occur. If this is the case, researchers should realise that they
could be dealing with a pseudo-psychic who consciously avoids making a specific
claim to prevent researchers forming specific counter-explanations before the
investigation takes place. To counter this stratagem, researchers should ensure that
the claimant specifies a detailed claim, in advance of formal experimentation. This
entails researchers, and claimant, coming to an agreement as to the specific psychic
ability, target and conditions that constitute the claim. This may be achieved in
several ways. First, if a claimant states that he/she is unsure as to the factors that are
conducive to his/her psi ability, researchers should help identify such factors. This
may include asking the claimant to note the conditions under which he/she believes
his/her psychic ability has occurred in the past. This dialogue between claimant and
researcher may help both parties develop a fuller picture of a claim. Also, researchers
could run several very informal sessions (i.e., with no controls present), in which the
claimant may attempt to produce psi under a variety of circumstances (perhaps
concentrating on factors that, in the past, have proved successful). On other occasions
a claimant may approach researchers with a specific claim. If this were the case, the
various steps described above would be unnecessary.
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Once a specific claim has been developed, researchers should run a number of pilot
studies. These studies could be designed with several aims in mind.
First, early pilot studies could maximise the opportunity for the claimant to produce
ostensible psi. Researchers would simply conform, as far as is practically possible,
to the conditions that the claimant believes to be psi conducive. If, under such
circumstances, the claimant was unable to produce ostensible psi, researchers may
decide not to invest resources on more formal experimentation.
Second, pilot studies could be designed, and recorded, to aid in the development of
more formal experimentation. For example, some writers (e.g., Morris, 1986b,
Hansen, 1990) have noted that the design of an experimental protocol may be aided
by researchers interacting with magicians. Morris (1986b) has noted how this
interaction may be helped by magicians either observing the claimant in person, or
viewing a videotape of the claimant. Pilot studies could act as an opportunity for
magicians to witness the claimant. Alternatively, such studies could be carefully
recorded on videotape, which could then be sent to various 'consulting' magicians.
Before filming a pilot study, researchers should interact with the magician/consultant,
in order to help discover the best way for the demonstration to be recorded (e.g.,
when filming should start/stop, the distance between claimant and camera, what part
of a room needs to be in shot etc.).
Third, pilot studies may also give researchers an opportunity to assess some of the
controls that might be used in more formal experimentation. For example,
researchers may wish to film a target during future experiments. If this is the case,
pilot studies may be an ideal opportunity to explore the use of such controls (e.g.,
filming the target from different distances, at different angles, analysing the resulting
videotape etc.). The introduction of potential controls may also help the claimant
appreciate some of the conditions under which formal experimentation will occur.
This, in turn, may act to sharpen a claim, should certain controls inhibit the
production of ostensible psi. When carrying out this stage of an assessment process,
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researchers should be aware of two points. First, the pseudo-psychic may try to
prevent the later application of effective controls by failing to produce any ostensible
psi during a pilot study, and stating that the conditions of this study was not psi
conducive. As such, researchers may decide to run some pilot studies without the
claimant being aware of the controls which are in place during these studies. Second,
researchers should also ensure that the use of certain controls during a pilot study does
not alter their effectiveness in a formal experimentation. For example, if hidden
controls are used in a pilot study, the claimant may discover the nature of such
measures, thus increasing the likelihood that these controls will be ineffective during
later experimentation.
Section 3.3.2.1 also outlined a second stratagem, in which the pseudo-psychic states
that he/she intends to produce a certain demonstration, whilst, in reality, intending to
produce another. This section outlined how this stratagem may bias the development
of counter-explanations. This stratagem may be countered by researchers, and
claimant, agreeing that only phenomena predicted before a formal experiment will be
viewed as potentially evidential.
Before undertaking the studies outlined above, both the claimant and researchers
should have a clear understanding of some ground rules. For example, both
researchers and claimant could agree that neither party can discuss such studies with
the media, until a specified time after their completion. This may help avoid the
'media circus' that has dogged some past investigations. In addition, such a condition
may help prevent a claimant gaining media attention by stating that he/she has been
'tested' by a respected university when, in reality, he/she has only taken part in very
informal pilot studies. Second, the document could help both researchers and
claimant agree how upon the wording of the conclusion which will be drawn, should
the claimant successfully produce some form of inexplicable phenomena. Third, the
claimant and researchers should have a clear understanding of how the results of pilot
studies may affect the assessment process. For example, there may be an agreement
that, should the claimant completely fail to produce any ostensible psi in such pilot
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studies, further assessment would be deemed unnecessary. If, however, the claimant
did manage to produce ostensible psi in these studies, the claimant could be assured
that more formal experimentation would follow. Fourth, researchers and claimant
should also agree that the results of such studies will not be seen as evidential. The
agreements outlined above should take the form of a written contract, ideally signed
by both researchers and claimant.
5.3.2.2 Retrospective analysis
Section 3.3.2.2 noted that researchers may be deceived when reconstructing a past
claim, thus hindering the development of counter-explanations. The section noted
ways in which the reconstruction of both primary material (i.e., information obtained
first hand), and secondary material (i.e., information obtained second hand), may be
biased. In addition, the section noted how different types of evidence (such as
researchers's own recollections of ^ experiment, testimony obtained from other
eyewitnesses, and photographic material) may be either fabricated, or biased. Chapter
four then elaborated upon one small part of this process, experimentally examining
how individuals' belief in psi may influence their observation, and recall, of a pseudo-
psychic demonstration. This section will outline a number of measures which
minimise these stratagems.
First, to avoid a reconstruction being incomplete, researchers should collect as much
relevant information, from as many sources (such as eyewitness testimony,
photographs, videotape, and diagrams), as possible.
Second, to minimise some of the biases discussed in section 3.3.2.2, researchers
should always attempt to access to primary, as opposed to secondary, material. For
example, researchers should attempt to interview the actual eyewitnesses themselves,
as opposed to accepting 'second hand' testimony. In addition, researchers should
access the original copies of written testimony, photographs, film, or videotape, as
opposed to working with material that may have already been edited, or modified.
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Third, once such material has been amassed, it should be assessed for completeness
and reliability. On some occasions it maybe difficult to assess the degree to which
the source maybe incomplete. For example, a researcher may include vital
information in a paper but, as the paper is referred and edited for academic
consumption, this information may be omitted. To help discover unreliable material,
all sources of information could be compared for consistency. Such an assessment
may take many forms, depending upon the type, and amount, of material available.
If a reconstruction is being based upon more than one source, sources could be
compared with one another. For example, a number of sitters may have been present
at a seance, and each may have offered an eyewitness account of that seance. It may
be discovered that testimony given by one sitter differs from that given by other
sitters. Also, eyewitness testimony may conflict with photographic, or videotaped,
evidence. For example, Randi (1982a) notes how he believes John Fuller's written
account of an 'operation' by an alleged psychic surgeon (Ze Arigo) disagreed with
film footage of the same event. Randi notes:
'As usual', writes Fuller, 'he [Arigo] plunged the knife in brutally, cut
deeply into the flesh of the small of the back - a sector heavily served
with blood vessels and therefore inclined to bleed profusely. Very
little blood flowed out, but the abscess was drained..the patient was
totally calm and without pain'. Nonsense. Arigo merely lanced a
boil. It hurt and it bled. That's all. (p. 175).
Alternatively, researchers may also compare information derived lfom a single source.
For example, Hanlon (1974) notes how:
Bryan Silcock, the science correspondent of the Sunday Times,
reported on Sunday 25 November last year: 'In a taxi on the way to
London airport yesterday Uri Geller bent the very tough key to my
office desk without even touching it. The key was lying flat in the
palm of photographer Bryan Wharton's hand at the time'. But the next
Sunday, 2 December, Silcock admitted error on the two most critical
points: Geller had handled the key, and it was in fact concealed in
Wharton's hands when it was supposed to have bent. (p. 172).
Such inconsistency is indicative of some of the information collected by researchers
being unreliable. However, even when material does not contain conflicting evidence,
it may still be unreliable. For this reason, all of the material obtained should be
assessed for reliability. This may be achieved in a number of ways. First,
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researchers may wish to discover if certain evidence has been fabricated. The
processes involved in such an assessment depend upon the material being judged. In
the case of photographic evidence researchers may need to consult with individuals
who understand the various ways in which such material can be faked (e.g., Sharpe,
1985), and the techniques which can be used to detect such fakery (e.g., image
enhancement and enlargement). When interviewing an eyewitness, researchers may
consider using some of the interview strategies designed to detect prevarication (see,
e.g., Comer, Ardis & Price, 1990). In addition, researchers could evaluate the
credibility of an eyewitness, and his/her testimony. The procedures involved with
such an assessment are well established within the legal profession (see, for example,
Stone, 1984). For example, to assess an eyewitnesses credibility, researchers may
assess that individual's character, personality and possible motivation for deceit.
Similarly, an eyewitness's testimony may be assessed for the qualities often discovered
in fabricated material (such as lack of factual detail and lack of personal involvement).
Evidence may still be unreliable, even if not fabricated. For example, section 3.3.2.2
noted how eyewitness recall may be biased by 'time misdirection, 'verbal recapping'
and 'in transit actions'. Researchers need to be aware of research into this area (see,
e.g., Hodgson & Davey, 1887, Besterman, 1932, Jones, Russell & Nickel, 1976, and
the experiments presented in chapter four) and take account of the results of such
work. Unfortunately, as noted in chapters three and four, this is difficult to do, in
part, because very little work has been carried out in this area In addition, researchers
may find it useful to examine how some of the research concerned with eyewitness
testimony may be germane to this problem (see, e.g., Loftus, 1979, Wells & Loftus,
1984), particularly that which concerns the observation of anomalous events (e.g.,
Hall, McFeaters & Loftus, 1987). The content of a photograph, film or videotape
may be more reliable than eyewitness testimony. However, such evidence may be
misleading if it is incomplete. For example, as noted in section 3.3.2.2, the pseudo-
psychic may ensure that trickery occurred outside the camera's field of vision, or
during any breaks in the recording process. Thus, researchers should find out if the
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claimant (or his/her accomplices) were in a position to engage in trickery outside of
the area being filmed by the camera. In addition, when analysing film or videotape,
researchers should determine if such filming was continuous and, if this was not the
case, obtain a description of any events which occurred during breaks in recording.
5.3.3 Causal schemata
Section 3.3.3 described how inappropriate causal schemata (i.e., schemata containing
the methods used to fabricate macro-PK) may hinder the development of counter-
explanations. The section also noted that such schemata may be inaccurate at both the
strategic, and tactical, level. For this reason, researchers should aim to develop
appropriate causal schemata at both of these levels. The first part of this section
outlines strategies by which macro-PK may be fabricated. The second part of the
section outlines ways in which researchers may develop, or access, the tactics used
to implement these strategies.
5.3.3.1 Strategic fabrication
This section describes six strategies involved in the fabrication of macro-PK. These
strategies have been culled from a number of sources within both the conjuring (e.g.,
Sharpe, 1932, Fitzkee, 1944) and parapsychology (e.g., Marks & Kammann, 1980,
Morris, 1986c) literature. It should be noted that these six methods are not extoftire,
but instead aim to cover the majority of the strategies used to fabricate macro-PK.
5.3.3.1.1 Erroneous initial measurement of target/target system
Pseudo-psychics can deceive researchers into incorrectly measuring the initial state of
the target. The pseudo-psychic later reveals the true nature of the target, and
researchers believe that genuine PK has taken place.
Appearances
To fabricate appearances, the pseudo-psychic may conceal an object within, or near
to, the area in which it will later be produced. Such concealment may be achieved
in several ways. First, the pseudo-psychic may conceal an object by placing it behind
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some form of physical screen. For example, before the start of a seance the fake
medium may conceal several objects under his/her clothing. During the seance the
medium secretly removes these objects, and states that he/she has apported then into
the seance room (see, for example, Bell, 1935). Second, an object may be concealed
by being disguised as another object. Corinda (1958) describes how this technique
can be used to fabricate the production of ectoplasm. Before the seance, the fake
medium prepares a handkerchief by coating all but one corner of it in luminous paint.
This handkerchief is then tucked into the medium's breast pocket, with only the
'normal' corner showing. During the seance (and once the lights have been lowered),
the fake medium slowly pulls the handkerchief from his/her pocket (possibly with
his/her teeth, if his/her hands are secured) to give the impression that ectoplasm is
slowly forming from his/her body. Finally, the object may be concealed via
camouflage (i.e., having it blend in with a background pattern, such that researchers
cannot detect the target against the backdrop). Conjurers employ this technique when
performing 'black art' magic. This is a method of camouflage in which the object to
be hidden is covered in black material such that, when placed against a carefully lit
black background, appears to be invisible. This black covering can then be removed
in order to make the object suddenly 'appear'.
Vanishes
Vanishes are the opposite of appearances, and are often fabricated by reversing the
methods used to make an object apparently materialise. The pseudo-psychic may
fabricate the 'vanish' of an object by first simulating the presence of that object, and
then discontinuing this simulation. For example, Sharpe (1985) describes a whole
host of optical equipment (such as plane mirror reflection, two-way mirrors, convex
mirrors, and concave mirrors) which are used by both fake mediums, and stage
magicians, to visually simulate the presence of both objects and people. This
simulation is then terminated to make the object apparently vanish.
Modifications
To fabricate modifications, the pseudo-psychic may deceive researchers into believing
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that an object is initially in one state when, in reality, it is in another. For a
'modification' to occur, the pseudo-psychic merely has to reveal the true state of the
object. For example, Harris (1985) outlines how PK metal bending may be fabricated
by the prior pre-weakening of a spoon (e.g., by repeatedly bending it back and forth).
At the start of the trick, the spoon appears, to the casual researchers, to be completely
unprepared. In reality, the spoon is already modified (i.e., greatly weakened) and
only requires a little pressure to break into two pieces.
Transpositions
To fabricate transpositions the pseudo-psychic may deceive researchers into believing
that an object is in one location when, in reality, it is in another. To create a
'transposition', the pseudo-psychic reveals the true position of the object. This
strategy (which is essentially the combination of an appearance, and vanish) may also
be used to fabricate penetrations, wherein the observer is deceived into believing that
an object is one side of a barrier when, it is on the opposite side of the barrier. For
a 'penetration' to occur, the pseudo-psychic reveals the true position of the object.
Levitations, suspensions and animations
To fabricate levitations, suspensions and animations the pseudo-psychic may conceal,
or disguise, the presence of a force that acts on an object. Later in the demonstration,
the action of this force is revealed. For example, in the 'Three Sword Suspension'
the magician's assistant initially appears to be laying across the tips of three swords
that have been embedded, handles downwards, into the stage. One at a time, two of
the swords are removed and the assistant magically remains suspended horizontally
from the last remaining sword. This illusion is accomplished by the assistant initially
wearing a harness that connects her to the remaining sword, the handle of which is
firmly embedded in the stage.
5.3.3.1.2 Concealed influence before controls are applied
The pseudo-psychic may access the target object, after researchers have measured that
object, but before any controls, designed to counter subject cheating, are
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implemented. This strategy can be used to fabricate a wide range of phenomena.
Appearances
To fake appearances, the pseudo-psychic may secretly move the object into the area
in which it will later 'appear'. For example, a fake medium may suggest that he/she
is searched. After this search has taken place, he/she then suggests that one of the
sitters should carefully observe him, to ensure that he/she is not able to secrete any
objects upon his/her person. In reality, the fake medium secretes such objects in the
moment of relaxation which occurs between the end of the search, and him suggesting
that he/she should be observed by a sitter. Alternatively, the pseudo-psychic may
openly move an object into the area in which it will later be produced, but only
simulate it's removal from that area. For example, one technique used by stage
magicians to fabricate the continuous appearance of playing cards, is the 'spilt fan'
production. This consists of the magician showing a fan of playing cards. Next, the
magician appears to discard all the cards into some form of container (e.g., a1/1
upturned top hat, or box). In reality, the card fan is slit into two. Approximately
half of the cards are discarded into the container, the remaining half are back
palmed49. The magician then indicates that the audience should pay careful attention,
and then 'magically' produces the palmed playing cards.
Vanishes
Vanishes may be fabricated by reversing the techniques described directly above.
Thus, before appropriate controls are in place, the pseudo-psychic may secretly
remove the target object out of the area from which it will later 'vanish'. The
presence of that object is then simulated, and later, this simulation is terminated. For
example, the stage magician may lay on a table, and apparently be covered by a cloth.
In reality, the magician climbs into a secret hiding place within the table, and the
cloth (containing a wire frame) gives the impression that he/she is still lying on the
table. The table (and magician) are then wheeled offstage, whilst two assistants hold
49A sleight which conceals a small object behind the back of the hand (see
Whaley, 1989, p. 58).
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the cloth (and frame) between them as if they held the magician. To make the
magician suddenly vanish, the assistants crush the cloth (and wire frame) into a small
ball. Alternatively, the pseudo-psychic may openly remove the object from the area,
and only simulate it's movement back into that area.
Transportations
To fabricate transportations the pseudo-psychic may, before any controls are in place,
secretly move an object from one position to another. For example, a magician might
be placed inside a cabinet, which is on the right of the stage. A second cabinet is
then shown empty and placed on the left of the stage. After a few moments, the
magician emerges from the cabinet on the left of the stage. This trick may be
achieved by having the cabinets constructed with fake bases. These boxes are then
placed over two trap doors, allowing the magician to quickly drop down one trap,
walk under the stage and climb through the second trap, into the second cabinet.
Such movement may occur before the boxes are lifted above the stage, a measure
designed to show that the magician could not be using trap doors. To fabricate
penetrations, the pseudo-psychic may, before any controls are in place, move a\object
either around, or through, a barrier. Alternatively, the pseudo-psychic may fabricate
both transportation and penetrations, by simulating the placement of the object into
one location whilst, in reality, retaining the object in it's original location. For
example, a magician may have a spectator examine his/her hands, and a coin. The
magician then apparently places the coin into his/her right hand but, in reality, retains
it in his/her left hand. The magician then instructs his/her audience to watch closely,
before showing his/her right hand empty, and his/her left hand holding the coin.
Modifications
To fabricate modifications the pseudo-psychic may, before any controls are in place,
secretly alter some aspect of the target. For example, to fabricate PK spoon bending
the pseudo-psychic may secretly bend the spoon after it has been examined by
researchers, but before the demonstration 'proper' begins. The pseudo-psychic then
holds the spoon 'face on' to the researchers, such that they cannot see it is bent. The
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researchers are then instructed to watch closely, and the pseudo-psychic reveals the
bend, by slowly turning the side of the spoon such that it faces the researchers.
Second, the pseudo-psychic may only simulate the modification of an object. For
example, one method for the 'torn and restored banknote' involves the magician
taking a banknote and only pretending to tear it into many pieces (in reality, the note
remains intact). The magician merely has to reveal the true nature of the bank note
for an apparent restoration to occur.
Levitations, suspensions and animations
Levitations, suspensions and animations can also be fabricated via the secret
application of force before any controls are implemented. For example, to make a
small object move across a surface, the pseudo-psychic may secretly blow onto the
object. When this has occurred, the pseudo-psychic may turn his/her head away, to
prove that he/she couldn't be blowing on the object. Exactly this stratagem was used
by pseudo-psychic, James Hydrick (see, Korem, 1982). In addition, such force can
secretly be applied by both 'invisible' thread, and the use of strong magnets.
5.3.3.1.3 Concealed influence whilst controls are being applied
This third strategy involves the pseudo-psychic secretly accessing the target after it has
been initially measured, and whilst controls are being applied. The actual techniques
used to fabricate each type of PK are identical to those discussed in the section above.
However, wherein the above techniques were used before controls were in place,
these strategies are used whilst the controls are being applied.
This strategy may be successful if researchers has failed to realise all of the ways in
which a target can be influenced by a pseudo-psychic. For example, Morris (1986a)
has outlined a variety of ways in which certain targets can be influenced in more ways
than if generally realised (e.g.,stopped watches can be started by the melting of
congealed lubricants through the heat of the hand). Second, researchers may have
thought of a way in which the claimant could surreptitiously influence the target, but
failed to effective control against such trickery. Third, a pseudo-psychic may be able
A
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to negate the controls by, for example, removing some of the seals used to secure the
target, and carefully replacing these seals, or providing substitute seals after the
interaction with the target is complete.
5.3.3.1.4 Concealed influence after controls have been removed
This stratagem involves the pseudo-psychic secretly influencing the target after any
controls have been removed. When using this stratagem, the pseudo-psychic may
have the added advantage of researchers having relaxed their attention in the belief
that the experiment has terminated. This relaxed attention may be caused by the
pseudo-psychic stating that a demonstration has terminated, and/or been unsuccessful.
In addition, the pseudo-psychic may ask for a rest period. Also, magicians often act
as if a trick has successfully finished, concealing the fact that the proper end to the
trick has yet to happen. For example, at the conclusion to 'The Miser's Dream'50,
the magician may produce a flurry of coins, and then bow to the audience. As such,
the audience may assume that the trick has finished, and relax their vigilance. The
magician may utilise this lapse in attention to steal51 a final load of coins. These
coins can then be suddenly produced as the audience are applauding.
5.3.3.1.5 Lack of knowledge concerning the properties of the target
The section above noted that researchers may not realise all of the ways in which a
pseudo-psychic can secretly influence a target. However, researchers may also be
deceived if they do not fully understand how the target behaves, even when not
subjected to any concealed influence. This may be the case when the properties of
a target are not yet fully understood within science. For example, Hasted (1981), in
discussing the relative merits of different types of target systems, notes:
...bimolecular systems and living organisms are...difficult to maintain
50A classic stage production routine in which a seemingly endless supply of coins
are plucked from the air and dropped into some form of receptacle (see Whaley,
1989, p.454).
51Any sleight used by magicians to secretly gain possession of an object, or
number of objects (see Whaley, 1989, p. 645).
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in a completely stable state. Gases, liquids and especially plasma are
subject to various instabilities. For example, 'Kirlian photography' of
high frequency discharges around the body can show interesting
effects, but such discharges are complex and difficult to understand
quantatively even in the absence of possible psychic influences, (p. 4-
5).
5.3.3.1.6 Erroneous remeasurement
This fifth strategy entails the pseudo-psychic deceiving an observer during the
remeasurement of the target, or target system. Many of the techniques described in
section 5.3.3.1.1 can be used to implement this strategy.
First, the pseudo-psychic may also fool researchers by having them measure a
different target/area to that initially measured. For example, to fabricate a vanish, the
pseudo-psychic may construct a second target system, identical to the first, but that
does not contain the target object. Researchers are then deceived into believing that
this system is actually the one they originally measured, and that the object has
apparently vanished. The pseudo-psychic may also make use of duplicate objects
when fabricating modifications, transportations and penetrations. For example, some
stage illusions, involving the apparent transposition of an assistant from one position
to another, employ 'twin' assistants. One twin is concealed at one location, whilst the
other is revealed at a second location. Also, versions of the torn and restored
newspaper involve the switch of a torn up newspaper for a second, duplicate but
intact, newspaper.
Second, researchers may be deceived, even when assessing the same target, or area,
measured at the start of the experiment. The methods used to implement this
stratagem are conceptually similar to the techniques already described in section
5.3.3.1.1. To fabricate appearances, the pseudo-psychic may deceive researchers
into believing that an object has actually appeared when, in reality, the presence of
this object has merely been simulated. For example, Fraser-Harris (1935) has
outlined how the dim red lighting (used during many seances) may cause an
researchers to experience various retinal illusions that could be mistaken for spirit
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entities. To fabricate vanishes the pseudo-psychic may deceive researchers into
believing that the object has disappeared when in reality, the object is concealed.
Such concealment may be achieved via occlusion, disguise or camouflage. To
fabricate transportations, and penetrations, the pseudo-psychic may deceive researchers
into believing that a, object is in a new location, when the object has not changed
locations. For example, Randi (1982a) has described how a fake psychic healer can
hold his fingers in a certain position, such that they appear to have penetrated a
patient's stomach. To fabricate modifications the pseudo-psychic might deceive
researchers into believing that the object is in a modified state, when/ it is still in an
initial state. For example, in the 'Boomerang illusion', the magician may show two
pieces of wood (cut in the shape of boomerangs) to be the same size by placing them
on top of one another. However, when the boomerangs are separated, one of them
appears to be much larger than the other. This apparent difference in size is the result
of an optical illusion. Such simulation may also be created by verbal suggestion. For
example, in discussing various methods of fake spoon bending, Fuller (1975), notes:
I always tell people that the spoon will keep on bending for two or
three weeks. Of course it won't.. .but people are so anxious to believe
that they'll imagine it really does keep bending (p. 20).
Levitations, suspensions and animations may be fabricated by researchers being
deceived into believing that a^ object has an additional force acting on it, when it has
not. This might be achieved in several ways. For example, Fraser-Harris (1935)
notes:
We should always remember the difficulty of pronouncing on the
movements of feebly illuminated objects in the dark. At those dark
seances where the purpose is to observe the movement of objects
(levitation or telekinesis) one has to stare steadily and for long periods
at spots or bands of luminous paint...The result of this staring at a
small, not very bright white spot or band against a black background
is to produce an after-image of the white spot (or band) which on
outward projection will appear to be oscillating slightly. Thus we may
easily imagine that a stationary spot is in slight movement, (p. 141).
5.3.3.2 Fabrication at the tactical level
Researchers should also discover the various tactics that may be employed to
implement the strategies outlined above. Such information may be obtained in a
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number of ways.
First, researchers may find it helpful to search previous literature within psychical
research, and parapsychology, to discover if past investigators have assessed the type
of claim currently being evaluated. The discovery of relevant literature may help
researchers generate ideas as to the specific types of trickery/controls, which they may
encounter/employ in their investigations.
Second, a recent statement by the Parapsychological Association (1984) has
recommended that parapsychologists consult with magicians when assessing psychic
claimants. However, such interaction has both advantages and disadvantages. On the
positive side, researchers clearly stand to gain from magicians' familiarity with the
tactics of conjuring, and psychic fraud. Also, as noted by Hansen (1990), magicians
may be able to help researchers develop controls which effectively counter such
trickery. In addition, some writers (e.g., Gardner, 1985, Hansen, 1990), have noted
that magicians may be more skilled than lay observers at identifying novel forms of
trickery. However, researchers should be aware that there such consultation has it's
limitations. For example, many writers (e.g., Hyman, 1964, Hansen, 1990) have
emphasised that magicians may themselves be fooled by certain kinds of magic
tricks52. As such, they cannot be relied upon to design a completely fraud proof
experiment.
If researchers do decided to consult with magicians, they can take several steps to
ensure the consultation is as productive as possible. When selecting a magician with
which to consult, researchers should be aware that the range of conjuring techniques
is huge, and most magicians necessarily specialise in certain types of magic (such as
close-up magic, stage magic and spirit magic). As a result their expertise may be
confined to these areas. As Dingwall (1921) writes:
The word of an ordinary magician is not to be wholly trusted. An
52There is an entire branch of magic which aims only to fool magicians. This has
come to be labelled 'magic for magicians' (see Whaley, 1989, p. 416).
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expert in billiard-ball manipulation.. .may know nothing of the methods
of the sealed letter reading or of concealing fakes for materialisation.
(p. 28).
Also, researchers should attempt to overcome some of the barriers which may hinder
effective magician/investigator communication. For example, Hansen (1990) has
noted that such barriers include; parapsychologists' lack of knowledge of conjuring,
the clandestine nature of magical literature, no established network of
researchers/magician communication and the false belief of many scientists that
magicians are hostile to parapsychology. Third, researchers should familiarise
themselves with previous studies which have employed magicians as consultants (see,
e.g., the list of such studies in Hansen, 1985a). This may help them learn lessons
from the ways in which such consultation has proceeded in the past.
Third, researchers should also study some of the publications which outline the
relevant tactics of conjuring, and psychic fraud. It is not necessary that researchers
become expert in all areas of psychic fraud. Instead they should aim to form a good
general understanding of the topic. In addition, researchers should develop a more
detailed knowledge of the types of trickery that are more relevant to the ostensible psi
they wish to assess. Researchers could discover relevant literature by consulting some
of the bibliographies ofmagic books, and indexes to magic magazines. This literature
can then be obtained from book dealers specializing in conjuring, and pseudo-psychic,
publications. In addition, researchers may also find it helpful to subscribe to some
of the magazines which are regularly produced for, and by, both magicians and
pseudo-psychics. Of particular interest may be magazines which specialise in
describing methods for mentalists, and fake mediums.
Fourth, if possible, researchers should attempt to develop informal contact with both
the magical, and pseudo-psychic, communities. This can be achieved in several ways.
For example, researchers should attend some of the major magic conventions regularly
held in both Europe and the USA. Second, researchers could also join both
international, national, and local, magic societies.
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Fifth, researchers should also consider interacting with individuals involved in the
security industry. Such individuals may be possess useful information relating to the
way in which criminals access supposedly secure systems, and can advise researchers
on commercial products which are designed to counter such subterfuges. For
example, Hansen (1990) advises researchers to study the 'CIA Flaps and Seals
Manual' (Harrison, 1975) to appreciate the diversity of techniques that may be used
to enter various types of packaging without leaving any signs of tampering. In
addition, security firms manufacture products which can be used to counter such
deception. Many of these products are easy to use, are unobtrusive and have been
fully assessed for effectiveness53. For example, many firms specialise in the
production of 'tamper evident' envelopes which are designed to show any attempts at
illicit entry.
Sixth, on occasion researchers may have to work with target systems without fully
understanding the properties of those systems. If this is the case, they should attempt
to discover how such systems behave without any form of normal, and/or paranormal,
influence, and also how they can be secretly influenced by a pseudo-psychic. For
example, researchers may wish to assess a claimant who can apparently cause strange
physiological effects within his/her own body (e.g., the slowing down/stopping of
his/her own heart beat). If this were the case, these researchers could first consult
literature which describes how such effects could be produced by normal means alone
(see, e.g., Fisher, 1979). In addition, such researchers could also interact with
individuals (e.g., medical practitioners, physiologists, etc.) who understand such
systems more fully.
Seventh, researchers should also consider using some of the techniques designed to
enhance lateral thinking (e.g., DeBono, 1970), and creative problem solving (for a
brief review of relevant courses, see Frederiksen, 1984). This procedure may
53It should be noted that some of these envelopes are more effective than others.
For example, one well known manufacturer uses a tamper evident seal to secure the
top flap of its envelope, but ordinary (water soluble) glue to secure its bottom flap!
147
increase the likelihood of developing tactics that may be absent, or little known, even
within the magic and pseudo-psychic communities and, as such, could be used when
researchers are confronted with an effect which is not well known within these
communities.
5.3.4 Adequacy of prior counter-explanations
Section 3.3.4 noted how researchers may decide not to develop additional counter-
explanations after forming one, or more, hypothesis(es) which he/she believes to be
adequate. To counter this stratagem, researchers should develop a large range of
hypotheses, despite the adequacy of the explanations that have already been
developed. For example, researchers should consider organising informal
'brainstorming' sessions with other individuals (such as fellow researchers, and
magicians), which would be designed to develop, rather than assess, as many counter-
explanations as possible.
5.3.5 Reporting recommendations
When reporting an active analysis, researchers should describe their initial interactions
with a claimant. This may include how the claimant contacted researchers (or vice
versa), and details of the initial claim. Researchers should then describe any informal
sessions, and pilot studies, undertaken with the claimant. This description should
include details of how a claim may have been modified during this period. To help
this procedure, researchers should attempt to record initial interactions with a claimant
as they occur (e.g., by keeping an experimental diary, openly recording conversations
etc.). In addition, reports should also include verbatim copies of any signed
agreements between claimant, and researchers.
When reporting a retrospective study researchers should describe how a claim was
reconstructed. This should include a description of: the material upon which the
analysis is based, the way in which this material was located, material which was
discovered but not used, how such material was assessed for reliability, and the
outcome of this assessment.
148
Researchers undertaking both active, and retrospective, analyses should also describe
the processes involved in the development of counter-explanations. This might
involve outlining the individuals, and literature, consulted to help form such
hypotheses. In addition, researchers should describe briefly the explanations
themselves.
5.4 ACCURATE ASSESSMENT OF PLAUSIBILITY
5-4,1 Introduction
Section 3.4 outlined various methods by which an observer may be deceived into
erroneously assessing a plausible counter-explanation as implausible. This section will
outline measures designed to counter such stratagems.
5.4.2 Fraud capability
Section 3.4.2 noted how researchers may overestimate the physical strength, manual
dexterity, conjuring knowledge, and motivation required to engage in certain types of
trickery. The section also noted how researchers may underestimate a claimant's
capability, and motivation, to engage in deception. Either of these stratagems may
result in researchers rejecting a plausible counter-explanation as implausible. As such,
researchers should aim to counter both stratagems.
First, researchers should, as accurately as possible, determine the level of expertise,
knowledge, and motivation needed to engage in certain types of trickery. To do so,
researchers may have to consult with experts who can perform the type of trickery
being assessed. For example, to determine how much practise is required to fake
'sleeving'54, researchers may consult with magicians who are proficient in this
technique. Alternatively, researchers may be able to discover such information by
personal experience. For example, Marks & Kammann (1980) note:
The next little Geller incident occurred after lunch. I took my room
key from my pocket to discover that it was so bent I couldn't get it in
54A sleight-of-hand technique wherein the magician secretly disposes of objects up
his jacket sleeve (see Whaley, 1989, p. 616).
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the keyhole... .1 remembered how I'd shown the key to Geller when he
wanted the room number. I was halfway up the hall on the way back
to the reception desk to ask for another key,...when I thought I'd test
my own skill at bending it back. Although quite a thick key, by giving
it a firm tweak in both hands, I easily bent it straight again...I, like
most people, assumed that keys are impossible to bend in the hands,
but this little assumption turned out to be false, (p. 83-84).
Second, researchers should form an accurate perception of the claimant's capability,
and motivation, to engage in fraud. The issues involved in such an assessment have
already been discussed in section 5.2.
When undertaking the above assessment, researchers should allow themselves a safe
margin of error by consciously underestimating the capability, and motivation,
required to perform certain trickery. Researchers should also overestimate the
claimant's capacity, and motivation, for deception. This may appear as if researchers
<k<1>
is-taking unnecessary precautions against trickery. However, at a future date it may
be discovered that a certain type of trickery is far easier than supposed by past
researchers. Alternatively, new evidence may reveal that a past claimant was indeed
a more sophisticated trickster than assumed at the time of testing. Unless researchers
underestimate the capability required for trickery, and overestimate the claimant's
ability to perform such trickery, their resulting controls may, in retrospect, be seen
as inadequate.
5.4,3 Simplicity/obviousness of explanation
Section 3.4.3 noted how a pseudo-psychic may deceive an observer into viewing an
explanation as implausible because it appears too obvious, or simple. For example,
the section noted how Hanlon (1974) did not consider some of the simpler methods
by which Geller could have attempted to fake some of his demonstrations (outlined,
for example, by Randi, 1982b), instead proposing far more complex methods (e.g.,
the use of a radio receiver concealed within Geller's tooth, and a faked 'radio die'
which electronically signals which of it's faces is uppermost). To counter this
stratagem, researchers should not reject a potential counter-explanation on the grounds
of simplicity or obviousness.
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5.4.4 Past methods
Section 2.4.4 noted that researchers may reject an explanation if it involves trickery
that the claimant has not, in the past, used, or been accused of using. Section 3.4.4
noted that a sophisticated trickster may exploit this process by deliberately changing
his/her methods both within, and between, demonstrations. To counter this stratagem,
researchers should not allow a claimant's apparent preference for certain types of
trickery to influence the way in which explanations are assessed for plausibility.
Section 3.4.4 also noted how a pseudo-psychic may attempt to discover the counter-
explanations being developed by an observer, and employ a method not under
consideration. To counter this stratagem, researchers engaged in an active analysis
should ensure that a claimant cannot gain access to material (e.g., written progress
reports) that describes the counter-explanations under consideration.
5.4.5 Reporting recommendations
When reporting an analysis, researchers should note if any counter-explanations were
rejected as implausible. If one, or more, counter-explanation was rejected as
implausible, researchers should note why this was the case.
5.5 ACCURATE (RECONSTRUCTION OF CONTROLS
5.5.1 Introduction
Section 3.5 noted how an observer could be deceived into underestimating the true
effectiveness of certain controls, believing that a set of ineffective controls are
effective. This section will discuss how researchers can counter this stratagem during
both active, and retrospective, analyses.
5.5.2 Active analysis
Before the start of an experiment researchers should develop, and assess, the controls
that will be used to test the claim under consideration. This could be achieved in
several ways.
First, researchers should examine literature, and/or interact with certain individuals
151
(e.g., magicians, security experts), to discover if a control will be effective. For
example, when using observational controls, researchers should discover any factors
that bias an individual's attention, perception, and recall. This may involve
researchers familiarising themselves with relevant literature within psychology,
conjuring and the legal profession (e.g., Wells & Loftus, 1984, Fitzkee, 1945, Stone,
1984). In addition, researchers should consider interacting with individuals who are
experienced at observing deception (such as magicians, customs officials, prison
officers, and law enforcement agents). Additionally researchers may decide to counter
potential deception by filming, or videotaping, an experiment. If this is the case,
researchers should consult literature which discusses the problems involved in filming
psychic claimants (Singer & Ankenbrandt, 1980, Hansen, 1990), and perhaps other
examples of human deception (e.g., Farrell & Farrara, 1985, discuss the filming of
shoplifting). Researchers should attempt to understand how various factors (such as
lighting conditions, angle of filming, distance of camera from event to be filmed, use
of multiple and/or concealed cameras) can maximise the effectiveness of such
controls. Physical controls can be assessed in a similar way, with researchers
examining past studies which may have used the same, or similar, controls. In
addition, researchers should consult individuals who manufacture, or have previously
employed, such controls. Researchers wishing to use commercial security devices
may discover that manufactures have already invested considerable time, and effort,
into assessing such products. If this is the case, researchers should ensure that the
product will be effective under the specific circumstances which will be present during
experimentation.
Second, researchers should consider running a 'dummy' experiment, in which all of
the controls which will be, or have been, used in the experiment proper are in place.
However, instead of asking the actual claimant to psychically interact with the target,
a skilled trickster (e.g., a magician, security expert) could be asked to try and
overcome the controls employed. This 'dry run' has two advantages. First, it could
help to prevent wasting the time of the actual claimant, as it reduces the likelihood of
him taking part in an experiment with inadequate controls against cheating. Second,
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it may help researchers identify general problems with an experiment (e.g., certain
controls may be difficult to implement etc.). However, in some circumstances, this
dummy experiment may prove problematic especially if, during such pre-testing,
'hidden' controls may be exposed, thus increasing the likelihood that a pseudo-psychic
could learn about such controls. This problem can be overcome in several ways.
First, researchers could only use 'dummy' claimants that were as trustworthy as the
consultants who suggested the controls in the first place. Second, researchers may
decide to evaluate a set of controls after the experiment proper has taken place.
Hansen (1982) has suggested a post-experimental procedure for assessing the physical
controls designed to counter surreptitious tampering of a small target. Hansen advises
researchers to construct a number of identical 'test items' (i.e., targets protected by
their physical controls) before the experiment. One of these items is then selected and
given to the claimant. If the claimant proves successful, and no signs of cheating are
discovered, one of the other test objects is randomly selected and given to a trickster
to attempt to duplicate the phenomena. Unfortunately, this approach could result in
researchers only discovering that their controls were ineffective after the experiment
proper has already taken place. As such, this second procedure should be used if
researchers do not have access to 'dummy' claimants which are considered as
trustworthy as their consultants.
5.5.3 Retrospective analysis
Section 2.5.3.2 noted how researchers may wish to reconstruct the controls used in
a past study. This may involve, for example, researchers piecing together the
construction, and working, of objects used as physical controls. If a past study used
observational controls, researchers may wish to reconstruct the physical, and
psychological, state of observers, as well as the conditions under which observation
took place. Section 3.5.3.2 outlined how researchers can be misle/d during this
process, reconstructing controls that appear more effective than they were during a
past experiment. The section noted various ways in which pseudo-psychics bias the
reconstruction of both primary (i.e., information obtained first hand), and secondary
(i.e., information obtained second hand), material. In addition, the section noted how
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different types of evidence (such as researchers's own recollections of controls,
testimony obtained from other eyewitnesses, and photographic material) may be either
fabricated, or biased.
The steps that should be taken to counter these stratagems are conceptually identical
to those outlined in section 5.3.2.2.
First, researchers should collect as much relevant information, from as many sources,
as possible (such as eyewitness testimony, photographs, videotape, and diagrams) as
possible. Second, to minimise some of the biases discussed in section 3.5.3.2,
researchers should, whenever possible, gain access to primary material. For example,
researchers should attempt to interview eyewitnesses, or at least gain access to an
original copy of the testimony provided by such individuals. In addition, researchers
should attempt to access original photographs, film, or videotape. Third, once such
material has been amassed, it should be compared for reliability. To help discover
unreliable material, all sources of information could be assessed for consistency. Such
an assessment may take many forms, depending upon the type, and amount, of
material available. If a reconstruction is being based upon more than one source,
sources could be compared with one another. It may be discovered that sources differ
in their description of past controls. For example, in discussing the security
precautions in his mini-lab experiments55, Cox (1983) notes that:
I should note that for all of my own experiments...a special string was
tied, in addition to the lock.. .This was synthetic, varicoloured, and was
purchased by me in Europe in order to preclude matching it here.
Whenever I locked up the ML [mini-lab] I would as an extra
precaution tie a bit of this string, and with a match I would melt the
ends together. Richards [the individual in whose house the ML was
storedl had no access to any remnant of it, which I would always take
away along with my key, [emphasis mine] (p. 4).
Yet Hansen (1985b) in his critique of these experiments, notes:
55A 'mini-lab' consists of a sealed container (e.g., an aquarium inverted over a
wooden base, secured by mental strips and locks) into which various small items (such
as toys, balloons, and leather rings) are placed by the experimenters.
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...in his paper Cox states that, for some of his experiments (the ones
in which he did not employ a locksmith), he used synthetic,
varicoloured string, in addition to a lock, to seal his mini-labs. He
claims that Richards had no access to any of it. What is not mentioned
in this paper is that Cox would take the roll of string to the Richard's
home, unwind a considerable length, and then turn his back on it to
attend to some other detail. I observed him do this a number of times;
sometimes he turned his back for half a minute, (p. 21).
For observational controls, researchers may wish to reconstruct the physical state, and
psychological capabilities, of the observer, as well as the conditions under which such
observation took place. For example, Panati (1976), discussing the observational
abilities of parapsychologist Ed Cox, notes:
Cox...is also a semiprofessional magician, an associate of the Society
of American Magicians, and formerly a member of the International
Brotherhood of Magicians...[he] has been active in the fields of both
magic and parapsychology for over forty years, and is the author of
numerous parapsychology research papers, as well as an advisory
booklet for magicians on ESP. (p. 139).
Thus giving the impression that Cox would be likely to detect pseudo-psychic trickery,
should it occur. Yet Couttie (1988), in discussing Ed Cox's description of his
investigation into Uri Geller, notes:
... [Cox] claims that a true psychic would be able to allow himself to
be filmed making a drawing of a hidden target, while a magician
would not. He makes no allowances for different methodologies, and
there are numerous methods, even without a tip-off from an
accomplice. Cox is so wrong that there is no need to even wonder
whether or not he can spot fraud. If he knows so little about
magician's techniques, then he clearly cannot, despite his forty years'
experience in magic and parapsychology, [emphasis mine] (p. 18).
Such inconsistency is a clear sign that some of the information collected by
researchers must be unreliable. However, even when material does not contain
conflicting evidence, it may still be unreliable. For this reason, all of the material
obtained should be assessed for reliability. As noted in section 5.3.2.2, this may be
achieved in a number of different ways. First, researchers should discover if certain
evidence has been fabricated. The processes involved in such an assessment may
depend upon the type ofmaterial being judged. Researchers may have to consult with
individuals who are knowledgable about techniques involved in faking photographs,
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film or videotape. When interviewing an eyewitness, researchers may use interview
strategies designed to detect prevarication, and possibly evaluate the credibility of an
eyewitness, and his/her testimony. Finally, evidence may still be unreliable, even if
r
not fabricated. The issues involved in assessing the reliability relating to the
reconstruction of controls are identical to those discussed in section 5.3.2.2.
jis
After researchers believe that they has accurately reconstructed a set of past controls,
they must assess the effectiveness of those measures. Such an assessment may use
some of the techniques outlined in section 5.5.2. Thus researchers may attempt to
physically reconstruct a past set of controls, and ask a skilled trickster to attempt
various types of deception. For example, Feilding (1922) describes how he and
William Marriott (a conjurer) was able to fabricate 'spirit photographs' under the
same conditions as had been previously used to test the alleged medium, Mr Hope.
As a result, Feilding concludes that the conditions originally used to test Hope were
ineffective. However, such an approach is problematic, given that a simulation can
never truly duplicate the controls used in past experimentation. Thus the simulation
may contain controls that were not present in a past study, and vice versa.
5.5.4 Reporting recommendations
When reporting an active analysis, researchers should describe how the controls,
intended to be used in an experiment, were developed, and tested. This may involve
researchers describing the different types of expertise employed during the
development of controls, and the processes involved in their assessment. In addition,
to aid future researchers, a report should mention any controls which were developed,
but rejected as ineffective.
When reporting a retrospective study researchers should describe how past controls
were reconstructed. This may include a description of the material upon which the
reconstruction is based, with a summary of how such material was discovered, and
assessed for reliability. In addition, researchers should report the way in which the
efficacy of a past set of controls was evaluated, and the outcome of this evaluation.
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5.6 ADDTTIONAL DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
5.6.1 Introduction
This section will outline two additional factors which should be taken into account
when designing a study.
5.6.2 Implementation of controls
Section 3.7 noted how a pseudo-psychic may attempt to ensure that certain controls
are not properly implemented during an experiment. For example, a pseudo-psychic
may secretly tamper with physical controls before a demonstration, and render them
ineffective. In addition, a pseudo-psychic may be able to discover the nature of
'hidden' controls, and thus be in a better position to overcome such measures. To
counter this stratagem, researchers should design an experiment to minimise the
likelihood of a pseudo-psychic preventing the correct implementation of controls. For
example, it should include measures to prevent the claimant gaining unsupervised
assess to any equipment which will be used during the experiment. Attempts should
be made to prevent such access both before, and after, the experiment has taken place.
This may be achieved in several ways. The claimant should not be informed where
such equipment is being housed. In addition, certain equipment could be placed in
an area that is especially secure (e.g., protected by a professional security system).
Such security may prove problematic, especially when the claimant has access to the
inside of these buildings during pilot studies, and formal experimentation. For
example, Randi (1986), in discussing Project Alpha, notes:
One device developed at the laboratory for testing the Alpha subjects
consisted of an overturned aquarium bolted and padlocked to a stout
table. Objects would be put inside and left overnight. Since the locks
on the doors were of excellent quality, and Phillips wore the padlock
and door keys around his neck, security was thought to be absolute.
It was not. Edwards and Shaw fthe two pseudo-psvchicsl simply left
a window unlocked, and returned to the premises at night. There were
several ways to open the sealed aquarium, and they were free to do
anything they pleased with the contents...[emphasis mine], (p. 163).
The design of an experiment should also contain measures designed to counter a
pseudo-psychic discovering the nature of 'hidden' controls. In addition, researchers
should design measures that eliminate any information, regarding the nature of such
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controls, being available to the claimant. For example, Hansen and Broughton (1982)
note that, when investigating the claims of SORRAT (the Society for Research into
Rapport and Telekinesis), documentation concerning security measures were hidden
in the home of one of the experimenters, rather than stored in a laboratory.
5.6.3 Evidence of fraud
Section 3.7 also noted how a pseudo-psychic may explain away evidence of fraud.
For example, given the difficulties involved in accusing an individual of fraud on the
basis of a still photograph, a pseudo-psychic may encourage an observer to use such
a control. Researchers should attempt to counter this stratagem. This can be achieved
in several ways. First, researchers should only use controls which produce relatively
unambiguous evidence of cheating (e.g., a good quality videotape of an individual
clearly engaging in trickery, or some form of alteration to a tamper evident product
which cannot be explained away as being due to other causes). Second, researchers
should try to figure out all of the ways in which apparent evidence of trickery could
be produced by non-fraudulent causes. In this way the honest claimant will not suffer
the indignity of unfairly being labelled a cheat, and the pseudo-psychic will not be
able to explain away evidence of actual trickery. However, this may be problematic.
First researchers have to predict the evidence that is produced by a control and
second, figure out how such evidence might be 'explained away'. This task may be
eased by researchers examining past studies that have either tested the same claim,
employed similar controls, or assessed the claimant in question. Such studies may
give an insight into some of the 'outs' that have arisen in these situations.
5.6.4 Reporting recommendations
When reporting an active investigation, researchers should mention the steps taken to
ensure that all controls were correctly implemented. In addition, the report should
also describe the steps taken to try to eliminate a pseudo-psychic explaining away
evidence of fraud which might be obtained.
5.7 DEVELOPING AN EXPERIMENTAL PROTOCOL AGREEMENT
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5.7.1 Introduction
Section 3.6 noted how a pseudo-psychic may exploit the conditions apparently needed
to elicit ostensible macro-PK. In an active analysis, the pseudo-psychic may state that
such conditions are not psi conducive, in order to negotiate away controls that prevent
trickery. In a retrospective analysis, a pseudo-psychic may explain away a failure to
produce ostensible macro-PK, by stating that the experimental conditions were not psi
conducive. This section will outline how researchers can counter both stratagems.
5.7.2 Active analysis
When running an active analysis it is vital that researchers do not run a formal study
before the claimant has stated that he/she believes the experimental conditions to be
psi conducive. The importance of this step has been emphasised by Randi (1982a),
who writes:
In my thirty five years of looking into these matters, I have found that
the most common reason for failure to come to any firm conclusion in
such testing procedures is the lack of a firm understanding of the
conditions and parameters in the beginning. Thus I insist that the
subject [claimant] must know in advance that conditions are satisfactory
for the demonstration of whatever miracle is to be shown, must know
exactly what will be accepted as proof, and must finally agree to abide
by the decisions reached under these conditions, (p. 256).
However, as noted in section 2.6.2, developing such a protocol may be problematic.
For example, researchers may be unwilling to inform the claimant as to the nature of
certain 'hidden' controls. As such, the claimant may not know the exact conditions
under which he/she will be expected to perform. To overcome this problem,
researchers could secretly introduce such controls into various pilot studies, to
determine if they are noticeable, or inhibit the production of ostensible psi. Also, the
v-o
objection of certain conditions by the claimant may effectively mean that he/she is
altering the very nature of his/her claim. If this is the case researchers may have to
modify the counter-explanations being considered, and develop additional controls.
For this reason, the process of protocol development can entail a considerable amount
of back and forth communication between claimant and researchers. However,
despite such difficulties it is vital that both researchers, and claimant, understand and
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are satisfied with, the conditions of the experiment. To help this process researchers
may find it helpful to 'walk' a claimant through the experiment. In addition,
researchers should ask their claimants to agree to (ideally, by signing) a form which
clearly outlines the conditions of the forthcoming experiment. This document could
serve a number of functions. For example, it should clearly set out the experimental
conditions. Second, it may help clarify that the claimant believes these conditions to
be psi conducive, and emphasise that the claimant must not cheat during the
experiment. This document could also contain information pertaining to the
dissemination of the results of the study. Such an agreement will help the assessment
process in several ways. First, it will help ensure that, if the claimant fails to produce
any ostensible psi, he/she cannot say he/she didn't fully understand the experimental
conditions, or that such conditions were not psi conducive. Second, the protocol may
help avoid any confusion which arises after a study, concerning when, where and how
the results of that study can be communicated to others.
5.7,3 Retrospective analysis
Section 3.6.3 noted how a pseudo-psychic may explain away a past failure to produce
ostensible macro-PK, by stating that the experimental conditions were not psi
conducive. If this is the case, researchers should attempt to discern if the claimant
understood, and agreed to, the experimental conditions, prior to the experiment. Such
a decision may be difficult to make, especially given that such understanding may
only come from actual participation in research, which may not have been the case
if the claimant had not taken part in any form of pilot work. In addition, even if such
conditions were agreed upon, it is possible that they became altered during the
experiment in way that had not been anticipated by researchers and//or claimant.
However, if the experimental conditions were understood, agreed upon and correctly
enforced, researchers should conclude that the claimant has failed. If such conditions
were not agreed upon, researchers should attempt to assess if the experimental
conditions should be seen as antagonistic to the elicitation of psi. This assessment
may be complex, and involve, for example, examining the conditions of previous
experiments in which the claimant did manage to produce ostensible macro-PK.
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5.7.4 Reporting recommendations
A report of an active analysis should include a full description of the stages involved
in developing a mutually agreed protocol, with a verbatim copy of the resulting
document.
When reporting a retrospective analysis, in which the claimant didn't produce macro-
PK, researchers should discuss any evidence relating to whether the claimant
understood, and agreed with, such conditions in advance of the experiment. If this
was not the case, researchers should report any information relating to whether the
conditions of the experiment should be considered conducive to psi.
5.8 ASSESSING THE RUNNING. AND OUTCOME. OF AN EXPERIMENT
5.8.1 Introduction
Section 2.7 noted the procedures involved when researchers run an experiment, and
assess its outcome. Section 3.7 then outlined some of the ways in which a pseudo-
psychic may disrupt these processes. This section will outline measures designed to
counter such stratagems.
5.8.2 Running an experiment
When running an experiment, researchers should attempt to ensure that all of the
controls, and measures, outlined above, are correctly implemented. This may entail,
for example, the observer ensuring that the claimant will not be able to tamper with
controls before, and while, they are used in a demonstration. Also, the observer may
wish to ensure that the nature of any hidden controls are effectively concealed from
the claimant.
Clearly, this section is not applicable to researchers carrying out a retrospective
analysis, in that the running of a past experiment will have already been assessed at
an earlier stage of the analysis (see section 5.5.3).
5.8.3 Assessing the outcome of an experiment
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Section 2.7 noted the various stages involved in assessing the outcome of a
demonstration. A vital part of this procedure hinged upon researchers assessing any
apparent evidence of fraud. Section 3.7 noted how this assessment may be biased by
the pseudo-psychic explaining away such evidence via a 'non-fraud' hypothesis. To
counter this stratagem researchers should attempt to objectively assess any 'non-fraud
hypothesis'. However, researchers should not underestimate the potential difficulties
which can arise during such an assessment. For example, Collins and Pinch (1982)
ran a study to assess the PK metal bending ability of several young children. They
believed that they had obtained still photographs showing some of their subjects
bending the target material by physical force alone. However, when Collins and
Pinch made this evidence public, they discovered that other individuals (e.g., their
subjects, other scientists not present at the original experiment) were able to produce
'non-fraud' explanations to account for the photographs. For example, one subject
was accused of cheating because she was photographed holding the target (a spoon)
in both hands, with each hand at one end of the spoon. The subject argued that this
photograph did not show signs of cheating, but instead was taken as she swapped the
spoon from one hand to the other.
5.8.4 Reporting recommendations
When reporting an active analysis, researchers must note if the experiment proceeded
according to plan. If this was not the case, researchers should note any deviations
away from the intended procedure, and comment upon the effect that these deviations
may have on the assessment procedure. In addition, researchers obviously need to
report the outcome of the experiment. If apparent evidence of fraud was discovered,
researchers must describe such evidence, as well as assessing the various ways in
which such evidence may be 'explained away' by non-fraud hypotheses.
Researchers should also attempt to help individuals, who at a later date, may wish to
assess the investigation. For example, researchers could figure out all of the
information needed to reconstruct the controls used in an experiment, and ensure that
this information will be available to future researchers. In the case of physical
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controls, the researcher should record the construction of such apparatus (e.g., via the
use of technical descriptions, diagrams and photographs) as fully as possible. In
addition, the researcher may try to ensure that future researchers are able to inspect
the actual equipment used during the experiment. This may entail retaining such
apparatus for a considerable period after the experiment. When describing
observational controls, researchers should note relevant information relating to the
researcher's psychological condition (e.g., knowledge of conjuring, level of stress,
etc.), physical condition (e.g., short sightedness), and the physical conditions under
which observation was made (e.g., lighting conditions, distance from claimant etc.).
Researchers should attempt to record the controls used in a study via as many
different types of media (e.g., still photographs, film, videotape, verbal descriptions,
drawings and plans) as possible. This has a number of advantages. First, the
possibility of such evidence containing ambiguities, and unreliabilities, which cannot
be resolved, is minimised. Second, when reporting a study researchers can base their
descriptions upon evidence obtained at the time of the study, and not have to depend
upon their own memories, which are more likely to be influenced by the effects of
bias, and decay. Also, all primary sources used to record controls (e.g., unedited
film, untouched photographs, unabridged verbal descriptions) as well as, where
possible, the actual controls themselves (e.g., material used to seal target material
etc.), should be retained by the investigator for a considerable period after the
termination of the study, such that it can made available to future researchers.
Finally, to assess if a report contains enough information researchers may find it
helpful to ask other individuals, not directly involved in the study, to reconstruct the
experiment from the report. This procedure may help researchers appreciate the
quantity of information, and amount of detail, needed by a reader to accurately
reconstruct a past experiment.
When undertaking a retrospective analysis, researchers should note the outcome of the
demonstration being assessed. In addition, researchers must report the assessment of
all 'non-fraud' hypotheses which might explain away any apparent evidence of fraud
obtained in that experiment.
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5.9 SUMMARY
This chapter briefly outlined recommendations for researchers wishing to carry out,
and report, an active, or retrospective, analysis of ostensible macro-PK. The chapter
first noted various strategies aimed at countering the cognitive, motivational and social
biases which encourage researchers^underestimate a claimant's potential for fraud.
Next, the chapter outlined ways in which researchers can maximise the development
of counter-explanations (i.e, hypotheses which account for the way in which the
ostensible macro-PK, under examination, may be fabricated). The chapter next noted
recommendations for assessing the plausibility of these hypotheses, to help ensure that
a plausible explanation is not erroneously rejected as implausible. Next, the chapter
outlined recommendations for the (re)construction, and assessment, of experimental
controls. The chapter then noted some of the difficulties in minimising a pseudo-
psychic being able to exploit the conditions apparently needed to elicit psi. Finally,
the chapter made a number of recommendations relating to the actual running, and
reporting, of a study. Each section of the chapter also contained recommendations
as to the type of information which should be reported in a write-up of either an
active, or retrospective, analysis of ostensible macro-PK.
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CHAPTER SIX
TESTING THE ESP CLAIMS OF SORRAT56
We often fail, of course.
Personal communication, the 'entities' to Wiseman,
January, 1992.
6.1 INTRODUCTION
Chapter five outlined recommendations for researchers wishing to carry out, and
report, active analyses of ostensible macro-PK. This chapter will describe how these
recommendations were used to assess a strong ESP claim made by The Society for
Research in Rapport and Telekinesis (SORRAT).
6.2 AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SORRAT
SORRAT is interested in the elicitation, and assessment, of major paranormal
phenomena. The group claims that these phenomena are not produced by living
individuals, but rather by 'spirit entities57'. This Missouri-based group were founded
in the 1960's by John Neihardt, a respected academic and authority on the Plains
Indians. After Neihardt's death in 1973, the leadership of the group was taken over
by John Neihardt's daughter, Alice Thompson. In 1977, William Edward Cox (a well
known parapsychologist) moved to Missouri, in part to study the SORRAT
phenomena. The effects apparently produced by the entities have been reported in
many publications (see Duke & Hansen, 1991) and include various apparent
phenomena, such as rapping, table movement and levitation, apports and matter
through matter. Possibly the best known, and most controversial, of these phenomena
56Parts of this chapter form the basis for a paper accepted for publication in the
Journal for the Society for Psychical Research.
"This paper will refer to messages apparently received from the 'entities'.
However, such messages could have been written by a living person. As such, the
term 'entity' has only been adopted for convenience, and does not imply that the
author believes in the reality of the SORRAT 'entities'.
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are those that have allegedly occurred inside various 'mini-labs58' (see, e.g., Cox
1983, Hansen, 1985b, Cox, 1985). Over the last ten years (Hansen, personal
correspondence, 11 May, 1992), Cox has claimed that the entities (or psi agency as
Cox prefers to call them) are able to divine the order of sealed decks of ESP59 cards.
Cox further claimed that the entities communicated in one of two ways. First, they
produced rapping sounds, with the pattern of raps corresponding to the shape, and
position, of cards in the ESP deck. Second, the entities have also apparently written
the order of ESP cards directly onto paper. Cox claimed that in most of these tests,
a large number of cards were correctly divined, including some runs of 100%
accuracy. In a letter to John Beloff (letter dated 12 January, 1991) Cox explained that
he had contacted several researchers, asking them to supply sealed decks of ESP
cards, to help assess the validity of this claim. Cox asked John Beloff (JB) if he too
would like to supply such a deck.
Such a study appeared worthwhile because, although SORRAT has generated much
anecdotal evidence of ostensible psi (see, for example, Richards, 1982), the group had
rarely been subjected to controlled testing (but see Phillips & McBeath, 1983, Hansen
& Broughton, 1991, and Stillings, 1991). In addition, the procedures, and results, of
the few investigators who have tested SORRAT have often been the subject of
controversy. For example, Hansen & Broughton (1991) report trying an experiment
to test the entity's claim to be able to alter the order of sealed decks of ESP cards.
When one of their ESP decks (sealed in a box) was returned and examined, the
authors note:
It appeared...that the box had been opened by other than paranormal
58A 'mini-lab' consists of a sealed container (e.g., an aquarium inverted over a
wooden base, secured by mental strips and locks) into which various small items (such
as toys, balloons, and leather rings) are placed by the experimenters. These 'mini-
labs' were designed to secure target material under circumstances in which they must
remain unattended during an experiment.
59A standard 'ESP' deck consists of twenty five cards, with each card bearing one
of five possible symbols (i.e., either a cross, star, circle, square or three 'wavy'
lines).
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means. It was obvious that whoever undertook the task devoted
considerable effort to entering the box with its layered security
precautions without leaving a trace. It seemed that unusual care was
taken at the beginning but, when breaching the final security measures
had resulted in the obvious damage to the box, the opener gave up in
frustration and, after opening the card box, had resealed it with less
care than when he began, (p. 25).
However, Cox (1986, 1987) has argued that this tampering does not constitute
evidence of fraud, but rather could have been caused by either a dishonest postal
employee looking for jewelry. Hansen & Broughton (1991) have presented a number
of objections to this interpretations of their findings.
6.3 AN ABORTED PILOT STUDY
u.
We first decided to undertake a pilot study. JB shuffledAdeck of ESP cards60, and
placed them inside a small (approximately 15cm by 8.5cm) white envelope, the flap
of which he then sealed with both glue and adhesive tape. JB's inked fingerprints
were placed onto the adhesive side of the tape in an attempt to prevent it being
removed, and 'duplicate' tape reapplied. In addition, all four edges of the envelope
were covered with adhesive tape that had been similarly marked. Cox had previously
stated that we should indicate the direction faced by the ESP cards (Cox had
previously noted [letter to Beloff, dated 10 June 1991] that the entities needed to know
which way the ESP cards were facing). For this reason, a sticker was placed on the
outside of the envelope, stating 'ESP cards face this way'. Both sides of the envelope
were photographed to help detect possible signs of tampering upon its return. This
deck was then sent to Cox, with a letter (dated 25 June 1991) stating that the deck
was designed as a pilot study, and was sealed in such a way as to counter only
superficial attempts at tampering. This letter further noted that, if the entities were
^These cards consisted of a standard deck of ESP cards, as supplied by 'Haines
House of Cards', Ohio. Each card is the approximate size, and thickness, of a bridge
playing card. The face of each card contains a large (approximately 5cm diameter)
black symbol on a white background. This type of deck was used in both the pilot
study, and formal experimentation. Such a deck can either be 'open' (i.e., containing
any number of each of the five symbols) or 'closed' (i.e., containing five duplicates
of each of the five symbols). Both of the decks used in both the pilot work, and
formal experimentation, were 'closed'.
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able to divine the order of this deck, no strong conclusions would be drawn, but a
second, more rigorously sealed, deck would be dispatched. If, however, the entities
were unable to divine the order of this 'pilot' deck, further testing would be deemed
unnecessary, and the assessment terminated. After receiving this deck, both Cox and
Tom Richards (a leading member of SORRAT) wrote independently (both letters
dated 23 July, 1991) to inform JB that, in view of the large number of successful pilot
studies, carried out with other researchers, they felt further pilot work to be
unnecessary. Both letters also indicated that they would be happy to proceed with
more formal experimentation61. JB then asked Richard Wiseman (RW), and Robert
Morris, if they would like to run a joint study designed to assess this claim. The
nature of the SORRAT claim entailed a deck of ESP cards being secured and sent to
the USA, where a pseudo-psychic may have available considerable time and resources
to access the deck. As such, the claim clearly presented something of a
methodological challenge, and thus seemed an ideal candidate to evaluate some of the
recommendations outlined in chapter five62. This, combined with the ambiguous
nature of the evidence from past assessments of SORRAT (see section 6.2), persuaded
both the present author, and Robert Morris, to help in the design, and running, of the
following study. As a result, JB wrote to Cox (dated 1 August 1991) stating that we
were happy to embark upon the design, and running, of a more formal experiment.
6.4 FORMAL EXPERIMENTATION
6IThe 'entities' did eventually offer two possible orders for this 'pilot deck'. Cox
initially sent these orders to us (letter dated 26 August, 1991) and, a little while later,
the sealed deck was returned (letter dated 5 October, 1991). The first of the orders
contained three hits, whilst the second contained four hits (see Appendix J). Thus
both orders fell slightly below the level of hitting expected by chance alone (i.e. five
hits). Although the end of one piece of the adhesive tape had obviously become lifted
from the envelope, there were no signs of tampering that would have allowed access
to the cards. This envelope is currently stored at Edinburgh University.
62Although the recommendations in chapter five concern the analysis of ostensible
macro-PK, most of the principles also apply to the assessment of ostensible major
ESP. In addition, it should be noted that the SORRAT claim was quite idiosyncratic,
having features more common to many macro-PK, and opposed to ESP, claims.
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6.4.1 Introduction
The following experimental design was constructed to test the SORRAT claim. First,
the experimenters were to randomise two decks of ESP cards and note their resulting
order (the documents containing these card orders will be referred to as the 'card
lists'). The cards would then be placed inside their respective card cases, and sealed.
One of these decks was to be dispatched to Cox, whilst the other was to be housed
at Edinburgh University63. Cox was then to ask the entities to divine the order of the
sealed ESP cards. Cox would then return both this card order, and the sealed deck,
to the experimenters. The actual order of the cards will then be compared to the
order predicted by the entities. To be successful, the entities must score at least a
certain number of hits, to be agreed upon before the experiment.
6.4.2 Developing an experimental protocol
As noted in section 2.6.2 psychic claimants who have failed to produce ostensible
paranormal phenomena have often stated, after the fact, that the experimental
conditions were not favourable to the production of psi. As also noted in that section,
this could be a legitimate complaint due to unfamiliarity with the actual procedure,
or an unfalsifiable excuse held in hand in case of such failure. To help prevent this
happening, Cox and Richards were asked to approve of, and sign, an agreement that
clearly outlined the experimental protocol. An initial draft of this agreement was sent
"As noted in section 5.5.2, this procedure has been recommended by Hansen
(1982) for use in macro-PK experiments which use small target objects. Should the
entities have been successful, this second package could have been sent to various
individuals (e.g., security experts, magicians etc.) to ascertain if it could have been
surreptitiously entered without showing signs of tampering. As noted in section 5.5.2,
it is necessaryfgr researchers to weigh up the pros and cons of using this method.
Obviously, it would have been advantages for this duplicate package to have been
distributed, and assessed, before the target package was sent to SORRAT. However,
this was not carried out for two reasons. First, before being dispatched to SORRAT,
RW spent a considerable amount of time ensuring that the target deck was effectively
sealed. Second, the distribution of the duplicate package, prior of the experiment,
would have increased the likelihood of other individuals discovering the methods used
to seal the deck.
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to Cox on 4 September 199164. Cox replied (letter not dated), asking that a small
number of minor changes be made to the wording of this agreement. This section
outlines the rationale behind the construction of the agreement, as well as containing
a verbatim copy of the final document (reproduced below in italics65).
It should be noted that some of the types of trickery mentioned in this section (e.g.,
a pseudo-psychic accessing the experimenters' card lists, or biasing the randomisation
of the ESP cards) may seem particularly unlikely, given that most SORRAT members
reside in the USA, and the target deck was ordered, and sealed, in Britain. However,
such methods are discussed for two reasons. First, as noted above, it is hoped that
this report may assist other researchers evaluate similar claims. Such researchers may
be faced with a claimant (or his/her confederate) who resides close to the
experimenter and, if this were the case, some of these 'unlikely' methods would
become more plausible. Second, SORRAT has an international membership, and it
was possible in principle (albeit unlikely) that one of their British members could have
attempted to interfere with the sections of the experiment carried out at Edinburgh
University.
We realised that a pseudo-psychic may discover, by non-psychic means, the procedure
used to order the ESP cards, and be able to ascertain the order of some, or all, of
those cards. For example, to order the deck, the experimenters may use information
contained in the weather reports of that day (e.g., by summating all of the high, and
low, temperatures in designated countries) to produce two numbers, which are then
used to access a row of figures in a standard random number table. This row of
random numbers would then be used to order the ESP deck. If a pseudo-psychic is
able to discover the way in which this process took place, he may be able to calculate
the resulting order of the deck. For example, the pseudo-psychic may discover how
54A verbatim copy of this initial agreement is contained in Appendix I.
"Because the various sections of this agreement have been fragmented in this
chapter, additional information (shown in square brackets) has occasionally been
added for clarity. This additional information is not present in the original agreement.
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information about the weather was being used, and determine the numbers used to
access the random number tables. Such an individual could then obtain a copy of the
random number tables used by the experimenters, and figure out the order of the ESP
deck. To help prevent this, the protocol did not contain any information relating to
the method used to randomise the cards, and this method of randomisation was not
used.
The pseudo-psychic may also be able to deceive the experimenters into believing that
the ESP deck was randomly ordered when, in reality, this process was biased by the
claimant. Magicians, and pseudo-psychics, have developed a myriad of methods
aimed at deceiving an observer into believing that a certain choice was unbiased, when
in reality that observer was unwittingly 'forced' into making a particular decision (for
a conceptual overview of these methods, see Sharpe, 1988). For example, the
experimenters may depend upon a random number generator (RNG), using a pseudo¬
random source, to produce a list of twenty-five numbers. These numbers could then
be used to order the ESP deck. If, in advance of this ordering process, the pseudo-
psychic were able to discover the way in which the cards will be randomised, he
might be able to bias this process. For example, the pseudo-psychic may tamper with
the RNG that will be used by the experimenters, such that the string of numbers it
produces can be determined by the pseudo-psychic. To help prevent this, the protocol
did not contain information relating to when, where and by whom the cards were to
be ordered. In addition, the cards were not ordered via the output of a RNG.
Additionally, a pseudo-psychic may access the card lists. This could be achieved in
several ways. First, the pseudo-psychic may surreptitiously monitor the experimenters
whilst these lists are being produced. Second, the pseudo-psychic may access the lists
after they have been compiled. Third, the pseudo-psychic may be able to access other
locations that contain the order of the cards. For example, one of the experimenters
may have listed the card orders on the top page of a pad of paper. If this is the case,
the experimenter may have unwittingly left a physical 'impression' of the lists on the
pages directly below the top page. If the claimant were able to see the pad in
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question, he might be able to discern the order of the cards by inspecting such
indentations. This latter technique has a long history in both the magical, and pseudo-
psychic, literature. To help prevent this, the protocol did not contain information
relating to whether or not the experimenters had noted the card orders, prior to sealing
the decks.
Also, a pseudo-psychic may be able to access the ESP cards themselves whilst those
cards are apparently sealed. This might be achieved in one of two ways. First, a
pseudo-psychic may remove some of the seals used to secure the deck, and carefully
replace these seals, or provide substitute seals. Second, the pseudo-psychic may be
able to access the card order without removing the seals. This might be the case, for
example, if the pseudo-psychic were able to see through the packaging used to seal
the cards. The chance of either of these stratagems being successful is increased by
the pseudo-psychics knowing exactly how the target deck was sealed. To help prevent
this, the protocol contained very little information relating to this issue, simple stating
that:
We (John and myself) will supply a package containing one standard
deck of25 ESP cards, sealed with any materials, andprocesses, ofour
choosing.
However, the claimant was told that:
Before the package is dispatched to Ed Cox, details of the precise
sealing procedure will be recorded (by John and myself), and remain
at Edinburgh University.
and:
Upon receipt of the package [back from Cox], we may have the
package examined (for signs ofdamage, or tampering) in any way that
we feel necessary.
Thus SORRAT was not informed as to exactly where, or how, these precautions
would be secured, nor how the package would be examined for signs of tampering.
Also, the protocol noted that there was a time limit of two months on the experiment:
The package must be returned, to us, within two months ofourposting
it to you, otherwise the experiment will be called off.
This was intended to limit the amount of time available to a pseudo-psychic to
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overcome the security measures installed in the package. In addition, it was possible
that a pseudo-psychic would attempt to enter the package, realise that it then displayed
irreparable signs of tampering, and not wish to return it to the experimenters. If this
happened, the two month time limit would prevent the experiment from dragging on
forever.
Obviously, the protocol stated that the package should not be tampered with, noting:
Anyone isfree to touch or hold the package in any manner that hefeels
necessary, but is not to try and open, or interfere, with its covering, or
seals. If such tampering occurs, the experiment will be aborted.
We also realised that a pseudo-psychic may consciously make his calls ambiguous,
such that a single call can be interpreted in a number of different ways. After the
card order is revealed, the pseudo-psychic then interprets the ambiguous calls in such
a way as to increase the number of hits obtained. To prevent this, the protocol noted:
Ed Cox is to complete a 'call sheet' (which will be sent with the
package) consisting oftwenty five sets ofthefive ESP symbols, each set
corresponding to a position in the ESP deck. This will entail simply
circling one of the symbols in each set, indicating the claimant's call
for the card in thatposition ofthe deck. This procedure is designed to
eliminate any ambiguity about the identity of each call. Should any
response on the call sheet be missing, or ambiguous, that call will be
counted as a miss. During examination, the package will be opened
and a comparison made between the call sheet and the order of the
respective ESP deck. In orderfor a single call to be considered a 'hit'
the call must exactly match the symbol on the face of the card at the
relevant position in the deck.
A pseudo-psychic may see the card order after it has been revealed by the
experimenters. For example, a pseudo-psychic may return the sealed deck with a fake
card order, perhaps sealed in an envelope. Once the order of the actual deck is
revealed the pseudo-psychic may secretly produce a second card order (sealed in an
identical envelope to that containing the 'fake' predicted card order) and secretly
switch this for the envelope originally supplied to the experimenters. Alternatively,
the pseudo-psychic may secretly make several different sets of 'predicted' card orders.
The pseudo-psychic then waits until the actual card order has been revealed, before
deciding which card order to disclose. Although both of these stratagems were
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unlikely, given the distance between Edinburgh and Rolla, the protocol did state that:
Once this is completed [i.e., the deck order divined], the package, must
be returned to us, by registered mail, along with the call sheet.
Neither the target deck, nor the card lists, would be opened before Cox had returned
both the target deck and clearly completed call sheet, and both were safely housed at
Edinburgh University.
A pseudo-psychic could simply guess the order of the cards, hoping that the
experimenters do not realise the likelihood of obtaining a certain number of hits by
chance alone. To minimise a pseudo-psychic being successful by chance alone, they
were asked to score fifteen, or more, direct hits (p=0.000014, 1 tail). This was well
within the range of the claim (Cox had claimed that many previous trials had obtained
25 hits), and clearly above chance, yet allowed for some error in any legitimate
psychic process that might take place. The protocol clearly stated this condition,
noting:
In order that the test be considered successful, there must be 15, or
more, direct hits.
We realised that if the deck returned from SORRAT showed signs of
damage/tampering, it may be difficult to decide if this constitutes evidence of
cheating, or is the result of an innocent cause (e.g., damage caused in transit). For
example, previous packages of this kind have often been sent (allegedly by the
entities) to other members of SORRAT, who may have unwittingly opened them (see,
e.g., Hansen & Broughton, 1991). Also, as noted in section 6.2, Cox (1986, 1987)
has claimed that a similar package (sent by Hansen & Broughton, 1991) may have
been opened by a dishonest postal employee, possibly looking for jewellery. In
addition, the package may be damaged in transit between the experimenters^ and
SORRAT. To help prevent all of the above, the protocol noted that:
After sealing the package, we will glue a sticker on the outside of it.
This sticker will state that, should the package be found, it should not
be opened, but mailed directly back to Ed Cox, at Rolla. This package
will then be placed inside an envelope and will be mailed, by registered
post, to yourself [i.e., to Cox]. Upon receipt of this envelope, you
[Cox] should open the envelope, and check that the outside of the
package shows no obvious sign of damage caused in transit. Should
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the package show any serious signs of damage, or tampering, please
return the package to ourselves, whereupon this experiment will be
aborted, and, possibly, arrangements made, for a second experiment
to begin. If the package shows no such sign of serious damage, you
should pass it on to Tom Richards.
The protocol also noted that the condition asked for by Cox, regarding an indication
of the direction faced by the ESP cards, would be present:
The outside of the package will also indicate which way the ESP cards
are facing.
A pseudo-psychic may misreport the experiment to other individuals. For example,
the pseudo-psychic may state that he did not agree to, or understand, the experimental
conditions prior to the study, when, in reality, this was not the case. The protocol
also noted how the results would be disseminated, noting:
Once the results are known, John and I will then prepare a full report,
describing, in general terms, the security precautions used in the
package, along with the results ofthe examination/judging procedures.
It should be noted that, should this experiment be successful (i. e. there
are 15, or more, hits, and the package shows no sign ofdamage, or
tampering), we would include in our report a statement that we are
impressed by the results, that we have no ready conventional
explanation for the results and that we feel further research is
warranted. However, we will not issue any statement to the effect that
we believe the claimant to have 'psychic' ability.
After receiving this report you will be asked ifyou wish to write up the
experimentfor either publication, orprivate circulation. Ifyou decide
to write-up the experiment, the above report must be reproduced as
part ofthat write up. The report may not be omitted, paraphrased, or
shortened in any manner without written permission from either John,
or myself. We reserve the right to both publish, or circulate, a write
up of the experiment in whatever manner we feel appropriate,
incorporating the full contents of the report.
Finally, the protocol noted that:
Both during, and after, the testing, all packaging remains the property
ofEdinburgh University.
To prevent any confusion both Cox and Richards were asked to provide a signed
agreement of the above protocol, stating that they accepted all of the above
conditions. A copy of the above agreement was sent to Cox on 17 September 1991,
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and a signed acceptance was received on 5 October 1991. In addition to returning the
signed agreement, Cox asked RW to send a copy of the following letter (written by
Cox), which would act as 'instructions' to the entities:
Dear Mr Cox,
It was good to hearfrom you, and we are happy to send you this ESP
deck. The cards face the same way as this personal message to the
entities producing the calls. Just 15 hits out of 25 would be excellent.
Please provide a return envelope addressed to yourselfor Tom, which
can then be sent by registered mail to us - both the deck and the calls.
Best Wishes
Richard Wiseman
In our reply to Cox (25 October 1991) we confirmed receipt of the signed agreement,
and noted that the sealed deck, and requested letter, would be prepared, and
despatched, as soon as possible.
6.4.3 Randomising, and recording, the target decks
This section will outline how the two decks of ESP cards were randomised, and their
resulting orders recorded.
As noted above, it was necessary to prevent a pseudo-psychic determining the card
order via information regarding the randomisation process. For this reason, it was
decided that SORRAT would not be informed how the cards were to be randomised.
Second, it was decided that an ordering process be designed such that, even if its
nature were discovered by a pseudo-psychic, this information could not be used to
calculate the order of the cards. On 30 October 1991 two ESP decks were
randomised by two of the experimenters (JB & RW). This randomisation procedure
was carried out in JB's office at Edinburgh University. To randomise the ESP cards,
each of the experimenters shuffled the decks several times. The cards were not in any
identifiable order before shuffling (e.g., ordered by symbol), and both multiple riffle,
and overhand, shuffles were carried out.
It was also necessary to counter the possibility of a pseudo-psychic influencing the
randomisation of the ESP cards. Given that this experiment did not use any physical
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devices (e.g., a RNG) to randomise the cards, it was not necessary to ensure that a
pseudo-psychic could not have gained prior access to this type of equipment.
However, it seemed possible that a pseudo-psychic could influence, by normal means,
the mixing of the cards, if he (or a confederate) were to be present at the time of this
shuffling. For this reason, at the time of the shuffling, only the two of the
experimenters (JB & RW) were present in the room. Of course, neither Cox, nor
Richards, had handled the cards prior to the experiment, and was not informed as to
when, or where, the randomisation procedure was carried out.
The section above also noted that a pseudo-psychic should not be able to access the
experimenters' card lists. For this reason, the experimenters ensured that they were
alone when producing these lists. Also, the experimenters ensured that this
information was present in just one location. Thus, the order of the decks were
clearly registered on two 'call sheets' (i.e., one call sheet per deck) and the
experimenters took care not to leave any 'impressions' of the card orders on any other
surfaces. The lists were then secured immediately after they had been written,
minimising any opportunity to access these lists before they were sealed. Second, to
ensure that the card lists could not be accessed whilst they were sealed, they were
placed into a 'tamper evident' envelope. After some research66, it was decided to use
the 'Keepsafe'67 security envelope. This is a commercially available product that,
according to its manufacturer, minimises the likelihood that any tampering will go
undetected. The manufacturers state that, as the envelopes are constructed from
polyethylene, they cannot be slit and resealed without detection. Second, the edges
"One of the security products assessed was the 'Survivor Pocket Envelope With
Tamper Evident Seal'. This was described as being 'ideal for payroll, classified
documents, financial statements, medical records or any confidential data'. Although
the top flap of this envelope was protected by a moderately secure 'tamper evident'
strip, it's bottom flap was sealed with conventional envelope glue. This bottom flap
could be easily opened by using a 'wet opening' technique (see Harrison, 1975, p.,
11-13), and re-glued, without showing any signs of tampering. Needless to say, this
envelope was not used in this present study.
67'Keepsafe' is a registered trademark of LMG Cambridge.
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of the envelopes are heat sealed, such that they too cannot be slit, and resealed,
without detection68. The envelope is sealed via a self-adhesive strip which runs along
the top of the bag. This strip reveals signs of physical tampering including: attempted
peeling off of the strip, the application of heat69 or cold, and the use of various
solvents. Two measures prevent an entire edge of the envelope being cut off, and the
envelope being completely resealed along one side. First, both edges of the envelope
carry a complex 'chain' pattern. If the edge were completely removed and the
envelope resealed, this pattern would have to be recreated. Second, the envelopes are
produced in a standard size. The cutting and resealing, of an envelope would
significantly lessen its width. Obviously, the envelope could be opened, and then
replaced by a second duplicate, but undamaged, envelope. To prevent this, each
envelope carries a permanent, and unique, six digit number. This number is also
printed on a removable tag, which is initially attached to the envelope. After the bag
has been sealed, this flap can be removed and used to check that the bag has not been
replaced by a duplicate bag carrying a different number. Finally, a pseudo-psychic
may attempt to access the card lists by holding the bag up to a bright light source, and
seeing through its sides. To prevent this, the card lists were folded in half, and
placed into an A5 brown manilla envelope. This brown envelope was then placed into
the Keepsafe envelope. In addition, the inside surfaces of the Keepsafe envelope are
printed with solid black such that, once the envelope is sealed, it becomes almost
completely opaque. This Keepsafe envelope was then placed inside a filing cabinet
located within JB's office. This office was locked when left unattended for any
significant periods of time. Finally, a pseudo-psychic could attempt to gain access to
the Keepsafe bag before it is used to secure the card order. In this way, a pseudo-
psychic might be able to tamper with it's sealing strip, such that the envelope could
68My special thanks to the Edinburgh University Polymer Unit who helped
assessed the envelopes, and verified that the sides could not be easily slit, and re¬
sealed.
MIt was discovered that the strip could be removed, and replaced, by careful
application of heat. However, such a process demands considerable skill and, even
then, is prone to result in slight puckering of the top edge of the envelope.
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be opened without showing signs of tampering. To counter this, the envelope was
carefully checked before use, for any signs of damage/tampering.
6.4.4 Securing the target deck
This section will outline exactly how the target deck of ESP cards was sealed.
We realised that a pseudo-psychic may attempt to see the ESP cards themselves before
they are sealed. To help prevent this, the interval between the shuffling, and sealing,
the decks was as short as possible (approximately two hours). During this interval the
cards were kept on RW's person, who ensured that the cards were not accessed by
anyone during this period. The cards were then taken to the home of RW and the
first stages of the sealing procedure were completed. This first entailed three pieces
of brown self-adhesive plastic packing tape (approximately 2 inches wide) being
wrapped around the card case. This tape was not designed to counter a pseudo-
psychic accessing the cards, but to prevent the cards moving out of the box during the
sealing procedure, and whilst in transit between Edinburgh/Rolla. Second, the decks
were then placed inside A5 (approximately 15cm by 21cm) Keepsafe security
envelopes. The specifications of these envelopes have already been described above.
Next, the A5 Keepsafe envelopes were carefully folded around the card cases, and
inserted into thicker transparent plastic bags. This second bag was not designed as
a security precaution, but to prevent the Keepsafe envelopes from being attacked by
the encapsulating resin (see below). To prevent the resin leaking inside this second
bag, these bags were then firmly sealed with plastic tape.
The two resulting packages (i.e., each consisting of a deck of ESP cards sealed in an
A5 Keepsafe envelope, and a thicker plastic bag) were then taken to Edinburgh
University's Department of Molecular Biology, and were each encapsulated in
approximately 500g of industrial embedding resin70. This resin (Trylon Embedding
70This method of sealing was suggested by the work of Hansen & Broughton
(1991) who, in their work with SORRAT, sealed an ESP deck within liquid plastic.
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Resin EM306PA) consists of a transparent liquid71 that is poured over the object to
be embedded. A catalyst72 is then added and, over a period of twenty-four hours,
the resin slowly hardens into a solid block. Obviously, parts of the block could be
attacked in several ways (e.g., by sawing or drilling), but it would be extremely
problematic to conceal signs of such tampering. However, it was necessary to prevent
a claimant from breaking up the entire block (e.g., by melting it), and then replacing
it with an identical, but undamaged, block. For this reason, as the block was setting,
a number of drops of potassium permanganate solution were placed in the resin.
These form small purple spots of different shapes and sizes, and which fell to
different depths in the resin. The position, diameter and depth of these dots would
be difficult to duplicate. In addition, the mould used to contain the resin was chipped
away in a complex pattern that would also be difficult to reproduce. Unfortunately,
as the resin around Deck 1 was setting, the packaged deck floated to the top of the
resin such that a small amount of the bag (approximately 2cm x 2cm) remained
uncovered. Deck 2 was completely encapsulated in the resin. The resulting blocks
measured 11.4cm x 17.2cm x 3cm.
The decks were then taken to Edinburgh University's Psychology Department and
photographed from all six sides. Each of these photographs included both the block,
and a ruler, such that the exact placement, and diameter, of the chemical drops can
be plotted. The photographs also include the pattern of the mould that has been
chipped away around the block itself. The deck that was to be sent to Cox (i.e.,
Deck 2) was then placed inside an A4 (approximately 30cm by 21cm) Keepsafe
envelope that had been checked for any signs of tampering/damage. This envelope
was sealed and signed by RW. The security numbers of the Keepsafe envelopes,
photographs (and negatives) of the blocks and documentation that outlined the above
sealing procedure were securely housed in the home of RW.
''Polyester resin in styrene monomer.
"Organic peroxide.
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6.4,5 Measures designed to minimise the target deck being tampered with, or
damaged, during the experiment
As noted in section 6.3.2, when the deck is returned from SORRAT, it may show
signs of damage/tampering. For the reasons outlined in that section, it may be
difficult to decide if such damage/tampering constitutes evidence of subject cheating.
For example, the package may be accidentally damaged whilst being handled by either
Cox, or Richards. To minimise this possibility, the A4 Keepsafe bag was carefully
folded around the resin block, and placed inside an A4 'padded' envelope. This
envelope was then firmly sealed with brown plastic packing tape.
Second, the package may be damaged in transit from Britain to the USA, or vice-
versa. Several steps were taken to minimise this possibility. First, when being sent
from Britain to the USA, the package was surrounded with paper and placed into a
strong cardboard box. Second, to help prevent damage whilst the package is
travelling from the USA to Britain, Cox was asked to securely repack the parcel
before dispatching it to Britain.
Third, either British, or US, customs officials may have wished to examine the
package. To minimise this possibility, a strip of paper was placed around the
package. This strip asked individuals not to open the package, and explained that it
was part of a parapsychology experiment being conducted by Edinburgh University.
In addition, the labels carried the addresses of both John Beloff, and Ed Cox, noting
that more information about the experiment could be obtained from either of these
individuals. Cox was asked to replace this strip of paper around the parcel, when
returning it to the experimenters.
Fourth, the package could be opened, and damaged, by an individual other than the
claimant. For example, previous packages of this kind have often been 'mismailed'
to other members of SORRAT, who may have unwittingly opened them. To
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minimise this happening, a label was firmly stuck to the outside of the parcel. This
label asked individuals not to open the package, and explained that it was part of a
parapsychology experiment being conducted by Edinburgh University. In addition,
the labels carried the addresses of both John Beloff, and Ed Cox, noting that the
parcel should be sent to either of these individuals.
The resulting parcel, with the requested letter to the entities, was dispatched to Cox
on 19 November 1991. In a letter (dated 6 December, 1991), Cox informed us that
the package had arrived, and did not appear to have been damaged in transit. Cox
also noted that as the package was apparently too large to be 'mismailed', he had
deleted last line of RW's letter to the entities73. Cox next wrote to Beloff on 13
January 1992, informing him that the letter (written by RW to the entities), but not
the deck, had gone missing from the mini-lab into which it had been placed. Cox
interpreted this as a good sign, noting that in previous experiments, this had preceded
the entities making their calls relating to the order of the target deck. Beloff replied
to Cox (letter dated 21 January, 1992), noting that, since the two month deadline had
expired, the return of the deck was now overdue. However, on 28 January, 1992,
RW received both a completed call sheet, and written letter, allegedly from the
entities. These documents had been mailed to another member of SORRAT (resident
in California), who had then forwarded them (with the envelope in which they were
received74) to RW. The call sheet contained 25 unambiguous calls (each circled in
black ink). The letter (written on the bottom of the letter originally written by RW
to the entities) noted:
Friend Richard-
We have tried to rearrange the cards in yourpacket to approximate the
calls we have marked. We often fail, of course.
Shanti-expeditor!Rector!J. K.
73That is, the line reading 'Please provide a return envelope addressed to yourself
or Tom, which can then be sent by registered mail to us - both the deck and the
calls'.
74This envelope displayed a post-mark showing that it had been posted in
'Spiritwood, North Dakota' on the morning of 13 January, 1992.
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To minimise the likelihood of this order being switched for another card list (e.g.,
after the actual card order has been announced), this call sheet was photocopied, and
the copies stored in both the home, and office, of RW. Beloff then wrote to Cox
(letter dated 28 January, 1992), enclosing a copy of this call sheet, and asking him
if he accepted these calls as authentic. Meanwhile, Cox had received a copy of both
the letter, and call sheet, from the same SORRAT member, and wrote to Beloff (letter
dated 27 January, 1992) stating that these calls should be taken as genuine. Cox also
returned the target package with this letter. This parcel arrived in Edinburgh on 5
February, 1992.
6,5 RESULTS
It was first necessary to discover how the calls, allegedly made by the entities,
compared with order of the deck as it had been dispatched ffom Edinburgh. Second,
regardless of the number of 'hits' obtained, it was necessary to examine the target
package for any signs of damage, or tampering. To achieve both goals, on 14
February 1992, the card list, and outer layers of the packaging, were examined75.
To counter the notion that the experimenters may have damaged the package whilst
opening it, the opening of the package was filmed by two video cameras. One
camera focused on a small area (approximately 16cm by 25cm) of the table on which
the examination was taking place (this will be referred to as the 'target area'). The
second camera had a wider field of vision and contained both the target area, and
surrounding sections of the table. During filming, RW placed the Keepsafe bag
(containing the card list) into the target area. All edges, and both sides of the bag,
were filmed close-up. RW then carefully cut the envelope open and removed the
inner, brown manilla, envelope. This envelope was then opened, and the card list
removed. Neither the Keepsafe bag, nor the manilla envelope, displayed any signs
of damage, or tampering. The card list was then compared with the calls allegedly
75This examination took place in the Parapsychology Laboratory at Edinburgh
University. Both of the experimenters (JB & RW) were present, along with Professor
Robert Morris, Robin Taylor (post-graduate student at the Koestler Chair of
Parapsychology), David Wilkinson and Jimmy Cuthbert (the two technicians filming
the examination).
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made by the entities. Eight 'hits' were obtained (p=0.11,1 tailed). The actual order
of the target deck, and the calls made by the entities, are shown in Appendix K.
Next, the outer layers of the target package were removed. This was performed in
the following manner. First, RW placed the target package into the target area, and
all sides, and edges of the outer brown envelope were fdmed. The tape around the
outer padded bag was then removed, and the bag opened. The inner A4 Keepsafe
envelope was removed and placed into the target area. This envelope was carefully
filmed on all edges, and sides. The strip that sealed the bag was also filmed close-up.
This bag was then carefully cut open by RW, and the resin block removed. The
Keepsafe bag was carefully examined, and found to be free from signs of damage, or
tampering. The resin block was then placed into the target area and all six sides
filmed. Each of these shots contained a ruler (placed alongside the block), to ensure
that accurate measurements could be taken from the videotape. Both the placement
of the drops of potassium permanganate, and the pattern formed by the chipping away
of the sides of the block, were compared to the photographs taken before the block
was dispatched from Edinburgh. No discrepancies were discovered. In addition, the
block displayed no signs of damage, or tampering. There was only one small
difference between the photographs of the block as it left Edinburgh, and the state of
the returned block. The glue which secured the sealing strip of the inner, A5,
Keepsafe envelope had spread, causing a small yellow stain on the surface of the
Keepsafe bag. This is likely to have been caused by the temperatures endured by the
Keepsafe bag in transit between the experimenters and SORRAT. The video camera
continuously recorded all the examination procedure, and the target package did not
leave the camera's field of vision during the whole of this time. A sheet of paper,
on which the card list, and the 'entities' calls, were compared, was written by
Professor Robert Morris and signed by himself, JB and RW.
After the above examination, all six sides of the resin block were carefully
photographed. These photographs contain a ruler, placed alongside the side of the
block, such that accurate measurements can be taken from these photographs.
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As the entities had stated that they had tried to reorder the target deck of cards, it was
decided to open the resin block itself. This procedure took place on 18 February
1992. This examination was filmed from a single camera, which contained a wide
angled shot of the bench at which the deck was opened. The camera first contained
a close-up shot of the face of the block, with a ruler alongside (such that accurate
measurements could be taken from the videotape). The camera slowly zoomed out,
ensuring that the deck was always in view on the videotape. The block was then
handed to a technician who, using an industrial circular saw, cut off three sides of the
block. These cuts removed both the resin, and the sides of the A5 Keepsafe envelope,
which held the cards. The block was then prised apart, and the card case removed.
RW then peeled off the brown plastic tape that had been placed around the deck, and
removed the cards. Each of the faces of these cards were then shown to the camera,
as the order of the deck was compared with the deck order made before the cards
were dispatched from Edinburgh. All 25 cards were in the same order as they had
been when the deck left Edinburgh. The video camera continuously recorded all the
above examination procedure, and the target package did not leave the camera's field
of vision during the whole of this process.
Finally, as promised in the experimental protocol agreement, a report (containing all
of the information in this chapter) was sent to Ed Cox.
To aid other researchers who may wish to reassess this study, most of the material
referred to in this chapter is currently stored at Edinburgh University. This includes:
all cited correspondence between Beloff and Cox, a copy of the experimental protocol
agreement signed by Cox and Richards, duplicates of the material used to seal the
target deck, the unused resin block containing the second deck of cards, all packaging
used to seal the actual target deck (i.e., brown tape, plastic tape, A5 & A4 Keepsafe
envelopes, the thick plastic bag), the target deck of cards and card case, the various
pieces of sawn up resin block, the videotapes containing footage of both examination
procedures, all photographs and negatives of the target and duplicate block, the call
sheet allegedly completed by the entities, the call lists, the letter allegedly from the
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entities to RW, and the envelope in which this letter was sent to the Californian
SORRAT member.
6.6 DISCUSSION
This study hoped to achieve two goals.
As noted in section 6.3, the nature of the SORRAT claim presented something of a
methodological challenge, and thus seemed an ideal candidate to evaluate some of the
recommendations outlined in chapter five. These recommendations provided useful
guidelines for the design, running, and reporting of this study. For example, many
of the guidelines relating to the construction of counter-explanations and controls (see
sections 5.3 & 5.5) were incorporated into the general design of this experiment (see
section 6.4), especially during the randomisation, and sealing, of the ESP decks. In
addition, guidelines relating to the interpretation of possible evidence of fraud (see
section 5.6.3), were used to create measures which minimised the difficulty in
deciding if any damage to the deck (when it was returned from SORRAT) constituted
evidence of cheating, or was the result of an 'innocent' cause (e.g., damage caused
in transit). Also, guidelines relating to the construction of an experimental agreement
(section 5.7) were used to construct the document reproduced, and discussed, in
section 6.4.2. Finally, many of the general reporting recommendations (especially
those which aim to help future researchers reassess past studies [see section 5.8.4])
were employed during the write-up of this experiment.
Additionally, the study was designed to assess the card divination claims of SORRAT.
SORRAT failed on three counts. First, the target package was not returned to the
experimenters within two months of it being dispatched to SORRAT. Second, and
most important, when the package and call sheet were returned and examined, the
entities obtained only 8 hits. This is not statistically significant at the p<0.05 level,
and also falls below the 15 hits required by the experiment and considerably below
the 25 hits which Cox claims has occurred on some past occasions. Third, the entities
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stated that they ha;? tried to rearrange the order of the cards in the target deck.
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However, when the deck was opened, all 25 cards were in the same order as when
they were dispatched from Edinburgh. This failure does not agree/with the results
obtained by at least two other experiments reported by Cox, both of which contained
a significant number of hits (Cox, 1992). This discrepancy could be interpreted in
a number of ways. It is possible that the security precautions, used in these previous
studies, were not as effective as the controls used in this present study. Such an
interpretation would suggest that the results of these other studies were due to
cheating76. Alternatively, it could be hypothesised that some aspect of this study
'blocked' the entities from divining the order of the ESP deck. If this were the case,
one would have to postulate that Cox, and Richards, are not aware of this condition,
given that they agreed to the experimental protocol. This latter interpretation could
be tested by running several additional studies, in which precautions against subject
cheating were high, but employed a large range of conditions (e.g., various materials
being used to seal the target deck) in an attempt to discover when the entities were,
or were not, successful. However, given the time, and resources, which would have
to be invested in such a study, it is with reluctance that the present author agrees with
Hansen & Broughton (1991) in noting:
...researchers must decide where to focus their energy, and for us it
appears that the SORRAT phenomena are not apt to produce a payoff
for further research, (p. 30).
76It should be stressed that this present study discovered no evidence of subject
fraud, nor was it specifically designed to do so. In addition, the author is not
insinuating that either Ed Cox, or Tom Richards, are guilty of any fraud which may
have occurred during previous testing of SORRAT phenomena.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE FEILDING REPORT: A RECONSIDERATION77
When will the investigators of Eusapia learn that no detail can be too
trivial and insignificant; that in these very details consists, frequently,
the clew [sic] to the mystery, and that no report will ever be regarded
as final and conclusive without them?
Hereward Carrington, writing before the 1908 Naples sittings
with Eusapia Palladino, in Eusapia Palladino and Her Phenomena.
71 INTRODUCTION
Chapter five outlined recommendations for researchers wishing to carry out, and
report, retrospective analyses of ostensible macro-PK. This chapter will describe how
these recommendations were used to reassess of one of the best known documents
within psychical research, namely: the Feilding Report (Feilding, Baggally and
Carrington, 1909).
7.2 HISTORY OF THE FEILDING REPORT
At the turn of this century, many leading psychical researchers had investigated the
physical mediumship of Eusapia Palladino. However, the resulting literature
contained a divergence of opinion as to the validity of her phenomena. Many writers
categorically stated that the phenomena were truly inexplicable (e.g. Lombroso,
1909/1988, Lodge, 1894), whilst others argued that she was merely a skilled trickster
(e.g. Hodgson, 1895). At this time, the Society for Psychical Research had a policy
of not working with mediums that had been found to be fraudulent. Yet Palladino
had 'been observed by probably a larger number of scientific men than any other
medium' (Sidgwick, 1909), such that the SPR felt it necessary to investigate this
controversial figure. This investigation was undertaken by three experienced,
knowledgeable and sceptical researchers, who documented their findings in a
77Part of this chapter has been published as a paper in the Journal for the Society
of Psychical Research. 58(826). 129-152, 1992.
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remarkable paper that has come to be labelled The Feilding Report'78 (Feilding,
Baggally and Carrington, 1909).
The qualifications of the investigators should not be underestimated. One of them,
Hereward Carrington, had previously published 'The Physical Phenomena of
Spiritualism' (Carrington, 1907), a book which catalogues the diverse range of
pseudo-psychic trickery which he had encountered during his extensive investigations
into fraudulent mediumship. The second investigator, Everard Feilding, had also
come into contact with many fake mediums, and has been described by Dingwall
(1950) as 'one of the most astute critics that this country has ever produced'. Finally,
the third member of the team, W.W. Baggally, was an amateur conjurer who 'had sat
with every notable physical medium since Home and had found them all wanting'
(Gauld, personal communication, 1991) and was also sceptical ofphysical phenomena.
The Feilding Report contains an extremely thorough account of eleven seances
undertaken with Eusapia Palladino. Each account contains details of both the
phenomena which took place, and the controls enforced against fraud. The detail
given in the Report is impressive, and necessary, given that one of the investigators'
aims was:
...not merely to come to a conclusion ourselves as to whether or not
the phenomena were true, but to present a report in such a form as to
enable a reader to judge of the possibility of our having been
deceived;- that is, to give an absolutely full account of the occurrences
at each seance, with a detailed statement of the precautions taken and
of the control existing at each moment. (Feilding, 1909a, p. 122).
All three investigators concluded that at least some of the phenomena witnessed in
Naples were genuine. In their concluding comments to the Report, they write:
...we are of the opinion that we have witnessed in the presence of
Eusapia Palladino the action of some telekinetic force.. .through which,
without the introduction of either accomplices, apparatus, or manual
dexterity, she is able to produce movements of...objects at a distance
from her.. .and also to produce matter.. .without any.. .source of supply.
(p.344).
78The remainder of this article will simple refer to this document as the 'Report'.
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For over eighty years, the Feilding report has been seen by many as some of the best
evidence for directly observable psi. Indeed, some writers have cited the report as
a triumph of psychical research. For example, Gauld (1968, p.243) has also noted
that it is 'without a doubt the most interesting record of it's kind ever published'.
Nicol (1977) has described it as 'probably the most thorough and reliable account of
physical phenomena that has ever been published'. Braude (1986, p. 141) has written
that; 'the report is a remarkable document of the reality of large scale PK'. Beloff
(1985) has cited the report as a case which has never received a satisfactory counter
explanation from sceptics.
Given all of the above, the Feilding Report seems an ideal candidate for exploring
some of the problems involved in evaluating archival material from this era.
Towards the end of 1908, two of the investigators (Feilding and Carrington) travelled
to Naples, in order to hold ten (although this figure was later increased to eleven)
sittings with Eusapia Palladino. After the fourth sitting, a third investigator,
Baggally, was asked to join the team. All of these seances were held in the middle
room of three adjoining rooms on the fifth floor of the Hotel Victoria, Naples. The
floor plan of these rooms, as it was presented in the Feilding Report, is reproduced
in Figure 7.1, at the end of this chapter. The investigators allowed Palladino to
supply her own thin black cashmere curtains, and seance table. Both of these items
were carefully examined (although the Report contains no details of this examination
procedure). The curtains 'concealed no mystery', whilst the table was 'found to be
an absolutely plain structure'. The curtains were hung across one corner of the room,
in order to create a seance 'cabinet'. Before each seance, all unnecessary furniture
was removed from the room. Various items (such as a small table and musical
instruments) were placed behind the curtain, and the seance table placed
approximately 2ft in front of the curtain. A second table was placed in the middle of
the room, and used by the stenographer, Mr Meeson. At the start of the seance,
Palladino would sit at the head of the table (i.e. nearest the cabinet). The
investigators would then take their places around the table, usually sitting to
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Palladino's left and right. For all eleven seances, Meeson took shorthand notes which
contain details of the events as they occurred in the seance room. The resulting
transcript includes descriptions of the phenomena produced, and controls enforced to
preclude fraud. It is only by reading these transcripts, that one can start to fully
appreciate the apparent evidential nature of the report. However, its flavour may be
gleaned from the summary table presented by Baggally (reproduced in Figure 7.2 at
the end of this chapter) in his conclusion to the Report. This table shows the huge
range and quantity of the phenomena apparently produced by Palladino.
7.3 A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF PAST COUNTER-EXPLANATIONS
7.3.1 Introduction
Five types of 'normal' explanations have been proposed to account for the phenomena
described within the Feilding Report. Each of these explanations were considered
both by the experimenters themselves at the time of the investigation, and by
commentators subsequent to the Report's publication. Each of these counter-
explanations will be briefly reviewed.
7.3.2 The freeing of a limb via 'substitution'
First, many writers have considered the idea that Palladino might have been able to
surreptitiously free one, or more, limb(s) from the control of her investigators. This
hypothesis was considered in the Report, as well as being discussed by Podmore
(1909, 1910), Stawell (1910), Baggally (1910) and Taylor (1910). The Feilding
Report notes that Eusapia did, albeit occasionally, try to free her limbs, usually by the
method of 'substitution'. This involved two of the investigators being led to believe
that they were each holding one of Palladino's hands/feet when, in reality, they were
each holding different sides of the same hand/foot. As noted by the investigators, this
substitution was made possible by four factors. First, Palladino would focus the
investigators' attention on the 'hand substitution' hypothesis by interrupting the
seance:
...to ask if the control was satisfactory, and perpetually rendering it as
difficult as possible for us to make it so (Report, p.325).
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Second, her hands would play on top of her controllers' hands, in a 'furtive and
elusive manner'. Third, Palladino would take advantage of occasions when the
investigators could not fully see her hands, as might be the case in dim lighting
conditions, or when the seance curtain covered her hands. Finally, she obviously
possessed considerable manual skill for performing such feats, with the investigators
admitting that:
.. .the skill with which the substitution was performed was remarkable.
The tactile sensation of continuity of contact was unbroken. (Report,
p.326).
However, it should be noted that, for much of the time, the seance conditions were
good, such that any hand substitution would have probably been detected by the
investigators. The investigators also admit that the most frequently employed foot
control (i.e. Palladino placing each of her feet upon those of the investigators) was
not satisfactory, as it made the detection of such substitutions problematic. However,
it must be remembered that the investigators were primed to expect exactly this
methodology. It seems implausible that Palladino would, under these conditions, be
able to continually perform such trickery and thus the notion that this hypothesis could
account for all 470 phenomena (as suggested by Podmore, 1910), seems incorrect.
Given all of the above, the 'substitution' hypothesis seems able to explain a relatively
small number of the reported phenomena.
7.3.3 Trick apparatus used by Palladino
A second line of attack suggested that Palladino was able to employ 'trick apparatus',
in order to produce the reported phenomena. There are a number of variants on this
hypothesis, each reflecting the investigator's, or commentator's, schema for what type
of apparatus may be available to a fake medium. For example, in the Report,
Carrington discusses the idea that a 'dummy' hand may have been used to produce the
'touches', experienced by the investigators during the sixth seance. In a similar vein,
Stawell outlined how a 'short india rubber tube with a bulb at one end' could have
produced the breeze which emitted from the medium's forehead, as well as the curtain
bulging and dress swelling phenomena. However, in trying to understand why this
explanation is somewhat limited, one can do no better that read Feilding's conclusion
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to the sixth seance:
It would be an interesting problem to set before a manufacturer of
conjuring machines to devise apparatus capable of producing.. .a white
hand with movable fingers..with practicable living thumb and fingers
having nails, capable of reaching high above the medium's head, of
patting, pinching and pulling hair, and of so vigorously grasping B.
[Baggally] by the coat as almost to upset him into the cabinet. Our
manufacturer must construct the apparatus that it can be actuated
unseen by a...lady clad in a tight plain gown, who sits outside the
curtain held visibly by hand and foot, in such a way as to escape the
observation of two practical conjurers clinging about her and on the
look-out for its operation.(Report, p.463).
Again, this explanation seems able to account for a small number of the phenomena.
7.3.4 Hallucination
A third explanation suggests that the investigators were the victims of hallucination,
and were simply deluded as to the reality of either the phenomena themselves, or the
controls being applied to Palladino. This hypothesis was discussed by the
investigators themselves and rejected (on the basis of their schemata relating to the
nature of hallucination) on a number of counts. First, the investigators believed that
such hallucinations would have had to have been both collective and concurrent in
that, all of the investigators agreed on the observation of both phenomena and
controls. Second, they believed that such hallucination would have been induced by
very little verbal influence on the part of Palladino, and would have entailed the
investigators not noting its occurrence in either themselves, or each other. For these
reasons, the investigators reject this hypothesis as a plausible counter-explanation.
7.3.5 Experimenter confederacy
Some writers have considered that some of the phenomena could have been caused by
one of the experimenters acting as a confederate. For example, during the Report
Baggally briefly considers the possibility that the stenographer, Meeson, could have
acted as a confederate. This is rejected on the grounds that Meeson was nearly
always visible to the investigators, and was placed several feet away from the seance
table. Other writers have even suggested that Carrington may have colluded with
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Palladino, allowing her to free a limb. For example, Rinn (1954) included Carrington
in his list of investigators who may have colluded with their subjects. More recently,
this accusation has been reiterated by Kurtz (1985) when he writes:
Was..[Carrington]..a true and naive believer, or was he, like her
[Palladino], a fraudulent hoaxer? Either or both explanations have
some rationale, though the latter no doubt seems especially compelling,
(p.209).
However, although Carrington may have had a motivation for such fraud (he later
acted as an agent to Palladino, promoting her mediumship when she toured America),
to my knowledge, there is little solid evidence to support this hypothesis. In addition,
there are two additional problems which have not been tackled by those suggesting
Carrington confederacy. First, even ifCarrington had allowed Eusapia to free a limb,
it is difficult to understand how such a practice would have gone undetected by the
other investigator(s). Second, it is also difficult to imagine how this hypothesis would
account for the phenomena which occurred in the eleventh seance (when Carrington
was absent). As such, those supporting this hypothesis have failed to account for the
conditions, and controls, present during the seances.
7.3.6 An accomplice
Finally, it has also been suggested that Palladino may have employed a hidden
accomplice. There are two main variants on this 'accomplice' theme. Stawell (1910)
notes that an accomplice (located in Baggally's room) may have been responsible for
just one set of phenomenon, namely the rapping on one of the doors which occurred
at the end of the eleventh seance. Also, the investigators themselves give passing
reference to the idea of an accomplice actually being located within the seance
cabinet. For example, the Report notes:
The conditions in which the seances were held render absolutely
inadmissible the supposition that there was any accomplice (p.341).
Whilst Baggally adds:
The help of a confederate need not be considered, as the seances took
place in our own room with locked doors. (Report, p.559).
Feilding (1909b), in relation to just one of the phenomena (grasps felt through the
seance curtain), simply noted:
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These grasps, if fraudulent, could only have been done by an
accomplice behind the curtain. There was no accomplice behind the
curtain (p.799).
Thus the investigators certainly held schemata (albeit to a limited extent) relating to
the 'accomplice hypothesis', but believed that it was falsified by the conditions under
OL hart'
which the seances were held. However, if accomplice could,gained either complete
entry into the cabinet, or merely placed his/her arm into the cabinet, a large
proportion of the phenomena could immediately be explained. Most of these are self-
explanatory and would include: the bulging and movement of the curtain, the rapping
noises which were heard on the double doors, some of the raps which occurred in the
many 'indeterminate' locations, movement of objects within the cabinet, objects
brought out of the cabinet, plucking of the guitar string, occasions on which sounds
were heard in the cabinet, touches by some object through curtain, touches by some
object inside cabinet, grasps through the curtain, hands seen from the cabinet, objects
of an indefinable nature which issued from the cabinet, objects of an indefinable
nature in the cabinet, objects resembling heads which issued from the cabinet, and
lights seen in the cabinet. In total this amounts to approximately 270 of the 470
reported phenomena.
In addition, many other phenomena might become explicable via such an accomplice,
depending on the controls enforced by the investigators at the time of their production.
Most of these would entail the accomplice using some form of instrument with which
he/she could reach out into the seance room79. These phenomena would include the
movement of objects outside of the cabinet, raps on the seance table and chairs,
touches outside the cabinet, and grasps outside of the cabinet.
A full (and very time consuming) analysis of the Report would be needed in order to
determine exactly how many of the phenomena could be explained by the
'''Reaching rods' were easily available to fake mediums. Indeed, one mail order
firm, which sold such devices (Sylvestre, 1901), advertised a telescopic reaching rod
that would 'go in the pocket, extend from four to five feet..and will pick up...any
small object, float a guitar, etc'!
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'accomplice' hypothesis. However, even without such an analysis, it is clear that the
'accomplice' hypothesis should be taken seriously, given that it easily explains a very
large number of the reported phenomena.
As noted in section 2.5 counter-explanations allow an observer to predict when,
where, and how, a claimant may engage, or have engaged, in deception. However,
a complete assessment of a claim does not simply entail accounting for that claim via
one, or more, counter-explanation(s). Instead, the observer must assess the likelihood
of trickery by reconstructing the controls (i.e., measures designed to prevent, or
detect, deception) which were in place during experimentation. Thus, the following
section willAto assess the controls, described in the Report (and subsequent literature),
which might preclude the possibility of an accomplice.
7.4 AN ANALYSIS OF CONTROLS AGAINST THE ACCOMPLICE'
HYPOTHESIS 7.4.1 Introduction
This section analyses the controls taken during the Naples investigation to prevent, or
detect, an accomplice being present within the seance cabinet. The analysis mainly
concentrates on the information presented within the well respected Feilding Report.
Where this information has been found to be inadequate, some of the subsequent
literature which refers to the Naples investigation is examined80.
This chapter will focus on how an accomplice could have gained access to the seance
cabinet via Baggally's room. This notion will be broken down into four separate
sections, each of which will be discussed in turn. The first of these considers the idea
that an accomplice could have gained access to Baggally's room (labelled B's room
on Figure 7.1, adjacent to the cabinet) either before, or during the seances. The
80The additional literature examined consists of Baggally (1910), Carrington
(1909a, 1909b), Feilding (1909a, 1909b), Stawell (1910), Taylor (1910), Feilding &
Baggally (1910) and Podmore (1909, 1910). It does not include some of the more
obscure sources which would have been difficult to obtain, and were less likely to
contain information of interest (e.g. personal correspondence written by the
investigators at the time of the seance, floor plans of the Hotel Victoria, etc.).
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second section examines the possibility that an accomplice could have moved both
into, and out of, the seance cabinet, from Baggally's room. The third section looks
at the steps, taken by the investigators, to detect the presence of an accomplice in the
seance cabinet. The fourth section examines the notion that such an accomplice would
not have been detected leaving Baggally's room, either during, or after, the
termination of the seances.
7,4,2 Could an accomplice have been in Baggally's room during the seances?
In order to access whether an accomplice could have been located within Baggally's
room, during the seances, it is important to know a number of pieces of information.
First, was Baggally's room thoroughly searched before the start of the seances? If so,
which if the investigators carried out this search and how was it performed? Second,
if the room was thoroughly searched, was it sealed in such a manner that would have
prevented an accomplice gaining access to it after this search? If so, would the
methods used to seal the room have been effective against an accomplice?
Each of these issues will be discussed in turn.
First, the Feilding Report does not mention Baggally's room being searched at all!
Indeed, it simply notes:
Before the arrival of Eusapia, the [seance] room was examined,
unnecessary furniture removed, the cabinet was prepared, the various
objects put in position, and the curtains drawn together. One of us
then went down to receive her [Palladino], (p.323).
Information, presented after the Feilding Report, sheds no further light on this issue.
Carrington (1909b) notes:
I need scarcely add that we made a careful examination of the cabinet,
the instruments, the table and the seance room before and after each
sitting, (p. 158).
The investigators seem quite confident that an accomplice could not have gained prior
access to Baggally's room. Yet, it appears they had little reason to suppose this.
Although it may be assumed that the investigators would have locked their rooms
when they were left unattended, a competent accomplice could have gained entry via
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a duplicate, pass or skeleton key. In addition, the Report (p.527) suggests that both
a chambermaid, and the 'boots'81, may have had unsupervised access to these rooms.
An accomplice disguised as a member of the (obviously large) hotel staff would have
attracted little attention, no matter where in the hotel he/she might have been seen by
the investigators.
In short, it is not difficult to imagine how an accomplice may have gained prior access
to Baggally's room. Given that neither the Report, nor any subsequent literature,
mention this room being searched, it may be assumed that the presence of such an
individual could have remained undetected.
However, let us assume that an accomplice could not have gained prior access to
Baggally's room, or that his presence would have been detected, had he done so.
Attention now focuses on the attempts made to prevent such an individual gaining
access to the room after it had been searched.
Theoretically, such entry could have been achieved in a number of different ways.
One obvious point of access would be the windows, which connect Baggally's room,
to the outside of the hotel. A second possibility would be that of the door which
connects his room to the hotel hall. Finally, a third possibility might entail some
form of covert entrance (e.g. a trap door) which connected Baggally's room to other
sections of the hotel. Each of these possibilities will now be examined.
Let us turn first to the windows. As noted in the Report (p.321), the rooms used for
the seance were located on the fifth floor of the hotel. Each window had a small
balcony, but there were no connections between balconies, and the windows were
locked and shuttered (Report, p. 345). The windows seem an unlikely point of entry.
81The presence of the chambermaid and the 'boots' is only casually mentioned in
relation to the 'bell' incident (Feilding et al., p.525-527). The Report really should
provide a complete list of all individuals who regularly accessed the suite of rooms.
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A second possible candidate for access would be the doors which link Baggally's room
with the public hall of the hotel. Baggally, in his brief consideration of the
'accomplice hypothesis', notes:
.. .the help of a confederate need not be considered, as the seances took
place in our own room with locked doors (Report, p. 559).
Yet, from the floor plan presented in the Report (see Figure 7.1), it can be seen that
the door which connects Baggally's room to the hall is not labelled 'locked' (unlike
both of the other doors connected to the hall). Thus, from the information in the
Report, it appears that an accomplice may have easily been able to enter Baggally's
room whilst the seance was in progress. However, there is some additional
information, which throws further light on the way in which these doors were sealed.
Carrington (1909b), notes that:
Our own seances at Naples were held in the middle room of our suite
at the Hotel Victoria. The three members of the committee occupied
three adjoining rooms-Mr Baggally the one on the extreme left, Mr
Feilding the one in the middle, myself on the extreme right. These
three rooms were all connected by double doors, which were usually
left open, but were closed during the seance. All these doors,
particularly those leading into the public hall, were securely locked and
bolted before each seance, and we tied the door handles together by
means of white tape, when the doors could not be bolted from the
inside, [emphasis mine] (p. 157-8).
Carrington's statement is ambiguous and confusing. When he refers to 'all these
doors, particularly those leading into the public hall', Carrington could be referring
to all sets of doors in the suite of rooms, particularly those leading from all three
rooms into the public hall. Alternatively, he could be referring to all three sets of
doors leading into the seance room, particularly the doors which connected the seance
room to the public hall. As such, Carrington's statement does not inform us how the
doors, connecting Baggally's room to the hotel, were secured. The situation is not
made any clearer by the fact that the floor plan, included in Carrington's book
(reproduced in Figure 7.3 at the end of this chapter), does not even include the rooms
either side of the seance room! In addition, one other aspect of Carrington's
statement must be incorrect. Either of the above interpretations imply the doors,
connecting Carrington's room to the seance room, were locked. Yet, during at least
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three of the seances (I, II and X) the Report clearly states that these doors (i.e., those
connecting Carrington's room to the seance room) were left open82. In another
statement, Carrington (1909a), notes that:
We occupied three adjoining rooms, which we fitted up for seance
purposes. The middle room we turned into an experimental laboratory.
The rooms on either side of this were occupied by ourselves, and the
doors of these rooms we securely locked and bolted before each
seance, [emphasis mine], (p.667-8).
Again, Carrington's statement is ambiguous. The phrase 'the doors of these rooms'
could be referring to all sets of doors in the suite of rooms. Alternatively, this phrase
could simply be referring to the doors linking the seance room to the rooms either
side of it. Also, this statement appears to disagree with his earlier comment, in which
he stated that some of the doors were secured with white tape, not bolted. In
addition, either of the above interpretations again imply that the doors, linking
Carrington's room to the seance room, were locked. This aspect of Carrington's
statement must be incorrect, given that the Report notes that on some occasions these
doors were left open (see above). The issue is further complicated by information
presented by Taylor (1910). In reply to the specific criticism that an accomplice may
have entered Baggally's room (made by Stawell, 1910), Taylor reports asking
Baggally how the door, connecting his bedroom with the hall, was sealed. Taylor
(1910) notes:
82For example, at the start of the Seance I, the stenographer, Meeson, was 'in the
next room [Carrington's] with the door open'. In additional, when describing the
lighting conditions at this first seance, the Report notes:
also light coming from the next room [Carrington's], which was lit by
an ordinary electric light, the door being ajar about 6 inches, [emphasis
mine], (p.349).
In describing the lighting conditions for Seance II, the Report notes:
Incandescent electric light in the centre of room, shaded as before.
Bright light in the next room [Carrington's] and the door
open .[emphasis mine], (p.361).
During Seance X, photographers were present, and Baggally notes:
There was a good deal of confusion at this seance owing to the
repeated opening and shutting of the door between the seance room and
C's room, where the photographic camera had been placed, [emphasis
mine], (p.535).
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In fact, the door of B's [Baggally's] room opens, not on the passage,
but into a dressing room, the door of which, he assures me, it was his
custom to lock whenever he left the room.' [emphasis mine] (p. 281).
This reply is interesting on two counts. First, and foremost, Baggally only mentions
locking (and not bolting) the door in question. Second, the statement is a clear
admission that the floor plan presented in the original report is misleading. Taylor's
statement is ambiguous, as it can be interpreted in one of two ways. First, Taylor
could have meant to imply that the dressing room was actually contained within the
space marked 'B's room' in the original diagram. If this were the case then the door
leading from the hall would have led, not directly into Baggally's bedroom, but rather
into the dressing room. Second, Taylor could have meant to imply that the dressing
room lay outside the area marked 'B's room', and that the door which appears to lead
from Baggally's room to the hall would have actually led into the dressing room. If
this were the case, it is still unclear if there was any access between this dressing
room and any other part of the hotel (as, for example, might be used by the
chambermaid). The original drawings of the floor plan (reproduced in Figure 7.483
at the end of this chapter) shed some additional light on this ambiguity. Although
these plans have been drawn in ink, they do show a thin pencil line which seems to
indicate that Baggally's dressing room lay outside his bedroom, and that there was
indeed a door which connects the dressing room to the hall. However, it should be
noted that there is no way of knowing when, and by whom, these pencil marks were
drawn84.
Finally, if the investigators had firmly secured the door leading from Baggally's room
to the hotel hall, they would have been confident that an accomplice could not have
83I would like to thank Alan Gauld for providing me with a copy of this original
floor plan, from the SPR archives.
840ne obvious way to clarity this point would be to visit the Hotel Victoria, or
examine the hotel plans. Unfortunately, the hotel was destroyed during the second
world war (John Beloff, personal correspondence, 1991). However, the Edinburgh
University School of Architecture have informed me that, if the hotel was of
architectural significance, its plans may still be housed somewhere in Naples.
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entered Baggally's room during the seances. However, this does not appear to be the
case. Indeed, Baggally reports checking for possible trap doors in the wall of the
seance room, noting that:
..as regards to the possibility of a confederate gaining access to the
cabinet by a trap door, I may say that I examined the interior of the
cabinet and found that the floor was made of tiles closely cemented
together. The walls were at right angles to each other; one consisting
of thick masonry gave on the street, the other of thin masonry, brick
or plaster, separated the seance room from my bedroom. There was
no trap door. (Report, p.560).
In short, the floor plan, presented in the original Report, is grossly misleading. It
fails to note that Baggally's room did not open directly into the hotel hall, but rather
into a dressing room. Additional evidence seems to indicate that this dressing room
then opened directly onto the hall way. Also, the Report fails to note exactly how the
door which connected Baggally's bedroom (or dressing room) to the hall, was sealed.
The later evidence suggests that some of the hotel doors were bolted, yet fails to
clearly note whether this precaution was only taken in respect of the doors leading
from the seance room, or all of the doors in the suite of rooms.
However, let us assume that all of the doors were securely locked and bolted. It
would then become essential to assess the possibility that an accomplice could have
gained access to Baggally's room via some form of covert entrance (e.g. such as a
hidden trap door). Unfortunately, the Report fails to mention examining Baggally's
room for any such entrances. Given the solid construction of the hotel walls (Report,
p. 560), the possibility of a trap door in the wall of Baggally's room appears
implausible. However, the investigators do not mention if the ceiling of Baggally's
room could have housed such an access. Yet Carrington (1907) was certainly aware
of this form of trickery because in his earlier book, the Physical Phenomena of
Spiritualism, he carefully cites sections of another book (Revelations of a Spirit
Medium) which describes how certain panelled ceilings can contain such trap doors.
He notes:
This [ceiling] panel was 'doctored' and could be displaced, leaving an
aperture large enough for 'spooks' to get through with perfect ease.
A light ladder which reached within three feet of the floor...was
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hooked fast above and furnished the means of getting down and up
again'(p. 268).
Yet the investigators choose not to inform their readers whether or not such a trap
door was possible in the Hotel Victoria, Naples. The Feilding Report, and subsequent
additional literature, does not mention the construction, or decoration, of the hotel
ceiling. This may have been of particular importance if the fifth floor of Hotel
Victoria was actually the top floor of the hotel. If this were the case, the room may
have had a hidden access to a loft area. All of the above may sound implausible, but,
if the Report truly wishes to be complete, this sort of detail should have been
provided.
An accomplice, attempting to use any of the above methods of entry, would have had
considerable time to do so. The Report notes that:
She [Palladino] came attended by her husband, who then left, and she
came up to our rooms alone, (p.323).
Thus the investigators knew Palladino's husband arrived at the hotel with Palladino,
and report making no effort to ensure that he actually left the hotel. In addition, in
the Report, Feilding notes that Palladino had to climb the five flights of stairs up to
the hotel rooms, remarking that on one occasion (Report, p.461), this journey lasted
25 minutes. The journey time, for the other seances, is not given. Also, it is
interesting that the Report simply states:
She [Palladino] came up to our rooms alone. The door was then
locked, and she immediately took her place at the narrow end of the
seance table...(p.323).
Yet Carrington (1909a) later states:
When Eusapia arrived at the hotel...we would invite her, first of all,
to partake of a cup of coffee, an invitation that she generally accepted,
(p. 668).
Whilst Feilding (1909a) later noted:
Sometimes we had to wait half-an-hour, an hour, even an hour and a
half, before anything took place, (p. 124).
Either of these delays would have provided more than enough time for an accomplice
to have entered Baggally's room before the start of the seance proper. Neither of
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them are mentioned in the original Report.
7,4,3 Could an accomplice have gained access to the seance cabinet, from
Baggally's room?
From the above analysis, it appears that an accomplice could have been present in
Baggally's room. As such, attention now focuses on the safeguards enforced by the
investigators to prevent passage from Baggally's room to the seance cabinet.
Such access may have been gained via the door connecting the two rooms would be
an obvious point of access.
Unfortunately, the report gives few details about the construction or sealing of the
door, simply stating that it 'was permanently locked and secured with tape' (p.345).
However, the door does feature in three of the photographs which accompany the
Report (one of which is reproduced in Photograph 7.1 at the end of this chapter).
From these photographs, it can be seen that the door is a 'double' door. The doors
appear to be of polished wood and heavily panelled.
The Report does not state if any precautions were taken in order to prevent, or detect,
tampering with the doors before the first seance. Thus, if the investigators had
booked the rooms from England (before setting off for Naples), Palladino, or her
colleagues, may have been able to discover which rooms were going to be used for
the seance, gained access to them (perhaps by renting the rooms), and have doctored
the door in question. Additional information sheds no light on this issue. Feilding
(1909b) notes that:
The eleven seances took place in my bedroom on the fifth floor of an
hotel chosen by ourselves...[emphasis mine] (p.802).
Carrington (1909b) writes:
.. .we [Carrington and Feilding] left London on different days, travelled
by different routes, and met in Naples on the afternoon of November
19, 1908.(p. 152).
Again, both of these statements fail to clarify exactly when the rooms were booked,
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and therefore whether Palladino (or her colleagues) would have had time to tamper
with the rooms.
Even if Palladino could not have accessed the rooms before the investigators arrived,
it is possible that such tampering could have been effected in the time between their
arrival in Naples (on the afternoon of the 19th November [Carrington, 1909b,
p. 152]), and the time of the first sitting (on the evening of the 21st November
[Report, p. 349]). Carrington (1909a, p. 667) describes how he and Feilding visited
Palladino very soon after their arrival in Naples (as noted above, Baggally did not join
the investigative team until the fifth seance). This being the case, Palladino would
have known the investigators were not going to have been in the hotel at this time,
potentially allowing any colleagues to effect alterations on the door in question
without fear of being disturbed. In addition, Carrington (1909a) also noted:
On two or three occasions, Eusapia appeared in very bad humor...We
were warned of this, happily, by previous investigators, and were
advised by them to stimulate her social nature...by presents, dinners,
drives and theatre-parties. We followed this advice, and found it
exceedingly helpful, (p.675).
Carrington then goes on to describe, in some detail, one such dinner party in a
Neapolitan restaurant85. The original Report mentions none of these diversions. In
addition, the investigators also fail to mention that Palladino had, previous to the 1908
Naples investigation, used a room on the second floor of the Hotel Victoria for a
preliminary set of seances with the 'Institut General Psychologique'86. This
information is vital, as it makes it more likely that Palladino may have had a 'special
relationship' with one, or more, of the Hotel's staff. Thus it appears that an
accomplice would have had ample opportunity to tamper with the investigator's
rooms, with little fear of being detected.
85Carrington does not state whether any of these events took place before, during
or after the series of eleven seances.
86I would like to thank Mary Rose Barrington for providing me with this
information.
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Such tampering could have entailed the faking of one of the larger door panels, such
that it could be secretly opened on a later date87. Given that the Report states that
the seance cabinet was 8ft 2 1/2 inches tall, and that the photograph shows the top of
the cabinet in line with the top of the door frame, it can be seen that the larger panels
on the bottom of the doors would be approximately 19 inches high and 15 inches
wide, which would be large enough for an individual of small stature to pass through
without difficulty. The above method was (and, on occasion, still is) employed by
criminals wishing to gain illicit entry into, and by escapologists trying to break out
of, supposedly 'secure' buildings. The method has a long history, being featured in
an early crime prevention handbook (Cruikshank, 1851). Such a false panel would
have to look convincing from both sides, and an accomplice would have to be able
to remove, and replace, the panel without attracting attention. To determine if such
a panel could be made, the present writer consulted a carpenter/magician. This
individual stated that such fakery could be easily achieved and promptly demonstrated
it by gimmicking a panel in a large section taken from a real panelled door. The
faking took less than an hour, requiring no carpentry tools that would not have been
available at the turn of the century. The panel can be removed or replaced easily and
with little noise or disturbance. I have found the fakery to be undetectable to anyone
who does not examine the door closely, knowing what to look for88. In addition,
when assessing if Palladino could have employed the skills of a carpenter, three
factors should be borne in mind. First, Naples was 'home territory' for Palladino.
Second, she was being paid a considerable sum of money (200 lira89, or, in present
day terms, approximately T65090) for each of the SPR seances. Third, Palladino
quite likely knew individuals capable of such fakery. Carrington (1909b), when
87My thanks to Martin Breese for mentioning this notion at my lecture to the SPR,
13th June 1991.
88This fake door panel is currently stored at Edinburgh University.
wMy thanks to Alan Gauld for making this information available from the SPR
archives.
"My thanks to Edinburgh University's Department of Economic and Social
History for providing this information.
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presenting a biographical sketch of Palladino, writes:
When we asked Eusapia whether the report was true that she had
married a conjuror, she replied indignantly that it was not. She stated
that her first husband91 had been 'connected with theatricals.' and
knew the details of stage mechanism, and its various trick devices'. He
also knew a few tricks, and took delight in exhibiting then" to his
fellow-workers; but that he was not by any means a professional
conjuror, [emphasis mine] (p. 19).
Given all of the above, it is perhaps surprising to discover that the Report makes
absolutely no mention of examining the doors in question, for any possible signs of
tampering. Also, the precautions reported by the investigators to seal the doors, (i.e.
locks, perhaps bolts, and the use of white tape placed around the door handles) would
not have prevented the above method of entry. In addition, even if we assume that
the doors connecting the seance room to Baggally's room were opened between
seances, there is no reason to suppose that a well constructed false panel would have
been discovered.
Given that an accomplice could have attempted to gain access to the seance cabinet
through such a faked door panel, attention focuses on the investigators' efforts to
detect the movement of either the panel, or an accomplice, during the seances.
In assessing this issue, it is important that the Report notes:
...the [seance] curtains were, at Eusapia's request, stretched across one
corner of the room, [emphasis mine] (p.322).
This statement is clearly ambiguous. This may mean that Palladino chose the exact
corner in which to place the curtains. Alternatively, it may mean that Palladino
merely insisted that the curtains be placed across any corner, and the investigators
chose which corner was most convenient. The Report, and subsequent literature, fails
to clarity this ambiguity.
9IIt should be noted that Palladino had remarried by the time of the Naples
investigation.
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Regardless of who chose the placement of the curtains, it is interesting to note that,
in all three photographs contained in the Report, one side of the curtain is fixed to a
point above the doors, such that the curtain completely obscures one half of the right
hand door. This is in direct contrast to the floor plan, (and the 43 seating sketches
scattered throughout the report, along with the floor plan produced by Carrington, see
Figure 7.3), which clearly shows the curtain to be fixed to the right of the door.
However, the original floor plan (see Figure 7.4) shows that the curtain did indeed
obscure part of the door. Again, the well respected Feilding Report appears to contain
grossly misleading information.
From the photographs, it is also clear that if the curtains were to be slightly pulled
forward then they would completely obscure the panel in question. If this had
happened, the curtains would have provided ample visual cover for an accomplice
entering the cabinet through this panel. From the same photographs, it can be seen
that not only do the curtains touch the floor, but there is actually a considerable
amount of the curtain resting on the floor of the seance room. It does not seem
unreasonable to assume that, if the curtain could have been pulled forward the extra
few inches needed to completely obscure the panel in question, it would have
remained in that position, due to the excess material resting on the floor of the seance
room.
It is also interesting to note the discrepancy in the dimensions of the seance cabinet
as they are presented in the Report. The Report states that the two sides of the
cabinet formed by the hotel walls measured 90cm and 100cm respectively. Yet the
Report gives the distance between the corner of the room and the centre of the seance
curtains as being 80cm. Assuming the corner of the room to be a right angle, and
that the investigators measured the shortest possible distance between corner and
curtain, these measurements simply cannot be correct. If the measurements of the two
sides of the cabinet are correct, the distance between the corner of the room and the
curtains should be approximately 70cm. This non-trivial discrepancy could be
interpreted in a number of different ways. Perhaps the measurements of the cabinet
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sides are incorrect. Perhaps the large amount of curtaining on the floor of the seance
room accounts for the inaccuracy. Perhaps the curtains were pulled forward from
their 'natural' position. Again, in retrospect, it is difficult to decide between these
hypotheses, and thus the above discrepancy is yet another source of ambiguity within
the Feilding Report.
However, even if the curtains were not permanently pulled forward, Palladino may
have had ample opportunity to pull the curtains into such a position before, or at the
start of, the seances. This movement of the curtain, could have been performed as
a quite natural action during the long period of waiting that accompanied the start of
the seances. The Report does indeed mention Palladino touching the curtain at the
start of some of the seances. For example, seance four starts at 9.30 pm. After
seventeen minutes, during which only a few 'non-evidential' phenomena (e.g., weak
rapping and tilting of the table) take place, Feilding noted:
Medium asks if she can touch the curtain, which she does with her left
hand, C's right hand being in hers. (p. 403).
Seance seven starts at 9.30 pm. After approximately seventeen minutes, during which
only the left side of Palladino's dress swelled out, Feilding asks Palladino if she could
try to make the small stool move towards her. In a note added to the Report the next
day, Feilding recalled:
She [Palladino] said 'We can always try it, but it does not depend upon
me.' I took the small stool from the cabinet, ascertained that it had no
attachment, and placed it on the ground to her left. She pulled the
curtain of the cabinet partly over it. [emphasis mine] (p. 466).
There would have certainly been time to make sure that the curtains were pushed
slightly back before the photographs were taken.
Given all of the above, it appears that any entry of an accomplice could have been
visually masked by the seance curtains. However, there is no doubt that the
investigators were seated very close to the seance curtain. Surely they would have
detected an accomplice climbing through a faked door panel? Again, the Report fails
to provide enough detail for later readers to assess this point. The Report fails to
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mention exactly how far the investigator, on the right hand side of the seance table
(i.e. the individual nearest the door in question) would have been from the door.
Instead, one again has to rely on the photographs presented within the Report itself,
and by Carrington (1909b). These photographs were not taken during the actual
seances but rather were reconstructions of the seances. Indeed, in many of the
photographs, the role of Palladino is played by the chambermaid of the hotel92. In
these photographs, the position of the table varies considerably. In one of the
photographs (Carrington, 1909b, facing p.98), one of the investigators is indeed
pushed very close to the panel in question. Yet in other photographs (e.g. Carrington,
1909b, facing p. 192 & p.222) a considerable distance separates the investigator from
the door. One cannot ascertain the exact position of the investigator nearest the door,
so again, in retrospect, vital information has been denied us.
In addition, even should an accomplice have accidentally touched the curtain, as
he/she climbed through the panel, this may simply have been interpreted as one of the
many 'paranormal' movements of the curtain.
Also, at least two, and sometimes all three, of the investigators were trying to control
Palladino. This control consisted of trying to hold onto her limbs, and constantly
describe, out loud, the nature of these controls. As such, Palladino may have been
in a position to make this control particularly difficult at certain moments, in order
to mask (both visually and acoustically) the possible removal of a fake panel, or entry
of an accomplice.
The investigators did not position themselves in such a way as to obtain a good view
of the double doors. As can be seen from the floor plan, the investigator nearest the
door (i.e. the person occupying the top right hand position of the seance table) would
not have been facing the door. The individuals facing the door (i.e. the people on the
92This information is casually mentioned in the Report, when Feilding notes:
The chambermaid...could barely be persuaded to play 'Eusapia' in
some imitation photographs of phenomena we took yesterday, (p. 527).
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left hand side of the seance table and the stenographer) would all have had their
observation of the door degraded, by both distance and the fact that Palladino and the
other investigators would, at least in part, obscure their view. The Report also notes
that 'the floor was of tiles covered by heavy carpet', which may have had the effect
of dampening any sound caused by an accomplice's contact with the floor.
It is also interesting to note which of the investigators were sitting at the top right
hand position of the seance table (i.e. the position nearest the door), when an
accomplice might have entered the seance room. At the start of six of the eleven
seances93 Carrington is seated in this position, and in four of these94 he swaps (three
times at Palladino's request) with another individual around the seance table. By
comparison, on the five occasions when another individual is seated in this position,
a seating change occurs only once95. Given that Carrington was the most
experienced of the investigators, this could be interpreted as Palladino attempting to
remove him from the position in which he was most likely to detect trickery. A
similar point has been made by Podmore (1909). Baggally (1910), in his reply to
Podmore, notes:
Mr Carrington was ill and was compelled to keep his bed for some
time during the course of these seances, and when Eusapia asked him
to retire from his control at seances V., VII., she said that she did so
because his vitality was very low. (p.216).
Thus, although the Report briefly mentions that Carrington was 'unwell' (p. 467) it
fails to note that this illness was such that he had to take to his bed. This is a good
example of the way in which information can be omitted by even the most qualified
investigators (see section 4.3.2.2). Surely the Report should have stated the severity
of the illness, along with assessing if the illness may have effected Carrington's
capacity to be an able investigator/observer.
93Seances I, III, V, VII, VIII, IX.
94Seances I, V, VII, VIII.
95This change occurs in Seance IV, when Palladino requests that Feilding changes
places with a non-investigator, Prof Galeotti.
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7,4,4 Would an accomplice have been discovered in the seance cabinet during
the seances?
All of the above arguments would be of little consequence if the investigators
regularly checked the inside of the cabinet during the seances.
Thus it is important to establish the number of times that, during the seances, the
investigators actually looked directly inside the cabinet. Throughout the eleven
seances, the Report only explicitly mentions three such occasions96. Two of these
occur towards the end of the second seance. In the first of these (Seance II, 12.1
a.m.) the investigators note that the seance curtains have become accidentally parted.
The investigators do not report seeing an accomplice in the cabinet, although it should
be noted that the phenomena which occurred at this time (i.e. the movement of the
small table into the cabinet, and the plucking of the toy guitar string) could have been
produced by an accomplice who had left the cabinet, but still remained in Baggally's
room. For example, such an accomplice could have, whilst he/she was in the cabinet,
attached a thread to the small table and passed this thread under the door, into
Baggally's room. Later pulls on the thread would then cause the table to jump back
into the cabinet. The plucking of the guitar string could have been caused by an
accomplice having a second toy guitar in Baggally's room. A few moments later
(Seance II, 12.15 a.m.) the curtains gently part in the middle, allowing the
investigators to see inside the cabinet. Again, this gentle parting of the curtains could
have been achieved by the accomplice attaching a thread to one of the curtains before
leaving the cabinet, and gently pulling this thread from Baggally's room. All of the
above may have been a staged attempt, performed early in the course of the seances,
to deceive the investigators into believing that the cabinet did not contain an
accomplice. The only other time at which the investigators explicitly report looking
inside the cabinet occurs at the end of the sixth seance. The Report notes:
^It should be noted that there are a few other occasions whereby it is difficult to
establish if the investigators actually looked inside the cabinet. For example,
occasionally the investigators report placing objects inside the cabinet, during the
seances. Yet they do not report if this entailed them actually looking inside the
cabinet, or merely placing their arms into the cabinet.
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F. I asked medium whether I could look inside the cabinet and she says
certainly97.
C. I see a slight bulge of the curtain.
B. She [Palladino] now parts the curtain altogether and gives it to me
to enable us all to look inside the cabinet, (p. 455-6).
For most of this seance the shorthand report carefully noted the time at which each
of the phenomena took place. However, this careful reporting did not continue until
the end of the seance. The last time recorded in the shorthand report is that of 12.55
a.m. (Feilding et al, 1909, p. 455). At this time the report noted that the
investigators had asked Palladino if she would try to influence the movement of a cork
which had been suspended on a piece of elastic stretched between two nails.
Palladino tried to psychically move the cork, but failed. The curtain then apparently
blew over Baggally's left shoulder, and Feilding then requested to see inside the
seance cabinet. As noted above, the seance officially ended after Palladino parted the
curtains. Unfortunately, the shorthand report fails to note the time at which each of
the events occurred, or how long the this entire episode (i.e., from 12.55 a.m. to the
end of the seance) lasted. Fortunately, Carrington, writing about the seance three
days later, provides us with this latter piece of information. He noted:
Several important phenomena took place at the conclusion of the sixth
seance, after the stenographic record ends. The reason for this is that
the stenographer ceased taking notes when the light was turned up,
owing to the lateness of the hour fit was getting on for 2,0 a.m.). but
phenomena continued to take place in the light...[emphasis mine]
(Report, p. 457).
Thus the events which occurred between 12.55 p.m. and the end of the seance
(occupying only 15 lines in the Report) definitely lasted over half an hour, and may
have lasted up to an hour. Thus, it remains quite possible that there was a time delay
between Feilding asking to see inside the cabinet, and Palladino opening the curtains.
Given that we do not know how long the above exchange took, an accomplice may
have had time to effect his/her exit in the time between the request and the opening
97Feilding does not explain why he wishes to look inside the cabinet, although the
comment may have been prompted by his earlier remark (made sometime between
12.40p.m. and 12.55p.m.) that The curtain is pulled up as though by somebody
inside. It is pulled inwards first and is then pushed outwards' (Report, p. 455).
213
of the curtains (perhaps thus accounting for the bulge in the curtain observed by
Carrington). Alternatively, an accomplice could have already left the cabinet before
Feilding's request, and somehow produced the bulge of the curtain from behind the
door.
Barrington (1991) has suggested that the investigators may have been able to see
through the seance curtains, and thus would have detected the presence of an
accomplice. Yet for the investigators to be able to see through the curtains, some
degree of illumination from within the cabinet, would have been required. However
the light for the seances was being provided from the centre of the seance room (and,
during the first seances, from a slight opening of the door into Carrington's room).
As such, all of this light would have been in front of the curtains, thus making it
difficult, if not impossible, for the investigators to see through the curtains into the
cabinet. This notion is supported by the fact that, during the entire Report, the
investigators never mention being able to see through the seance curtains. In fact,
given the lighting conditions described above, it seems likely that an accomplice may
well have been able (at least to some extent) to see out of the cabinet. Indeed, such
a notion would account for some of the moments wherein phenomena, radiating from
the cabinet, appeared to be coordinated with movements being made by either the
investigators or Palladino herself.
Barrington (1992) also makes much of Palladino not asking for a black curtain to be
hung at the back of the seance cabinet (as had been the case during some of her
previous seances). She argued that a black-clad accomplice would have been
camouflaged against such a curtain, and thus its absence proves that Palladino did not
use an accomplice. She states:
The walls making up the corner of the cabinet behind the curtain
were...white or light in colour. If Palladino were in the habit of
introducing an [accomplice] into her cabinet...she would know that
there was always some danger of an inquisitive researcher looking into
the cabinet to assure himself that the hand grasping him through the
curtain was not attached to a permanent body...A black draped figure
freezing in a corner of the cabinet might just succeed in merging into
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the background if there were a black background, (p. 4).
I do not agree that a back curtain is essential, helpful, or even feasible if a accomplice
is to be used, and so its absence does not prove an accomplice was not used.
First, a back curtain would have needed to have been fixed in the corner of the room
somehow. However, when describing the seance room, Carrington (1909a) notes:
The floor was the usual tiled floor common to Italian houses; the walls
were of brick and stone, so solid in character that we found it
impossible to drive a nail into them, (p. 668). [emphasis mine].
Thus it seems possible that the curtain was absent simply because it would have been
very difficult to secure it in place. Second, a back curtain (probably nailed,
somewhere, to the door connecting the seance room to Baggally's room) could well
have obscured the very door panel through which the hypothetical accomplice could
have gained access to the seance cabinet. It seems unlikely that would PalladinoAhave
risked possibly having to draw attention to the door by requesting that part of the
cabinet wall be left uncovered. Third, it is doubtful that a back curtain would have
actually been necessary, or helpful, in the event of somebody seeing into the cabinet,
either covertly or overtly. A parting of the curtain sufficiently covert to escape
Palladino's attention would afford such a narrow and poorly illuminated field of view
that a back curtain would -net hardly be necessary for an accomplice to escape
detection. If, however, the researchers had simply throwing open the curtain,
suddenly and without warning, a back curtain would be of little help to an accomplice
trapped in the cabinet; camouflage needs distance to be effective, and an investigator
willing to dramatically open the cabinet in this way would hardly balk at stepping
inside it. But it is unlikely that the investigators would have behaved like this
anyway. It is vital to realise that the idea of the investigators looking suddenly into
the cabinet, without first asking Palladino's permission, runs contrary to the whole
nature of the 1908 Naples inquiry. Throughout the whole of the Report, the
investigators make it quite clear that they were most anxious not to displease Palladino
by imposing any conditions which might annoy or upset her. At the start of the
Report they note:
.. .we preferred to adopt conditions to which the medium was used and
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in which therefore it was probable that effects would be produced,
rather than impose others which might possibly impede the production
of what we had gone to study, (p. 326).
For example, before the fourth seance the investigators pasted a strip of paper around
the seance table, to help prevent Palladino faking the levitation of the table by placing
her hand under the table. However, following only one tilting of the table, and two
non-evidential levitations (Report, p. 400), Palladino contested that the paper was
'antipathetic' to her (p. 404). The investigators immediately reversed the table
allowing Palladino access to its opposite end, which did not have any paper pasted
around it. Similarly, on the one occasion (approximately 12.55pm in seance six)
when the investigators actively opened the seance curtains, and looked into the
cabinet, the resulting shorthand report reveals that Feilding asked Palladino's
permission beforehand. As such, the investigators were clearly eager to ensure that
their behaviour complied with the whims of Palladino. Judging by this, and their
guiding principle of the non-imposition of antagonistic controls, it seems unlikely that
the investigators would have suddenly opened the seance curtains without seeking
prior permission. Mediumistic law dictates that such behaviour could be physically
damaging, if not fatal, to the medium - something which would have be borne in
mind by an investigator contemplating covert action. The investigators would have
probably seen such an action as likely to, in their own words, 'impede the production'
of what they had travelled to Naples to study. Palladino, if she was considering using
an accomplice (who in any case would not need to spend all his time wholly inside
the cabinet) would probably have considered it an acceptably small risk.
Barrington (1992) has also argued that the 'accomplice' hypothesis is implausible as
hurt,
the experimenters may, at any moment, rushed into Baggally's room and thus
A
discovered the accomplice. However, I believe this argument to be incorrect for
many reasons. First, Barrington fails to note that the hypothetical scenario of
Baggally suddenly entering his room has already been considered by Stawell (1910).
Stawell concluded that:
As the door from the seance room into B's [Baggally's]...was
'permanently locked and secured with tape' (p. 345) it would not have
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been possible to detect the confederate hv suddenly opening it. (p.
235).
Taylor (1910) later criticised many aspects of Stawell's paper often supporting his
ideas with additional comments by Baggally. However, neither Taylor, nor Baggally,
argued against this particular part of Stawell's critique. Second, as noted above, the
investigators were unlikely to do anything which might have upset, or annoyed,
Palladino. Thus, Palladino could have easily prevented Baggally from unsealing the
door by stating, for example, that such an action was upsetting the seance cabinet and
thus causing her harm.
7,4,5 Could an accomplice have left Baggally's room before the termination
of the seances?
Finally, an accomplice could have left the seance cabinet, and then Baggally's
room(s), via any of the access points outlined in section 7.4.2 (e.g., the door linking
Baggally's room to the hotel hall or a hidden ceiling panel). Alternatively, he/she
could have hidden in Baggally's room(s) (which neither the Report, nor additional
literature, mention searching after the seance) and waited until the doors were
unlocked/unbolted before making his exit. In addition, the Report makes no mention
of any of the investigators accompanying Palladino down the stairs of the hotel, and
thus does not report at what point in the evening Palladino met back up with her
husband.
7,5 DISCUSSION
This chapter first noted that a majority of the phenomena in the Report become
explicable if one assumes an accomplice could have gained access to the seance
cabinet. It was argued that this 'accomplice hypothesis' should therefore be taken
more seriously than it has been in the past.
The chapter then utilised some of the recommendations in chapter five in order to
carry out a detailed retrospective analysis of the Feilding Report. For example, as
recommended in sections 5.3.2.2 & 5.5.3, a number of sources (e.g., the Report
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itself, later descriptions of the investigation made by Feilding et al., the writings of
subsequent commentators on the Report etc.) were collected and examined98.
Second, where important (e.g., when assessing the floor plan presented in the
Report), access was gained to primary, as opposed to secondary, material. Third, all
sources of information were compared for completeness, and consistency. It was
discovered that the Report was badly flawed in a number of respects. The Report
does not describe any search being made of Baggally's room before the start of
seances. The controls enforced to prevent entry to this room were not described in
any great detail. The Report also failed to note that there were often large delays at
the start of the seances.
The Report contains a floor plan which is grossly inaccurate. The floor plan (and all
of the 43 seating plans) contained in the Report fail to show that the seance curtain
actually occluded part of the door which led from Baggally's room, into the seance
room. The floor plan also failed to note the presence of a dressing room between
Baggally's room and the hotel hall. The Report fails to mention taking any
precautions to prevent prior tampering with this door, or making any examination of
the door. The measurements of the seance cabinet given within the Report cannot be
correct. The Report fails to indicate the exact position of the seance curtain during
the seances. On only three occasions do the investigators report looking inside the
seance cabinet. On all three occasions an accomplice could have left the cabinet in
advance of these observations. The Report fails to note any search of Baggally's
room after the seances. It was argued that these errors allow for the possibility of an
accomplice moving in and out of the seance cabinet, from Baggally's room.
It may seem astonishing that the investigators did not give more information
concerning the possibility of an accomplice, especially since the investigators often
remarked that many of the phenomena appeared to be caused by an entity located
98It should be noted that, although this analysis examined the bulk of additional
published material, it is possible that some more obscure sources (e.g. the
investigator's private correspondence, or hotel plans) may still cast additional light on
the topic. It will be interesting to see if any additional sources act to further confirm,
or disconfirm, the 'accomplice hypothesis'.
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behind the curtain. For example, in the third seance, Carrington noted 'I can hear
noises in the cabinet as though something were moving softly about'. Whilst, in the
seventh seance, Baggally, describing a form emerging from the cabinet, remarks 'In
appearance it resembled an arm with a closed fist, covered by some black material',
and later in the same seance, noted 'the hand appeared to be a mans hand of a natural
colour'. In trying to understand why the investigators took the 'accomplice
hypothesis' so lightly, it is important to understand that, in the past, Palladino had not
been seriously accused of using such a methodology. As such, the investigators may
have become preoccupied with guarding against possible limb substitution (which she
had attempted both before, and during, the 1908 Naples seances) and this may have
caused them to view any other 'normal' explanation as implausible. It was exactly
this stratagem which was discussed in section 3.4. Of course it is possible that the
investigators did not lightly dismiss the accomplice hypothesis at all, but rather simply
chose not to report the various controls taken to counter the notion. Again, as noted
in section 4.5.4, the reporting of such studies needs to be complete, and extremely
accurate. As noted by Carrington (1909b):
I have no doubt whatever that every impartial investigator, who sits
with Eusapia, becomes convinced of the reality of at least some of the
phenomena; but all the world cannot obtain personal sittings. They
must judge by the printed reports; so long as that is the case, the
reports of the sittings must be made to read convincingly, (p. 156).
As such, this analysis has demonstrated the clear need for recommendations (of the
type outlined in chapter five) to help parapsychologists design, and report, research
in such a way that the opportunity for retrospective accusations of deception are
minimised.
If additional sources do not disconfirm the 'accomplice hypothesis', it is vital that a
thorough reassessment of the phenomena contained in the Feilding Report takes place
(taking into account both the 'accomplice', and all other possible 'fraud' hypotheses).
This may alter the evidential nature of the Report in a number of ways. First, it may
be that all of the phenomena become explicable, and thus the Report would no longer
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be evidential to the paranormal. Second, it may be that the Report will no longer be
seen as containing enough information about the phenomena (e.g. the exact position
of objects etc.) to assess whether or not they are explicable. Finally, such an analysis
may reveal that, although some of the phenomena can now be explained, others still
remain inexplicable. It this were the case, it would have important implications for
those researchers attempting to speculate on the nature of the paranormal ability which
may have been possessed by Palladino (e.g. Braude, 1986).
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Figure 7.1: The floor plan, as presented in the Feilding Report (Feilding,

















Complete levitstions of seance table. 34 3 3 45
Bnlgings and movements of curtains. 59 32 2 93
1 Occasions on which bulges of med¬
ium's dress occurred, - 4 2 — 3
Movements of objects within the
cabinet, 23 4 2 34
Movements of objects (other than
seance table) outside the cabinet. 41 3 7 51
Objects brought out of the cabinet, - 5 3 1 14
Plucking of the guitar string, - 1 — — 1
2Occasions on which sounds were
heard in the cabinet (including
sounds on tambourine, guitar.
etc.), 14 7 — 21
2Occasions on which sounds were
beard outside the cabinet, such
as knocks and scrapings on door.
raps on backs of chairs, etc., S 3 — 14
Loud sounds on seance table, syn¬
chronising with movements of
medium's head or foot. 7 — — 7
Touches by some object (hand ?)
through curtain, ... 20 9 2 28
Touches oy some object (hand ?)
outside the cabinet, ... 22 21 1 44
Occasions on which touches by some
object (hand?) were felt inside
the cabinet, .... — 1 — 1
Grasps and touches by a tangible hand
28through curtain, ... 19 7 —
Grasps and touches by a tangible hand
(not visible) outside the cabinet. 13 22 — 35
Hands seen which issued from and
retired into the cabinet. 3 -2 — 5
Objects seen of an indefinable nature
which issued from and retired
into the cabinet. - 16 9 3 28
Objects seen of an indefinable nature
in the cabinet, - - - - j 1 — — 1
Objects seen resembling heads which j i
issued from and retired into the j
cabinet, ..... 5 1 — 6
Lights seen in the cabinet, on the
curtain, and on medium's lap, - 5 o — 7
Untying of knots, ^ - — I — 1
Occasions on which currents of air
issued from medium's head, o — — o
305 144 21 470
'These do not give the actual number of bulges but the occasions on which
they occurred. Several bulges in succession are put down as one phenomenon.
2 The actual number of sounds is not given but the occasions on which they
were heard. A series of thumps on the tambourine struck in succession are
put down as one pheuomenon, etc.
Figure 7.2: A summary table ofphenomena, as presented in the Feilding Report



















Figure 7.4: The floor plan, as housed in the SPR archives.
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Photograph 7.1: A photograph of Palladino, and the corner of the seance room





The first part of this thesis outlined a cognitive proto-model which helped organise the
stratagems used by conjurors, and pseudo-psychics, to fabricate macro-PK. A small
part of this model was then subjected to experimental testing. The proto-model was
then used to create methodological recommendations for researchers engaged in the
assessment of individuals claiming macro-PK ability. Finally, these recommendations
were illustrated by two detailed assessments of such individuals.
This section will briefly outline the implications of the work presented in this thesis
and how future research could build upon it.
8.2 THE FURTHER CONSTRUCTION, AND EVALUATION- OF
DECEPTION MODELLING
Chapters two, and three, outlined a proto-model which accounted for the stratagems
used by conjurors, and pseudo-psychics, to fabricate macro-PK. Chapter two first
discussed how an observer may frame a demonstration as either a magic trick, a
pseudo-psychic hoax or a display of genuine macro-PK, with chapter three showing
how a pseudo-psychic may deceive an observer into misframing a fake demonstration
as genuine by manipulating the cognitive, motivational and social processes involved
in the framing process. Chapter two then outlined how an observer develops counter-
explanations for a demonstration, noting how such hypotheses depended upon the
observer's claim schemata, causal schemata and perceived adequacy of prior counter-
explanations. Chapter three outlined how both magicians, and pseudo-psychics, may
exploit these factors to deceive an observer into not forming the correct counter-
explanation. Chapter three also noted that even if the correct hypothesis is developed,
the observer may be deceived into rejecting it as implausible. Chapter two also
discussed how an observer may develop controls designed to counter the trickery
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predicted by the various counter-explanations. Chapter three presented the ways in
which an observer can be deceived into applying controls which are ineffective and/or
can be removed. Chapter two outlined how the assessment process can be influenced
by consideration of the conditions apparently needed to elicit psi. Chapter three
outlined how a fake claimant may, during an active analysis, manipulate these
conditions in order to be able to better deceive the observer. In a retrospective
analysis, such manipulation can persuade an observer to reject an unsuccessful
demonstration (i.e., one at which fake macro-PK could not be performed) as non-
evidential. Finally, chapter two noted how an observer assesses the running, and
outcome, of a demonstration. Chapter three noted how a fake claimant may be able
to exploit the running of a study, and 'explain away' evidence of fraud which might
be uncovered during, or after, a demonstration.
Chapter four then described one pilot study, and two formal experiments, concerned
with the effect that observers' belief in psi has on the observation, and recall, of
pseudo-psychic demonstrations. In all three studies, Ss were first shown a videotape
containing pseudo-psychic trickery, and then asked to rate the 'paranormal' content
of the videotape. In the pilot study and second experiment, Ss were then asked to
write down any explanations (either 'normal' or 'paranormal') which they believed
might account for the demonstrations. In all three studies, all Ss were then asked to
complete a set of recall questions. Ss were then told that the videotape contained
magic tricks, and asked to complete a second set of recall questions. The recall
questions referred to information that was either 'important' or 'unimportant' to the
methodology of the trickery. Five findings emerged. First, Goats rated the pseudo-
psychic demonstrations as less paranormal than Sheep. Second, Goats tended to be
better than Sheep at solving the pseudo-psychic trickery used in these demonstrations.
Third, the first recall period there was a tendency for Goats to recall more
'important', but not more 'unimportant', information than Sheep. Fourth, this
differential recall only occurred when a problem solving task was inserted between the
initial observation of the videotape, and the first recall period. Fifth, this differential
recall still appeared to be present in the second recall period, despite all of the Ss now
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knowing that the videotape contained trickery.
Future research could build upon this work in a number of ways.
First, the proto-model could be elaborated upon, such that it accounts for the
fabrication of ESP, as well as macro-PK. Given the ease with which many of the
recommendations, derived from the model, were used to assess the ESP claim of
SORRAT (see chapter six), this extension may not be especially problematic.
However, it should be noted that the SORRAT claim was quite idiosyncratic, having
features more common to many macro-PK, and opposed to ESP, claims.
Second, the thesis presented a general overview of the model. Future work could
build upon this structure by elaborating on various sections of the model. Such
elaboration could incorporate other areas of both cognitive, and social, psychological
research. For example, section 3.3.2.2 noted how an observers recall of a pseudo-
psychic demonstration may be biased by the use of 'verbal recapping'. The effect that
postevent verbal information can have on recall has been examined by researchers
interested in eyewitness testimony (e.g., Loftus, 1975, Loftus & Palmer, 1974,
Loftus, Miller & Burns, 1978). Wells & Turtle (1987) noted this research has
identified many factors which influence the extent to which misinformation is
incorporated into eyewitness reports. For example, Loftus at al. (1978) noted that
postevent information has a greater impact on observer's reports if it is administered
at a later time, rather than immediately following the original event. Also, Dristas
& Hamilton (1977) demonstrated that observer's recall for peripheral details of an
event are more susceptible to the effects of misinformation than are memories for
more salient components of the event. These findings could be incorporated into the
proto-model to help understand when, and how, fake claimants can distort an
observer's reconstruction of ostensible macro-PK by presenting misinformation in this
way. Section 3.3.2.2 noted how an observer's recall of a pseudo-psychic
demonstration may be biased by the use of 'in transit' actions. This aspect of the
model could be expanded upon by employing, and building upon, previous work on
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the recall of goal directed actions. For example, Lichtenstein & Brewer (1980) asked
Ss to watch, and then recall, a videotape which showed an actor carrying out two
everyday tasks (i.e., writing a letter, and setting up a projector). All of the actor's
actions had previously been segmented, and classified as either 'goal', or 'non-goal'
directed. For example, in one sequence, the actor opened a desk drawer, removed
a pen, took the cap off of the pen and signed a letter. Here, the first three actions
were classified as 'non-goal' directed, as they were performed in order to achieve the
fourth ('goal' directed) action. Lichtenstein & Brewer discovered that Ss recall for
'goal' directed actions was significantly better then their recall of 'non-goal' directed
actions. These findings, along with the theory suggested by Lichtenstein & Brewer
to account for the result, could be used to elaborate upon how fake claimants can use
'in transit' actions to bias an observer's recall. Other parts of the model could benefit
from findings, and theory, within social psychology. For example, a great deal of
research has attempted to identify the psychological, and physical, attributes which
help a communicator be an effective persuader (see, e.g., the seminal work of
Hovland, Janis & Kelley, 1953). This work could be used to elaborate on section
2.2.2.3, which was concerned with the way in which a pseudo-psychic used
interpersonal influence to coerce an observer into misframing a fake demonstration as
genuine. In addition, the model could be elaborated upon by including novel types
of bias suggested by this type of psychological research. For example, Lichtenstein
& Brewer (1980) also discovered that Ss often altered the sequence of events during
recall, such that they did not adhere to the order in which they occurred on the
videotape (e.g., the actor removing an envelope from a draw before signing the
letter), but rather the order in which they usually occur in everyday situations (e.g.,
the actor removing an envelope from a draw after signing the letter). Other sections
of the model may not have been the subject of previous research and, if this is the
case, work into these areas may have to be more exploratory.
Third, only one small part of the proto-model underwent any type of formal testing
(see chapter four). The remainder of the model remains speculative. Future work
could redress this balance by testing additional sections of the model, and modifying
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the model on the basis of the results of such testing. As noted in chapter four, some
of this additional testing could utilise the methodology developed in that chapter, as
it provides researchers with a flexible, straightforward, and easy to apply, way of
accurately assessing various issues involved in the recall of complex material. This
methodology could be used to examine the observation, and recall, of other types of
ostensible psychic events (e.g., psychic surgery), and by different types of observers
(e.g., parapsychologists who have observed a large number of ostensibly psychic
demonstrations, magicians). Also, such studies could be compare the recall of 'live',
as opposed to videotaped, demonstrations. The testing, and development, of other
parts of the model may require methods associated more with social psychology. For
example, many studies have examined the way in which the presence of others can
influence an observer's perception of a stimuli (see, e.g., Sherifs [1936] now classic
studies concerned with the so-called 'autokinetic' effect). Similar studies could
compare observers' perception/recall of an ostensible macro-PK demonstration both
with, and without, the influence of other individuals. For example, such studies could
\A
examine how an observer's perception/recall can be modified by being,the presence
of others who either strongly believe, or disbelieve, the validity of a supposedly
psychic demonstration (as would be the case, for example, when the observer attends
a seance, and is surrounded by a number of other sitters).
Such elaboration, and testing, may have advantages for both parapsychology, and
cognitive psychology. For parapsychologists, a more detailed understanding of the
stratagems of psychic fraud may help develop further recommendations for the
assessment of psychic claimants (see section 8.3 below). For cognitive psychology,
research into certain sections of the model may reveal novel types of bias and, like
the study of optical illusions (e.g. Coren & Girgus, 1978), and judgements under
uncertainty (Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1982), provide important new insight into
the weaknesses of human information processing. Also, the further analysis of
psychic fraud may allow cognitive psychologists to undertake research into novel areas
of enquiry which are recognised as important but, up to this point in time, have
proved problematic to investigate. For example, Norman (1980), in his discussion
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of new directions which should be taken by cognitive psychologists, lists the
investigation of belief systems as one of 'a core group of issues along which we must
proceed if our field is to make substantive progress. Clearly, an examination of
psychic fraud may prove helpful to such an endeavour, given that pseudo-psychics
frequently manipulate, and exploit, an observer's belief system. Finally, various
writers (e.g., Rumelhart, 1980, Thorndyke & Yekovich, 1980), have noted that
schema theories are often phrased in very general terms. This, in turn, makes the
formulation, and testing, of specific hypotheses problematic. To help overcome this
problem, Thorndyke (1984) has recommended that theorists apply schema theory to
'real world' problem areas involving cognition. The application of schema theory to
the study of conjuring, and psychic fraud, could further help develop, and sharpen,
the schema concept for use within cognitive psychology.
Fourth, the methodology used in this thesis to model the stratagems of conjuring, and
psychic fraud, could be applied to help understand other areas of human deception.
These areas could include: military operations, confidence games, corporate fraud,
white collar fraud, scientific fraud, gambling scams, hoaxing, and deception within
the intelligence and security services. The modelling of these types of deception may
benefit from, and have relevance to, parapsychology. For example, further
understanding of experimenter fraud within mainstream science (see Broad & Wade,
1982) may be aided by the study of examples within parapsychology (e.g. the Levy
exposure [see, e.g., Rogo, 1985]), and the lessons learnt may minimise the likelihood
of parapsychologists successfully engaging in such behaviour, or being unfairly
accused of so doing.
Finally, as noted in the introduction of this thesis, some writers have postulated that
it is possible to model the underlying principles of human deception. The stratagems
of conjuring, and psychic fraud, identified in this thesis, may help in the construction
of this general theory of deception. Indeed, there is reason to be optimistic about
such a theory, given that there is a certain amount of overlap between the stratagems
of conjuring and psychic fraud described in this thesis, and the principles of deception
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already identified in the two other areas of deception which have received most
attention from theorists, namely: military deception and confidence games. For
example, in the same way that pseudo-psychics deceive observers into misfiraming a
faked psychic demonstration as genuine (see section 3.2), so confidence artists ensure
that their 'marks'99 misframe a scam as a genuine money making scheme (see, e.g.,
Hankiss, 1980). Likewise, military deception planners also wish their targets to
misframe a false manoeuvre as a genuine military operation (see, e.g., Daniel &
Herbig, 1982). Further, in agreement with section 3.2, such mis-framing is achieved
by the exploitation of motivational, cognitive and social factors. Hankiss notes that
all con games involve some form of 'bait'100 which acts to motivate the mark into
wanting to believe the scheme genuine. Likewise, when discussing the creation of
deceptive military operations, Moose (1982) advises planners to 'stimulate actions on
the part of the target that are congruent with the target's goals', thus increasing the
likelihood of the target wanting to believe the operation genuine. For example, a
military planner may be aware that the enemy wishes to take control of a certain
bridge. If this is the case, the planner may purposely invest, but conceal, a large
amount of resources defending this bridge. Such concealment exploits the enemy's
goals by encouraging them to attack the bridge with insufficient force. Hankiss has
described the various social stratagems which cause a mark to trust the con man. For
example, Hankiss notes how the skilled con artist may select marks who would not
wish to voice distrust of another individual, in part, because they would find it
socially embarrassing to do so101. Also, both confidence artists, and military
deception planners, try to make their trickery seem as plausible as possible. Thus,
Leff (1976) has noted how con men construct plausible scams by ensuring that both
con man, and mark, appear to need each other for either of them to profit from the
"The term 'mark' refers to the victim, or intended victim, of a con (see Maurer,
1974, p. 281).
100The 'bait' is the sum of money which the mark apparently stands to gain if he
becomes involved in the confidence game.
101Hankiss (1980, p. 110) refers to this as the 'sensitive plant syndrome'.
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scheme. Also, many writers on military deception note that most successful
deceptions appear, to the enemy, to be plausible because they reenforce the enemy's
predispositions (see, e.g., Daniel & Herbig, 1982, Handel, 1987). For example,
towards the end of WWII, the German High Command believed that the most
plausible place for an Allied attack was Pas de Calais. The Allies exploited this belief
by mounting OPERATION FORTITUDE, which provided misinformation supporting
such an attack, and, at the same time, concealed the locations of the actual invasion
(see Dewar, 1989). Also, section 3.4 noted that a fake claimant may deceive an
observer into rejecting the correct counter-explanation as implausible by incorrectly
estimating the claimant's fraud capability, or rejecting the hypothesis because it
seemed too obvious. Both of these stratagems are commonly used by military
deceivers. For example, Daniel & Herbig (1982) note that some planners were
manipulated into erroneously rejecting the notion of an enemy carrying out a certain
action, because they were deceived into believing that their opponents did not have
the capability to mount such an operation. Also, Dewar (1989) notes how the 'double
bluff has been used during some military campaigns. Section 3.4. also noted the
importance of fake claimants being able to adapt their trickery to changing
circumstances, especially on the basis of feedback from the observer. Again, this
stratagem has already been identified in both military deceptions, and confidence
games. For example, Daniel and Herbig (1982) note the importance of obtaining
feedback relating to the success of an ongoing military deception, and further note that
one characteristic of the most effective deceptions is their ability to adapt to changing
circumstances. When discussing confidence games, Hankiss describes a similar
attribute, noting:
An able con artist almost immediately ascertains the kind of role a
victim will be attracted to (likes being patronised or giving orders, is
naive or a know-it-all, etc.), and the con artist adopts the
complementary role with all its trappings, both in appearance and
behaviour, (p. 111).
Section 3.6 noted how a pseudo-psychic may have an 'out' to account for why he/she
failed to produce genuine psychic phenomena during a demonstration. Likewise, con
men have a number of 'outs' to account for why an apparent money making scheme
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has lost the mark an (often considerable) amount of money. The use of these outs are
referred to as 'cooling off the mark (Goffman, 1952, Maurer, 1974). For example,
the con man might inform the mark he has a good tip for a horse race, telling him to
place his money on a certain horse. The mark then bets that horse to win and, if it
comes either second or third, the con man states that there was a misunderstanding
concerning the term 'place'102. As illustrated by this, albeit brief, review, there does
appear to be a certain amount of overlap between the stratagems of conjuring and
psychic fraud outlined in this thesis, and the principles of deception already identified
within military deception and confidence games. Such an overlap implies that a
general theory of deception may be possible, and appears to be a promising area for
future research.
8.3 THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT. AND APPLICATION. OF
METHODOLOGICAL RECOMMENDATIONS
Chapter five outlined many recommendations for researchers wishing to investigate
individuals claiming macro-PK ability. Chapter six then illustrated how these
recommendations could be used during an active investigation, describing a recent^
assessment of psychic claims made by the SORRAT. Chapter seven then illustrated
how the recommendations could be used to analyze a past investigation, describing a
reassessment of the 1908 Naples investigation into Eusapia Palladino.
Future work in this area could take a number of directions.
First, the assessment of SORRAT demonstrated that the recommendations could also
help the testing, and reporting, of present day claimants. Parapsychologists could
employ, and expand upon, these recommendations when assessing present day
claimants. In addition, the recommendations could be used by a variety of
investigators interested in assessing psychic claimants operating in a diverse range of
'real world' settings (e.g., faith healers, physical mediums, and cult leaders who
I02In British horse racing parlance, the term 'place' refers to a type of bet which
pays out if the horse comes either first, second or third.
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claim macro-PK ability).
Second, future research could use the recommendations to reassess other well
documented examples of ostensible macro-PK which have apparently occurred in the
past. The usefulness of such archival research need not be confined to evaluating the
validity of psychic ability. Instead, the methodology of such investigations can be
studied, in order that present day researchers can learn from the mistakes made, and
knowledge possessed, by their predecessors.
Finally, the recommendations presented in chapter five were more conceptual than
pragmatic. Thus the chapter identified general suggestions to minimise subject fraud,
as opposed to describing detailed procedures by which these suggestions could be
implemented. Future research could concentrate on constructing more specific
procedures, and methods, by which with these general ideas can be executed. In
addition, the recommendations required researchers to have a relatively large amount
of control over the running of their studies, and thus applied more to laboratory, as
opposed to field, investigations. Future research could concentrate on developing
analogous recommendations for the testing of psychic claimants in field settings.
Finally, the recommendations could be disseminated through the parapsychological
community, perhaps in the form of a training manual, or expert system (see Morris,
1986b). Such a manual (based upon the work presented in chapter five) is currently
being produced by the author, jointly funded by the John Bjorkhem Memorial Fund
and the Koestler Chair of Parapsychology.
234
APPENDIX A
Literature search within the conjuring, and pseudo-psychic,
communities (Chapter one).
Introduction
A large amount of literature, relating to the stratagems of conjuring and psychic fraud
have been produced by, and for, magicians and pseudo-psychics. This information
often takes the form of specialised books, pamphlets, and magazines, which are
intended for relatively small groups of potential deceivers. This literature is, for the
most part, not well organised and could not be searched in a systematic manner.
However, the following searches were undertaken.
Books
A number of authors have produced bibliographies of the magic, and pseudo-psychic,
literature. Gill (1976) contains information on many of the more well known works
on conjuring, presenting a brief overview of each title mentioned. Weibel (1980) has
compiled a bibliography of articles relating specifically to conjuring and psychology.
More recently, Coleman (1987) has presented a reference guide to various aspects of
conjuring, including the psychology of conjuring. Finally, Whaley (1989) has
produced a massive two volume work which details publications which have used
various words of magic jargon. All of these works were searched for relevant
literature. In addition, the catalogues, produced by various magic, and pseudo-
psychic, book dealers were searched. These included publications by; Magic Books
by Post, The Supreme Magic Company, Goodliffe Publications Ltd, Martin Breese,
Lee Jacobs, and Jeff Busby.
Periodicals
Alfredson & Dailey (1986) have noted that there have been approximately 1,250
magic, and pseudo-psychic, periodicals published within the period 1791-1983. Many
of the articles (i.e. up to, and including, 1967) contained in these publications have
been catalogued, by subject, in The Master Index to Magic In Print' (Potter &
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Hades, 1967). In addition, many individual magazines (namely, Abracadabra, The
Magic Circular, Invocation, Seance, Magik) have produced subject indexes of their
own articles. Both the Potter Index, and individual magazine indexes, were searched
for relevant material.
Additional searches
In addition to the above sources, I also wrote a Guest Editorial for the weekly magic
magazine Abracadabra (number 2254) asking for individuals, interested in the
psychology of magic and psychic fraud, to contact me. I also lectured on the
relevance of psychology to parapsychology, and conjuring, at the Magic Castle,
Hollywood. Finally, I corresponded with, and/or interviewed, a number of
magicians, and pseudo-psychics, who were knowledgable in this field. These
individuals included; Richard Weibel, David Berglas, Malcolm Davison, Sam Sharpe,
Max Maven, T A Waters, Roy Scott, and Charles Cameron.
Obtaining references
Some of the references were located via the Edinburgh University Inter-Library Loans
Service, the National Library of Scotland, the Edinburgh Public Library and the
British Library. Other literature was obtained through The Magic Castle Library, the
Harry Price Library and the private libraries of Rex Cooper, Roy Scott, Dan Mayers,
Eddie Dawes, and Nikunj Somia.
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APPENDIX B
Belief in the Paranormal Questionnaire (BPQ)
The six questions of the 'Belief in the Paranormal Questionnaire' (BPQ) are
reproduced below.
1) Do you think that some people are able to gain, by paranormal means, access to
information being thought of by others?
2) Do you think that some people are able to gain, by paranormal means, access to
information that nobody else is aware of at the time (e.g. the order of a shuffled deck
of cards)?
3) Do you think that some people can, by paranormal means, know what is going to
happen in the future?
4) Do you think that some people can influence a frequently occurring event (e.g. a
number of rolls of dice) such the outcome of that event deviates away from chance
(e.g. the dice show more or less 'sixes' than would be predicted by chance alone)?
5) Do you think that some people can, just by mental effort, apply a noticeable force
to an object?
6) Do you think that some people can, just by mental effort, alter the physical
characteristics of the material from which an object is made?
Ss responded to each of the questions on a five point scale, depending on the degree
to which they felt the answer to be yes or no. Before the above study, the
questionnaire was run on 122 Ss and the inter-question correlations shown in Table
A.l.
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3 .22 .21 1
4 .47 .50 .23 1
5 .48 .55 .22 .41 1
6 .46 .53 .19 .44 .73 1




A brief description of pseudo-psychic demonstrations used in Pilot Study 1
and Experiment 1 (Chapter Four)
Key bending
In the first demonstration, the magician chose two items from a pile of keys. The
interviewer was asked to concentrate on bending the keys. After a short period the
keys remained unbent. The magician picked up one of the keys and apparently placed
it into the interviewer's hand. After another short period the key was removed from
his hand and shown to be bent.
Divination of ESP cards
In the second demonstration, the interviewer mixed up some ESP cards. The magician
placed the cards under the table, and then returned them to the interviewer. The
interviewer was then instructed to hold the cards under the table and cut them as many
times as he liked. The magician then incorrectly guessed the first card and correctly
divined the following three cards.
Fork bending/breaking
In the third demonstration, both the magician and interviewer chose one fork each
from a pile of cutlery. One of the forks was returned to the pile of cutlery. The
magician carefully stroked the neck of the remaining fork, whereupon it started to
bend, and eventually broke.
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APPENDIX D
Marking procedure for the problem solving task used in Pilot
Study 1 (Chapter Four)
One mark was awarded for each of the 'main principles' explicitly stated in Ss
protocols, an additional half-mark was awarded for each further detail mentioned.
Key bending
Main Principle
Magician switched the keys
Details
Magician may have already had another pre-bent key.
The pre-bent key rested on the magicians lap.
Magician chose the key from the pile himself.
The magician switched keys as he apparently placed the key into the interviewers
hand.
Divination of ESP cards
Main Principle
The magician knew the order of the cards.
Details
The magician had another pack in a prearranged order.
The prearranged pack rested in the magicians lap.
The magician switched packs under the table.
The interviewers cutting of the cards did not disturb the order of the cards.






The magician had prestressed a fork before the demonstration.
The prestressed fork was hidden under the pad on the table.
The magician loaded the prestressed fork onto the pile of cutlery when he move the
pad.
The magician chose which fork should be used in the demonstration.
The magician handled the fork as it bent and broke.
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APPENDIX E
Recall questions used in Pilot Study 1 and Experiment 1 (Chapter Four)
'I' denotes an 'important' question.
'U' denotes an 'unimportant' question.
First Set
1) Key bending
a) Three keys were initially chosen from the large pile of keys. (U).
b) Nick Dowdes chose the key that was eventually bent. (I).
c) When being touched by Nick Dowdes during this demonstration, the chosen key
was always in view on the video tape. (I).
d) After the demonstration, the key was placed aside by Nick Dowdes. (U).
2) Divination of ESP Cards
a) Up to this demonstration, the ESP cards were always in view on the video tape.
(U).
b) When being touched by Nick Dowdes, the ESP cards were always in view on the
video tape. (I).
c) Nick Dowdes incorrectly guessed the first of the ESP cards. (I).
d) After the demonstration, the cards were held onto by the interviewer. (U).
3) The broken fork
a) The cutlery was touched by Nick Dowdes before the fork demonstration began. (I).
b) At the start of the demonstration, three forks were initially chosen from the pile of
cutlery. (U).
c) Nick Dowdes returned the unbent cutlery to the pile. (U).





a) During the whole of this demonstration, the remaining pile of keys were always in
view on the videotape. (U).
b) Nick Dowdes picked up the chosen key and placed it into the interviewers hand.
(I).
c) The chosen key was definitely bent when the interviewer opened his hand. (U).
d) The chosen key continued to bend after it was removed from the interviewers hand.
(I).
2) Divination of ESP cards.
a) After the ESP cards were initially removed from the box and displayed, the cards
were shuffled by the interviewer. (U).
b) The interviewer was then instructed by Nick Dowdes to hold the cards under the
table and again thoroughly mix them up. (I).
c) Nick Dowdes saw the face of each card after attempting to guess the geometrical
design on that face. (I).
d) After Nick Dowdes had made his guesses the faces of the rest of the cards were
not shown on the video tape. (U).
3) Bending the fork
a) The interviewer chose the fork that was eventually bent. (I).
b) The pile of cutlery was touched by Nick Dowdes during the fork demonstration.
(U).
c) The region in which the fork broke was previously being held by Nick Dowdes.
(I).




A description of pseudo-ESP demonstrations used in Experiment 2 (Chapter
Four)
Demonstration 1
A deck of cards was shuffled by the magician. The magician instructed the
interviewer to cut the cards, and the cut was 'marked' by the magician placing the top
half of the deck at right angles to the bottom half. The magician picked up a writing
pad and tore off two sheets of paper. The interviewer looked at the 'selected' card,
and secretly noted its value on his sheet of paper. The magician then picked up his
sheet of paper and noted the value of a card. When the interviewer, and magician,
compared papers it was seen that the same card had been written on each.
Demonstration 2
A deck of cards was shuffled by the interviewer. The interviewer cut the cards and
'marked' the cut in the manner described above. The magician then gave the pad to
the interviewer, and asked him to write down the value of the selected card. Once
the interviewer had done this, the magician asked him to remove this piece of paper
from the pad and place it out of sight. The magician then took the pad, removed a
piece of paper, and correctly noted down the value of the selected card.
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APPENDIX G
Marking procedure for the problem solving task used in Experiment 2
(Chapter Four)
One mark was awarded for each of the 'main principles' explicitly stated in Ss
protocols, an additional half-mark was awarded for each further detail mentioned.
Demonstration 1
Main principle
The magician 'forced' the interviewer to take a certain card.
Details
The magician shuffled the deck, and looked at the top card.
The magician incorrectly 'marked' the cut by placing the bottom half of the deck on
top of the top half of the deck.
Demonstration 2
Main Principle
The magician could see the impression left on the pad by the interviewer.
Details
The interviewer leant on the pad to draw his design.
The magician looked at the pad after the interviewer had drawn his design.
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APPENDIX H
Recall questions used in Experiment 2 (Chapter Four)
'I' denotes 'important' questions.
'U' denotes 'unimportant' questions.
'PI' denotes 'pseudo-important' questions.
First Set
1) Key bending
a) In one of the four video clips, Nick Dowdes placed a writing pad on the pile of
keys. (PI).
b) The interviewer initially chose one of the two keys taken from the pile of keys on
the table. (U).
c) During this demonstration, both of Nick Dowdes hands were always fully visible
on the videotape. (I).
2) First telepathy demonstration
(target card; the 2 of clubs)
a) At the start of the demonstration, the interviewer picked the cards up off of the
table. (U).
b) Nick Dowdes did not touch the cards directly after the interviewer had cut them
into two piles. (I).
c) Whilst drawing his design, the interviewer held both the piece of paper and writing
pad under the table. (PI).
3) Fork bending/breaking
a) At one point during this demonstration, the fork which eventually bent was fully
obscured (i.e not visible) on the videotape. (PI).
b) Nick Dowdes was touching the fork when claiming that it was bending. (I).
c) Right at the end of the demonstration, Nick Dowdes was left holding the broken
pieces of fork. (U).
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4) Second telepathy demonstration
(target card; the 8 of diamonds)
a) At the start of the demonstration the interviewer shuffled the deck of cards. (PI).
b) Both of the pieces of paper (on which the interviewer and Nick Dowdes draw their
designs) were removed from the writing pad at the same time. (I).




a) At one point during this demonstration, the key which eventually bent was fully
obscured (i.e. not visible) on the video tape. (I).
b) Nick Dowdes was touching the key when claiming that it was bending. (PI).
c) Right at the end of the demonstration, Nick Dowdes was left holding the bent key.
(U).
2) First telepathy demonstration
(target card; the 2 of clubs)
a) At the start of the demonstration the interviewer shuffled the deck of cards. (I).
b) Both of the pieces of paper (on which the interviewer and Nick Dowdes draw their
designs) were removed from the writing pad at the same time. (PI).
c) During the demonstration, Nick Dowdes moved the cards off of the mat and onto
the table. (U).
3) Fork bending/breaking
a) In one of the four video clips, placed a writing pad on the pile of cutlery. (I).
b) The interviewer initially chose one of the two forks taken from the pile of cutlery
on the table. (U).
c) During this demonstration, both of Nick Dowdes hands were always fully visible
on the videotape. (PI).
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4) Second telepathy demonstration
(target card; the 8 of diamonds)
a) At the start of the demonstration, the interviewer picked the cards up off of the
table. (U).
b) Nick Dowdes did not touch the cards directly after the interviewer had cut them
into two piles. (PI).
c) Whilst drawing his design, the interviewer held both the piece of paper and the
writing pad under the table. (I).
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APPENDIX I
Experimental Conditions initially sent to the SORRAT (Chapter six)
We (John and myself) will supply a package containing one standard deck of 25 ESP
cards, sealed with any materials, and processes, of our choosing.
Before the package is dispatched to you, details of the precise sealing procedure will
be recorded (by John and myself), and remain at Edinburgh University.
After sealing the package, we will place a sticker on the outside of it. This sticker
will state that, should the package be found, it should not be opened, but mailed
directly back to Edinburgh University. The outside of the package will also indicate
which way the ESP cards are facing.
This package will then be placed inside an envelope and will be mailed, by registered
post, to yourself. Upon receipt of this envelope, you should open the envelope, and
check that the outside of the package shows no obvious sign of damage caused in
transit. Should the package show any serious signs of damage, or tampering, please
return the package to ourselves, whereupon this experiment will be aborted, and,
possibly, arrangements made, for a second experiment to begin. If the package shows
no such sign of serious damage, you should pass it onto the claimant.
The claimant is free to touch or hold the package in any manner that he feels
necessary, but is not to try and open, or interfere, with it's covering, or seals.
The claimant is to complete a 'call sheet' (which will be sent with the package)
consisting of twenty five sets of the five ESP symbols, each set corresponding to a
position in the ESP deck. The claimant is to circle one of the symbols in each set,
indicating the claimants call for the card in that position of the deck. This procedure
is designed to eliminate any ambiguity about the identity of each call.
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Once the claimant has returned the package, it must be returned to us, by registered
mail, along with the call sheet.
The package must be returned, to us, within two months of our posting it to you,
otherwise the experiment will be called off. Upon receipt of the package, we may
have the package examined (for signs of damage, or tampering) in any way that we
feel necessary.
During examination, the package will be opened and a comparison made between the
call sheet and the order of the respective ESP deck.
Should any response on the call sheet be missing, or ambiguous, that call will be
counted as a miss.
In order for a single call to be considered a 'hit' the call must exactly match the
symbol on the face of the card at the relevant position in the deck.
In order that the test be considered successful, the claimant must score 15, or more,
direct hits.
Once the results are known, John and I will then prepare a full report, describing, in
general terms, the security precautions used in the package, along with the results of
the examination/judging procedures. It should be noted that, should the claimant be
successful in this experiment (i.e. he manages to produce 15, or more, hits, and the
package shows no sign of damage, or tampering), we would include in our report a
statement that we are impressed by the results, that we have no ready conventional
explanation for the results and that we feel further research is warranted. However,
we will not issue any statement to the effect that we believe the claimant to have
'psychic' ability.
After receiving this report you will be asked if you wish to write up the experiment
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for either publication, or private circulation. If you decide to write-up the
experiment, the above report must be reproduced as part of that write up. The report
may not be omitted, paraphrased, or shortened in any manner without written
permission from either John, or myself. We reserve the right to both publish, or
circulate, a write up of the experiment in whatever manner we feel appropriate,
incorporating the full contents of the report.
Both during, and after, the testing, all packaging remains the property of Edinburgh
University.
We, the undersigned, fully accept all of the above experimental conditions.
Ed Cox Tom Richards
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APPENDIX J
The actual card order, and the two sets of 'entity' calls, for each position in
the pilot ESP deck [hits shown in bold] (Chapter six)
Position Number Actual Symbol First attempt Second
attempt
1 Circle Square Lines
2 Cross Star Lines
3 Lines Star Circle
4 Lines Circle Square
5 Cross Lines Square
6 Lines Cross Star
7 Lines Circle Cross
8 Star Square Circle
9 Square Star Cross
10 Square Square Square
11 Circle Star Lines
12 Star Cross Square
13 Star Cross Star
14 Cross Circle Star
15 Square Circle Circle
16 Circle Lines Cross
17 Circle Square Star
18 Cross Square Star
19 Square Circle Cross
20 Cross Cross Circle
21 Circle Star Circle
22 Star Lines Square
23 Lines Lines Lines
24 Star Lines Cross
25 Square Blank Lines
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APPENDIX K
A copy of the actual card order, and calls, for each position in the ESP deck
used in the formal experiment [hits shown in bold] (Chapter six).
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